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Editorial

Dalam edisi kali ini Jurnal Studi Diplomasi dan Keamanan (JSDK) hadir dengan delapan artikel. Artikel pertama adalah Women on The Gun, Gender in The Armed Forces: Study on Women Condition in The Armed Forces of Indonesia and Germany oleh Fitri Bintang Timur. Dalam artikel ini penulis membahas mengenai peran dan problematika perempuan dalam angkatan bersenjata dengan melakukan perbandingan antara kasus di Indonesia dengan kasus di Jerman.

Artikel kedua Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) dalam Bantuan Kemanusiaan ((Studi Kasus Masa Tanggap Darurat Letusan G. Merapi 2010) oleh Sundoro Agung Nugroho yang menunjukkan bagaimana koordinasi militer-sipil yang efektif dalam kasus bantuan kemanusiaan di wilayah bencana Gunung Merapi tahun 2010.

Artikel selanjutnya adalah Middle Class, Religious Rituals, and Democracy in India oleh June Cahyaningtyas. Dalam tulisan ini penulis menunjukkan adanya saling hubungan antara meningkatnya jumlah kelas menengah, tingkat relijuisitas dan demokrasi di India. Meski secara teoritik hubungan antara kelas menegah, tingkat konsumerisme dan kesejahteraan mendukung munculnya konsumerisme. Kasus India menujukkan bahwa jumlah kelas menengah yang terus membesar tidak mampu mengurangi tingkat ketimpangan ekonomi, sehingga gagal mendukung munculnya demokrasi yang stabil. Kelas menengah yang besar dan ritual keagaamaan terus melanggengkan ketimpangan ekonomi.

Di artikel keempat oleh Denik Iswardani Witarti yang berjudul Penyelundupan Senjata Api: Isu Keamanan Perbatasan Indonesia ditunjukkan bagaimana bagaimana jalur proses dan mekanisme penyelundupan senjata api di wilayah perbatasan. Selanjutnya Artikel kelima The Peace Process in Mindanau Conflict: Its Dynamics and Prospects oleh Aryanta Nugraha & Ahmad Fuad Fanani. Dalam artikel ini dipaprkan mengenai proses tercapainya perdamaian di Mindanau selatan dan berbagai dinamika dan persoalan yang mungkin muncul dari proses tersebut.

Di artikel Selanjutnya, Fredy Oki berpendapat bahwa AOA memiliki dampak yang siginifkan terhadap kondisi keamanan pangan di Indonesia. Apabila pemerintah tidak mempersiapkan kebijakan yang komprehensif dalam bidang pertanian maka akan keikutsertaan Indonesia dalam liberalisasi pangan dunia justru akan berdampak kontra produktif.

Artikel ketujuh Learning from Venezuela under Hugo Chaves oleh Desy Nur Aini menunjukkan berbagai langkah kebijakan yang dilakukan oleh Hugo Chaves di Venezuela untuk megembangkan kemandirian ekonomi-politik. Dengan menggunakan perspektif dependencia, penulis melihat ada upaya yang sangat kuat dari Chaves untuk melepaskan diri dari jerat ketergantungan sistem internasional yang didominasi oleh kekuatan ekonomi-politik Barat.

Edisi kali ini ditutup oleh Tulisan Mujahidudin dengan artikel mengenai konflik politik di Thailand Selatan. Penulis berpendapat bahwa konflik yang meletus di Thailand Selatan di era Thaksin, sebenarnya adalah dampak dari konflik elit di Bangkok.

Demikian pengantar dari redaksi, Akhir kata redaksi mengucapkan selamat membaca.

EDITOR

WOMEN ON THE GUN, GENDER IN THE ARMED FORCES:
STUDY ON WOMEN CONDITION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF INDONESIA AND GERMANY

Fitri Bintang Timur[1]

Abstract

This paper discusses how is the current feminist studies see the development of women in the armed forces in democratic countries. It will describe which conditions women are able to gain entry and obtain the same access and promotional ranking level as their male cohorts. The background of democratic society is taken as general prescriptive requirement since it values women equal rights to men, despite the acceptance of women voters in general election was just started in the late 19th century. The focus of the discourse brought up in this writing is whether or not the level of democracy affects women condition in the armed forces, especially to gain entry to the combat roles. The study is done toward the women condition in the democratic states' armed forces with specific preference of Indonesia and Germany as the locations where the research was conducted. German's armed forces, along with several other countries such as the UK, US, New Zealand, Canada, and Israel allow women to fill combat position. Indonesia, in the other place, does not allow women enter active combat roles. The aim of this paper is to see what conditions allow Germany to conduct improvement for women in its military and compared them with the conditions of Indonesia. The conditions will be observed in the level of feminist thought that evolved; the legal framework of national, regional and international; the implementation in the field; and the society in general.

Keywords: *Women in Military, Feminism, Democracy, Germany, Indonesia.*

Introduction

There are several debates on women roles in the security sectors. These debates are not only done by people that prefer to limit the involvement of women in the armed forces, but also by feminists themselves. In traditionalist point of view, women are excluded from warrior roles, moreover from the decision making of war. Feminist strand associated with pacifist even directly stated that women position is making peace, and not to be involved in war, for example Sara Ruddick and Jean Elshtain. This way of thinking is behind movements such as *Seneca Falls Peace Encampment* and *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* which are against women conscription in the military.

Other feminist perspective sees women being mostly the victim of conflict,

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as the object of raped or the mothers of soldiers that are killed. This view was held by feminists such as Megan Bastick and Karen Grimm. This line of thought shaped the women survival movements such as *Las Mujeres de la Plaza de Mayo* that made monthly demonstration in Buenos Aires for their sons that were kidnapped by the government because they had been considered too political.

There are also feminists who believed that direct involvement in the military is part of citizenship rights and there are supports needed by women in the armed forces to conduct their works in good and conducive environment, which in situation of equal rights with their male colleagues. This line of thinking is addressed by Clara Lovett and Barton Hacker, and supported by organization such as *Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute* in the United States (US).

Feminists need not to say the same thing in unison to reclaim they fight for the same cause of women oppression. These divergence thoughts are responds for different needs and suffering, in the time and place they belong to, which makes each feminist strand fights in their own way to make better situation for women. Nevertheless, it is interesting to conduct research on how is the current feminist studies see the development of women in the armed forces in democratic countries. It is also important to see in which conditions women are able to gain entry and obtain the same access and promotional ranking level as their male cohorts. The background of democratic society is taken as general prescriptive requirement since it values women equal rights to men, despite the acceptance of women voters in general election was just started in the late 19th century. The focus of the discourse brought up in this writing is whether or not the level

of democracy affects women condition in the armed forces, especially to gain entry to the combat roles. The study is done toward the women condition in the democratic states' armed forces with specific preference of Indonesia and Germany as the locations where the research was conducted. German's armed forces, along with several other countries such as the UK, US, New Zealand, Canada, and Israel allow women to fill combat position. Indonesia, in the other place, does not allow women enter active combat roles.

Before, in the era of independence movement, Indonesian women were actively involved in open conflict. There were women national heroes that had active roles in combat level such as Christina Marthatiahanu and Cut Nyak Dien which had fought bravely. Despite the folklore of women greatness in Indonesian past, the condition of women in the armed forces is still lagging behind their male colleagues. Their roles are also limited in supporting roles, such as administrative and secretary. This is because of the doctrine of *state ibuism* that was grown by the New Order regime (1966-1998) to cut off women active roles which in the previous President Soekarno era that had been seen to be affiliated with communism (Wieringa, 1985). The biggest women organization in Indonesia after its independence is Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesia Women Movement) that was the under Indonesia Communist Party PKI. This movement received backlash and banning with its member killed or missing. Women therefore must play the role as 'mother of the state' which run domestic roles and set up good example for children, not to actively engage outside the house. Ironically, in this time frame Indonesia ratified Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (State Law No.7/1984). *Reformasi* era after

the fall of Soeharto authoritarian regime in 1998 brought wind of changes, yet until now there have been no significant policy changes for women in the armed forces.

Changes of women condition is also experienced by German although it leads to different direction. In the world war era women were encouraged to give birth to as many soldiers as they can. They also play the supporting roles for cooking and cleaning of the combatants. But in the end of WW II, women troops were deployed in the battle field. After the war ended and the *Bundeswehr* (German's Armed Forces) created in 1955, the policy became more conservative and women were discharged from combat function. In East Germany, women along with men were able to serve in artillery unit to shot down Allied Forces' warplanes (Campbell, 1993) nevertheless the effort to include women in military conscription was failed in 1982 (Baldez, 2003; 263-265). Women in German's military were only allowed to enter medical and supporting roles. After the unification of the East and West and the maturization of European Union, Germany change the law to allow women to enter combat roles in the armed forces since 2001 following the court ruling of European Court of Justice. Until now the German's women soldier allowed to be in every branch of service and regularly send to international mission.

The fact that Germany and Indonesia are democratic countries but encounter different transformation of women position in the armed forces is interesting for further study. Therefore the aim of this paper is to see what conditions allow Germany to conduct improvement for women in its military and compared them with the conditions of Indonesia. The conditions will be observed in the level of feminist thought that evolved; the legal framework of national, regional and international;

the implementation in the field; and the society in general. This paper will seek answers of the following key questions: (1) How is the gender perspective in the armed forces of democratic state?; (2) How is the condition of women in German armed forces?; (3) How is the condition of women in Indonesian armed forces?; (4) What is the lesson learned from German's experience that can be use to improve women conditions in Indonesian armed forces?

Gender Perspective on Peace and Conflict

The term 'gender' refers to social roles given to the existing sexes by the society in certain time and place. The sexes (whether they are male and female) are determined by biology, while gender changed as society changed. It can be said that gender is learned. Women and men are taught certain roles and appropriate behaviors according to their sex (Valasek, 2008; 3) and its perpetuation is conducted by their interaction within certain society. One example is women traditionally responsible for preparing food. They are not biologically predestined to cook but it is the gender role that most women learn. But this role can change over time and vary across cultures, since nowadays many men can also cook.

Not limited to the normal peaceful situation, in the definition of UN Researcher for Social Development and International Security Studies, Brigitte Sorensen, gender refers to the social relationship between men and women which is created by social, cultural, economic and political conditions as well as expectation and obligations within society, that in turn influenced how each group is affected by the running of daily life, whether in peace or armed conflict (Sorensen, 1998; 44). Scholar expert

in feminism in international relations, Spike Peterson, stated that worldwide, people are socialized into their gender. In her words, gender can be said as:

> *"systemic social construction that dichotomized identities, behaviors, and expectation as masculine and feminine … not simply a trait of individuals but institutionalized feature of social life"* (Peterson, 1992; 194).

Political science feminist (Tong, 1989) Jill Steans emphasized on ideological and material interaction which created the patterns of interaction between women and men. The patterns are not constant, but tend to change varying to the dynamic of its environment since gender is bounded on certain time and place of the society (Steans, 1998; 10).

Within the boundary of gender terminology, exists the idioms feminine and masculine as the commonly known stereotypes. The first is attached to women while the later to men, which gave artificial imaging of the two sexes' characteristic in correlation with their roles and responsibilities. It is also widely acknowledged that male-identified roles gain more importance and receive higher social rewards that those belong to women (Steans, 1998; 12). This is because in current world material interaction, men mostly work outside the house and bring the bread, whilst women at home and having lesser access to capital. This situation then created boundaries defined by power relations in the society which determines what is *expected, allowed and valued* in a woman or a man in a given context (UN DPKO, 2006). What stressed here is that gender is linked to material interaction which creates power relations which build the boundaries and limitation for the sexes. So that if there is changes in material interaction, it will also alter the power relations that gave effect to gender perspective imposed to men and women in certain context of society. The chain reaction is illustrated in Figure II.1.

Problem arisen as the masculine is valued more by the society compared to feminine, which then created unfairness that the one sex associated with masculinity (male) will gain more respect and gain easier access to material more than the other. For example the military is seen to be more connected to masculinity therefore man can get easier entry. The perpetuation of this social construction is globally known to produce forms of inequality which from gender-based power relation manifest from the ideology and material interaction to discriminative policies. This situation

Figure 1. Cycle of Gender Situation Transformation

Source: Author, 2010

is shown in the following chart of gender-system.

In examining the gender condition in society and its inequality between women and men which cause unfairness, gender analysis is needed. It is a perspective to investigate the different conditions imposed on both sexes which its understanding then applied to the development policy and public service.

such as anthropology, sociology, politics, economics, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and literary (Brabek & Brown, 1997; 15-35) which in general aim to create equal rights and legal protection for women due to their marginalized position in the society. It gives critiques of social relations with focus on analyzing gender inequality and promotion of women's rights and issues. Feminism grew in certain time and place

Figure. 2. Gender System Chart

Source: Septi Silawati, *"Pengarusutamaan Jender di Sektor Keamanan"*, in Mufti Makarim *et al, Almanak HAM di Sektor Keamanan Indonesia 2009,* (IDSPS, Jakarta, 2009 p. 128)

Gender analysis also emphasized the root problem which caused inequality to create positive change for women (*http://www.gdrc.org/gender/framework/what-is.html*). The gender approach basically believes that women and men have different needs which ought to be accommodated fairly by the government of democratic states to reach non-discriminatory development goals. With this approach, the differing situation faced by women and men can be understand in order to make changes on power relations by formulating gender-sensitive policy and program for answering their needs without diminishing each other rights.

Putting forward gender perspective cannot be detached from feminism. Gender perspective is part of feminist theory which is the feminism theoretical discourse that aims to comprehend the nature of gender inequality. Feminism discourse studies the roles of women in various fields,

according to the situations and needs of the women in the society. The goal of feminism is not for advancing women *per se* but it is mainly exist because women are commonly marginalized in most of the social movements although the ratio of women-men ratio in the world is 101 male to 100 female (2011) (*https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.htm*). The paradigm is also benefiting the society as whole, including men as well, since women and men are seen as the two feet of society, it cannot go toward its goal unless both have the equal ability to walk.

Social and historical feminist Maggie Humm noted that there are three waves of feminism in which the focus of the movement transformed (Humm, 1990; 278; also Krolokke and Sorensen, 2005). The first was in 19th up to early 20th century which occurred in western countries such as the UK and the US. It mostly fought for women rights as human rights, including

ownership rights, voting rights (suffrage movement), and sexual reproductive rights. In the military side, women were allowed to be involved in war as nurses by the effort demonstrated by Florence Nightingale.

The second wave of feminism took place in 1960-1990s and focused more on social and cultural rights. It was the continuation of the first movement of fighting for political rights that got deeper to body politic. The popular feminist slogan born in this era is "the personal is political" by Carol Hanish (Hanish, 2010) which concerned of the sexist power structures that created discrimination. The eminent feminist book referred by this wave is The Second Sex by Simone de Beauvoir that coined the phrase "one is not born as a woman but becomes one" (Beauvoir, 1948). She viewed that woman is socially constructed as *the other* which became as the base of oppression, and believed that to succeed feminism must not consider men as 'ideal'. This revoked the proud of femininity. Related with situation of conflict, the second wave was build on post World War situation where men need to get into the labour market again and new technology created, which made women work less valued.

As the two early feminism waves were considered only defending the needs of western white heterosexual women, newer and more diverse movement grown. It is called the third wave which started in 1990s and lasted to present, which covers many issues from black feminism, lesbian feminism, theology feminism, eco feminism, third-world feminism, and so on. Since there are many stand points and debates between feminism perspectives, the era is also said to be post-structuralist feminism (Leslie and Drake, 1997; see also Gillis, Howie and Munford, 2007).

The framework of this paper is set in the third wave feminism, specifically in political or gender feminism. This line of feminism is not only fighting for women rights enforcement but for everyone's. The main focus of this line is struggling against coercive interference and that the rights of people are guaranteed by sets of regulations and tools, such as government and international law (Sommers, 1995). This line of feminism is sometimes seen as non-pure feminism or even anti-feminist because it fights for both sexes, not only women. In the plus side, this feminism then can capture larger audience because it easier to gain entry to the government policy, especially because of the 'gender mainstreaming' movement that was born in late 1990s which became one of the many values of good governance.

Gender analysis addresses men's and women's respective roles and the social relationship between them. This is done to build constructive position that challenges presumptions about the 'common' or naturally perceived gender roles, and showing how the two sexes' identity, position and relationship between them is constantly reconstructed, contested and given new social meaning (Sorensen, 1998; 44-45). The main gender perspective used in this paper is the assumption given by Louis Kriesberg (Kriesberg, 1991; 401-402):

> "(F)eminists argue that major source of war is the socialization of men to be aggressive and concerned about appearing strong in the sense of being ready to fight and kill; consequently, an androgynous socialization would help generate peace."

Therefore the main goal is to analyze the condition of women that is involved voluntarily in conflict as soldiers and not as victims or survivors, as there are more litera-

Table 1. Different Approach in Gender Equality Policies

Strategy	Diagnosis What is wrong?	Attribution of Causality Who/what is responsible for the problem?	Prognosis What should be done?	Call for Action Who should do something?
Equal treatment	Inequality in law, different laws/ rights for men and women	Individual responsibilities	Change the laws towards formally equal rights for men and women in laws	Legislators
Specific equality policies	Unequal starting position of men and women. Group disadvantage of women. Specific problems of women that are not addressed. Lack of access, skills, or resources of women	Diverse, both at individual level, and at structural level	Design and fund specific projects to address the problems of (specific groups of) women	Gender equality agencies, some-times together with established institutions
Gender mainstreaming	Gender bias in regular policies and social institutions resulting in gender inequality	Policy makers (unintentionally)	(Re) organize policy processes to incorporate a gender equality perspective in all policies	Government /all actors routinely involved in policy making

Souce: David A. Snow, "Theory of Social Movement", 1996 quoted in Mieke Verloo, "Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe: A Frame Analysis Approach", paper presented in Conference of the Europeanists in Chicago, March 11-13, 2004, p. 8.

ture on women being the weaker side (see Ingram, 1991, also Peach, 1994). Women are usually seen as victims or post-conflict survivors and peace makers. This is because in the beginning the only feminist theory on conflict largely acknowledged is the pacifist which was big in UK and France in the world war era and currently adapted by peace activism movement. It sees women prefer peace than war, and that physical force and violence is not a way to solve problems. The ideology is also partly support the policy of women not to be included in military conscription. Continuing the statement of Kriesberg, including women in active roles in open conflict can add the chance to transform the nature of battle. Unfortunately, the possibility has not been proven since it is difficult for women to equally engage in wars. In gender analysis, the understanding of women's roles in conflict goes beyond the universalistic feminist narrative of "women's experience in war" but the diversity of the experience must also be acknowledged. There are writing on women that came from differentiated group, those who owned valuable resources and capacities, which can develop their own agendas which the government should not limit based on their sex. In the words of Brigitte Sorensen, "the reduction of women to targets and beneficiaries fails

to recognize their contributions and contributes to their marginalization" (Sorensen, 1998; iv). Therefore gender analysis in this case is used to see women condition in the security sector, especially in the armed forces. To simplify the steps, diagnosis should be done to see what is wrong with the current condition, what is causing the problem, what should be done and who should make action to solve it.

The three strategies can be executed depending on the situation and necessity. This table will be looked upon after the gender condition analysis in certain society had been done, which in this paper will be on German and Indonesian armed forces. Afterwards, the prognosis and call of action can be done, depending on the assessment's result.

Since gender is social roles and relations associated by the society, there are

women the second position in the society. In other words, women are positioned in the domestic area and not in public, rarely as state's decision makers that hold responsible for the whole society and not only for partial decision (For example as Minister of Women Empowerment or Family Health Care). The gender stereotype that is commonly associated with women gives constraint for them to be involved in the security sector and to actively enrol in its actors, such as the parliament; the police and the armed forces. As the focus of this writing is the armed forces, below is the comparison of men and women soldiers.

In this paper author highlight women in the armed forces in democratic countries because in democratic system, the state is a representation of its people which consist of both sexes. Some of the important values of democracy are equality and freedom

Table 2. Percentage of Sexes in the Armed Forces

Country	Men	Women
Austria (2006)	98.3	1.7
Bangladesh (2006)	99.6	0.4
Brazil (2006)	96.5	3.5
Finland (2006)	75.7	24.3
Germany (2006)	94.0	6.0
Indonesia (2007)	90.0	10.0
Kenya (2006)	96.3	13.7
Latvia (2007)	77.0	23.0
Poland (2007)	99.0	1.0
Turkey (2006)	96.9	3.1
USA (2006)	89.5	10.5
Zambia (2006)	76.7	24.5

Source: *Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces,* DCAF Backgrounder: Gender and Security Sector Reform, *10/2009, p. 2.* German data from *http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1842630,00.html.* Indonesia data from *http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006113555*

stereotypes that linked with it. For example that woman is seen as the weaker sex, 'the other', that is marginalized because she can only raise pen (Beauvoir, 1948; 105), not weapon. This gender positioning give

which in ideal situation are guaranteed by the constitution. By this the involvement of women in active roles of the military is based on the willingness and not necessity. In democracy also the social changes

can be conducted when there is demand from the people, which is half of them are women, because "opinion of one can be held ... and received fair compromised" as part of the government *for* the people and *by* the people (Dahl, Shapiro and Cheibub, 2003; 8-9). Therefore the issue is on how the democratic countries positioned women in the armed forces and how the law supports them.

(*http://www.lothene.demon.uk/othewomen20. html*). Soviet, that is now Russia, already open its combat posts for women since 1917. After Russia, Norway also allowed women to serve in the same position as men (1938) but changed its constitution to prohibit women in fighting position in 1947 which then altered again by Equal Opportunity Legislation in 1985 (*http://www.nato.int/ ims/2006/win/pdf/norway_report.pdf+women+*

Map. 1. World Democratic Countries

Blue - Governments that claim to be democratic and allow opposition parties to exist (though in some cases those opposition parties may be persecuted).

Green - Governments that claim to be democratic but do not allow opposition parties to exist.

Red - Governments that do not claim to be democratic.

Source: Freedom House survey quoted in San Oo Aung, "Analysing Various Democracy (Part 2)", *Burma Digest,* December 2006, more up to date view see *www.freedomhouse.org*

To this point of *herstory* (as opposed to history) most of women that join the military are posted in medical, clerical, and cook posts. Although there are stories of women fighting in wars such as Jean de Arc in Hundred Years War and Kady Brownell in US Civil War, not all the countries allow women to enter combat forces. The few countries that put women in active fighting position are Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Nederland, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka and Sweden. Some countries, such as the UK and the US, (Eisenstein, 2007; 39) allowed women only in several combat roles, such as in artillery and fighter pilot but not in infantry. Uni Soviet is the first country that legally put women in combat which was in WW II with 70% of its 800,000 women soldiers deployed to the front line

in+the+norwegian+armed+forces&hl=en&gl=u k&ct=clnk&cd=3). Finally, in 2011, Australia started to open its Armed Forces equally for men and women (*http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2011/sep/27/australian-military- women-frontline-roles*).

Meanwhile for military conscription for women exists in Eritrea, Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, North Korea, Peru, Taiwan and Tunisia although not in combat forces (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2006; 1). What is interesting in 2002, Sweden started female conscription on the grounds that excluding them goes against the ideology of equality to only conscript male (*http://www.cbc.ca/ news/background/military-international*). From these lists, it can be seen that the countries which conscript women and/or allowing them to enter combat positions are not always coming from the 'mature

Map.2. Freedom and Rights Survey

◉◉**Free (green)**. In Free countries, citizens enjoy a high degree of political and civil freedom.

◉◉**Partly Free (orange)** In Partly Free countries are characterized by some restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, or civil war.

◉◉**Not Free (red)**. In Not Free countries, the political process is tightly controlled and basic freedoms are denied.

Source: Freedom House survey quoted in San Oo Aung, "Analysing Various Democracy (Part 2)", *Burma Digest*, December 2006, more up to date view see *www.freedomhouse.org*.

Table 3. Democracy Index by Regime Type 2011

	Countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	**25**	**15.0**	**11.3**
Flawed democracies	**53**	**31.7**	**37.1**
Hybrid regimes	**37**	**22.2**	**14.0**
Authoritarian regimes	**52**	**31.1**	**37.6**

"World" population refers to total population of the 167 countries that are covered. Since this excludes only micro states this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population in 2011.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under Stress*, The Economist, London, January 2012, p. 2.

democratic' countries.

Among the world's current situation of 167 democratic countries (The Economist, 2012), from the research conducted, it had been found that there are currently 14 countries that fully allow women in combat forces (8.4%), 2 countries that allow women engagement in limited combat forces (1.2%), and the rest of the world's countries (151 countries, which equal to 90.4%) do not allow women participate in the combat forces at all. Using reference of The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy that had assessed the type of democracy of the country that claimed to be democratic, author found out 11 out of 15 countries (73%) that allow women in

the combat forces are in 'full democracy' situation. However the countries that include women in military conscript are almost all having imperfect democracy, whether they are 'flawed' or having 'authoritarian regime', except for Sweden. Therefore it can be said that countries that are more democratic is able to allow women to have the same access in the military compared with the one those coming from immature level of democracy, which include women in the military based on necessity.

Facing the question on how is the current gender perspective in the armed forces of democratic states, the answers can be as diverse as how the countries treat their women soldier. Country like Cana-

Table 4. Women in the Armed Forces of Democratic Countries

Women in the Armed Forces	Country	Level of Democracy	Type of Women Corps
	Australia	Full democracy	Integrated with men
Allow women in combat forces	Canada	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Denmark	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Finland	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	France	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Germany	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Israel	Flawed democracy	Integrated with men
	Nederland	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	New Zealand	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Norway	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Russia	Hybrid regimes	Integrated with men
	Serbia	Flawed democracy	Integrated with men
	Spain	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Sri Lanka	Flawed democracy	Integrated with men
	Sweden	Full democracy	Integrated with men
Women limited combat forces	United Kingdom	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	United States	Full democracy	Integrated with men
Military Conscription for Women	Eritrea	Authoritarian regime	Medical/separated with men
	Egypt	Authoritarian regime	Medical/separated with men
	Israel	Flawed democracy	Integrated with men
	Malaysia	Flawed democracy	Medical/separated with men
	North Korea	Authoritarian regime	Medical/separated with men
	Peru	Flawed democracy	Medical/separated with men
	Sweden	Full democracy	Integrated with men
	Taiwan	Flawed democracy	Medical/separated with men
	Tunisia	Authoritarian regime	Medical/separated with men

Source: Author, 2012

da or Nordic states had granted the same rights and opportunities for female soldier as their male cohort, including posting them in direct combat posts. Meanwhile countries like the UK, although it is known as one of old democratic county, still opposed women in infantry. Since the military is traditionally defined as masculine institution, for women to be able to equally participate, either the democratic govern-

ment provide stimulus for transformation or the women conduct the break through themselves. Perceptions of women in the armed forces are socially constructed and the discourse is not based on objective reality but rather on cultural values. Therefore situations of gender discourse in the country itself determined how the women condition in the armed forces, not *per se* the democracy level.

Based on the research of sociologist M.W. Segal, culture can exaggerate or minimized the importance of sex differences, let it be physical or psychological, and further justified gender based division on women's military roles. The greater emphasis on gender attribution and lesser emphasis to individual differences give more limitation on women (Segal, 1995; 758-768). Especially in the male dominated work field, there has been grown view that women, prevented by her weakness and inferior productive capacity in primitive society, could not became a fellow work cohort with the man. Since "he did not accept her" because she seemed in his eyes to have the aspect of the *other*, "man could not be otherwise than her oppressor. The male will to power and expansion made of woman's in capacity a curse" (Rosenberg and Bergstorm, 1975; 8-9). For example, in Israel military service for men, the ideal military assets of soldiery are physical ability, endurance, self-control, and tap on masculine performance by contrasting with images of 'otherness' such as femininity, homosexuality and Arab enemy (Kaplan, 2000; 127).

In the armed forces, women are most often curbed using the arguments of they are seen as more emotional than rational, and they have the physical limitation that do not allow them to serve the combat service as good as men. For example the different strength of the upper body part (*Army Times*, July 29, 1996) to carry armor or the ability to bear baby. These arguments are not valid in the current situation since the revolution of military technology simplifies the tools of modern war and the physical strength can be trained as long as there is willingness and support to do so. Yet there are some actualities that women soldiers are still slightly unwanted by their male colleagues because of the thoughts of women need protecting (Kristof, 2003) and their existence can distract combat readiness by romantic affair or sexual harassment cases (Sagawa and Campbell, 1992).

Along with the waves of feminist movement, the paradigm of allowing more women in the armed forces the in democratic countries increased. The reasons are: (a) each sex has different security experiences and taking this into account strengthens the ability of the armed forces to prevent gender based violence (GBV) and respond the security needs of the public. (b) The armed forces able to mirror the society at large in term of sex so it can be more trusted by giving more legitimate representation and working more effective in facing special needs, for example performed searches of women and assist sexual violence. This highlights operational benefit of incorporating women. (c) Give stimulus to create situation that respect human rights. Allowing women to enter the armed forces give a way to equal employment rights to be fulfilled, despite shortcomings such as limitation of service posts and difficulty on advancing in career ladder. (d) Women in the armed forces can help reduce GBV toward women in conflict area (Cohn, 2004; 8-9). UN Security Council viewed that women capacities during disarmament, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and post conflict reconstruction is central for the possibility of building peace. Sexual

harassment and GBV have been the two big issues that hamper to incorporating more women in the armed forces (Amnesty International, 2006). Sexual harassment experienced by female soldiers in the field, such as in Afghanistan, hold back women to be deployed. Adding more women can increase the level of empowerment for other women in the conflict situation and give more oversight for male comrades.

Meanwhile for the reasons of women interested to enter combat position of the armed forces are varies. These reasons cover from *voluntary recruitment*; *conscription*; *respond to local violence*; *financial gain*; *improve education and career options*; to as simple as *parent, sibling or spouse already in the forces* (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; 22). Each woman has her own individual background in joining the combat post and there is also influence of her country situation in creating the decision. The social's structure and culture too are affecting the woman and the country's policy in positioning whether women enter the combat troops or not. For example, country that sees women inappropriate to be in the front line might block the opportunity and therefore end the women motivation. For example in UK in the time of World War II, women in the military service are defined as non combatants because they are not allowed to fire weapons. They perform all tasks associated with firing antiaircraft weapon except actual firing; they moved ammunition and loaded the weapons but are not allowed to fire, they had to get a man to do it (Segal, 1995; 760). Until now the country still not having women in the infantry but they can join in other combat forces, such as fighter pilot. However, changes started to see with the 2011 policy to appoint Lt. Commander Sarah West to command HMS Portland Warship of the British Royal Navy.

Women in German Armed Forces

Based on the research on the work field of German women conducted by Jochem Langkau and Monika Langkau-Hermann, it was found that German women concentrate on job categories mainly those generally described as typically female (Yohalem, 1980; 20-21). This creates work segregation of women which ideally moved the government provided promotional programs and project (such as "females in male jobs") as stimulus. But what happen if the government also gives barrier for the women to enter certain kind of work, for example combat position in the military? This happened in Germany before the year 2000.

Discussing herstory (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010) and roles of women in German Armed Forces are tricky since after the end of World War II Germany was divided into two, the East and the West, with each having different situations. Opposed of history, that mostly depicts men action in the current past world story, herstory is a newly coined term in 1960s passed by the feminists to emphasize the role of women or told from a woman's point of view and also a piece of historical writing by or about women. Nevertheless in this paper, author would like to point out the similarities and focusing more on the time after reunification 1990. When there are exceptions they will be noted specifically. It is commonly known that after the WW II, there were fears of resurgence of 'German militarism' which reflected on the reconstruction of its armed forces. Even so, Germany implement military conscription to rebuild its armed forces after the war ended. Federal Republic of Germany (the West) introduced military conscription in 1956, earlier than German Democratic Republic (the East) that started in 1962. Both countries policy were only conscript men, although in World War

era women are conscripted too, despite only posted for civilian jobs (Tuten, 1982). It is common that in war that the lack of resource opens position for women, and also there is motivation for women to enter the military to be part of the war effort. However, when the war ended, women are sent back home, just like in Germany.

Effort to conscript women in the armed forces recurred in 1982 when East Germany passed law to allow women drafted in military but opposed by organization called *Women for Peace* which also fought for it to be cancelled in 1987 (Baldez, 2003). In West Germany, military conscription is not subjected to women because of the view was that women will spend time more at home to take care of children so their time need not to be spent in the military service. This perspective has correlation with the situation of 'remasculinization' of postwar Germany where 'masculine' Allies troops temporarily take over the country and create the absence of adequate German male authority. As stated by humanistic researcher Heide Fehrenbach, "In the wake of defeat and occupation, German men lost their status as protectors, provider, and even (or so it seemed for a short time) as procreators: the three Ps that had traditionally defined and justified their masculinity" (Fehrenbach, 1998; 109). Therefore in the revival of German military, women are tried to be kept in the background. When women enrolled in the armed forces, they were placed as nurses, clerks or military bands. For example 3,800 women used to make up 24% of West German military medical service (Baldez, 2003). East Germany was more advanced in allowing women to be part of political officers and technician in its military service. In the mid 1980s, women consisted as a third of East Germany's active defense force (*http://www.country-data.com/ cgi-bin/query/r-5160.html*) although they are also not posted in combat forces.

After the Berlin wall fell and German reunified in 1990, the *Nationale Volksarmee* of East Germany was dissolved. Its personnel and armaments adopted by the West Germany's forces under the *Bundeswehr*, which become the unified German national armed forces. The reconstruction of *Bundeswehr* after WW II was under the fear of resurgence of 'German militarism' which made the armed forces integrated with the society by using the cast of "civilian in uniform". Deep trauma of military over power placed the armed forces under parliamentary control mechanisms in order to ensure the respect of constitutional principles. This constitution limitation then back-lashed the development of German's armed forces, especially the women soldiers. *Bundeswehr* was stamped as 'exclusive boys club' (*http:// www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1842630,00. html*) because women were only permitted to serve in medical or musical posts, which was even only started in 1975, 20 years after it had been formed. The reason was because in German Basic Law Article 12, it explicitly forbids women active involvement in the armed service. The quoted regulation as follow:

> ***Basic Law for Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz),*** *Article 12(a) Compulsory Military or Alternative Service, Paragraph (4)*
> "If, during a state of defense, the need for civilian services in the civilian health system or in stationary military hospitals cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five may be called

upon to render such services by or pursuant to a law. *Under no circumstances may they render service involving the use of arms*." (*http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm*).

The change was stirred by a woman name Tanja Kreil, a Hannover based technician graduated from Siemens AG as electronic engineer that applied to the *Bundeswehr* to become Leopard II tank weapon technician in 1996. The former Defense Minister Ruhe letter replied "Thank you for your interest, but unfortunately there is no chance" (Torne, 2000). Her application was rejected on the ground of German Basic Law Article 12a, paragraph 4 above, which women are not allowed to conduct service with arms. With the support from Federal Armed Forces Association (*Bundeswehrverband*), she made complaint to the Administrative Court of Hannover under the case of "Tanja Kreil vs Germany". The case argument used was the European Court Directive of 79/7/EEC of December 19th, 1978 on the Progressive Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Matters of Social Security(*http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31979L0007&model=guichett*). The Administrative Court regarded that German basic law might conflict with European Law EC Directive 76/207/EEC of February 9th, 1976 that prohibits discrimination for employment in the bases of sex.

The case was brought to the European Court in Luxemburg which on January 11, 2000 declared that the German Basic Law was contrary to EU directive on the equality between woman and men. With this decision, Germany was obligated to change its constitution. Therefore the writing of article 12a paragraph 4 was amended by Law No. 19 December 2000. The sentence "Under no circumstances may women render service involving the use of arms" changed to "They may under no circumstances be required to bear weapons" (Raible, 2003; 300-301). Because of this amendment –despite it is a very small- German woman can apply as professional soldiers without legal restriction.

In June 2000, the new Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said, "In the future, the armed forces open all their diversity for the voluntary service of women." In January 2001, there are already 244 women enrolled. Up to January 2010, the number of female soldiers raised to 16,900 personnel which make up 9% of the armed forces in whole. The *Bundeswehr* target is to increase the number to 15%.. Now the selection of armed forces member is not based on sex, but by skill. But after all the effort carried out by Tanja Kreil, did finally she manage to enter the military? It is too bad that her height is only 1.57 meters. On the year she applied (1996) the minimum size is 1.55 meters but since 2000 the standard changed to 1.59 meters (Jach, 2000).

The transformation to integrate women in all military services brought new era for the *Bundeswehr*. The institution needs to modify how it operates, from logistical adjustments such as separate barracks and toilet, up to behavioral adjustment, for example male personnel to be open to training given by female officer. The women soldiers generally agree they do not ask for special treatment, only for them being safe from sexual harassment by their male cohorts. Especially in the beginning of women integration to *Bundeswehr*, the sexual harassment cases raised (*http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1842630,00.html*). This situation made the institution to

applied strict punishment for the doer and also conducted seminars on preventing sexual harassment.

All field of service in the *Bundeswehr* is started to open for women in 2001. "In principle there are no exclusions for women in the German Federal Armed Forces. Possible application limitations could arise only as a result of the fact that women are not interested at all in certain careers," stated Defense Minister Scharping in the first days of *Bundeswehr* recruit women (*http:// userpages.aug.com/captbarb/NATOwomen. html*). The requirements for women to enroll in German military are the same with the man, nevertheless there are still stereotype given to them, such as what can be noticed from the minister statement that women *are* not interested, although he himself is not a woman.

Along the time, women are getting gradually integrated and accepted in *Bundeswehr*. As the current Defense Minister Guttenberg said early this year, "I'm glad that women belong in the armed forces today is already sounded like normalcy" (*http://userpages.aug.com/captbarb/ NATOwomen.html*). Women integration in *Bundeswehr* can be said to be successful because of their number rose three times since it's transformed in 2001 till 2010, from 3% to 9%. The increase occurred not only in domestic posting, but also in international mission. It is recorded in last January, among 7,000 German soldiers abroad; about 380 or 5.4 % of them are women, which rose from zero percent (*http://www.bundeswehr. de/portal/a/bwde/streitkraefte/grundlagen/ frauen_in_der_bw*). To illustrate the current successful integration, below is the table of the women soldiers' distribution of force:

To see it in the qualitative point of view, *Bundeswehr* has its Institute of Social Science (*Sozialwissenschaftliche Institut der Bundeswehr*) that assesses how women integration in the body runs. In the year 2008, this institute published a report titled *Troops mit Dame* (Armed Forces with Woman), study conducted by Dr. Gerhard Kümmel. The report shown the climate is gradually getting better for women in *Bundeswehr*. The positive improvement is felt by 84% female and 86% male troops. While 89% women and 83% men soldiers confirmed they have good cooperation. The integration is also shown by the increase of male cohort in accepting women, from only 50% in the year 2000 when *Bundeswehr* just started accepting, to almost two third of the surveyed male troops. Less and less people think *Bundeswehr* is better without women. Only 15% male soldiers said the military mission will not be achieved with women in it, and even lesser think women takeover their job field.

Women in Indonesian Armed Forces

Indonesian armed forces had its women corps around seven years since the beginning of its military body was built. It was because the country background kept the memory of women warrior that joined the fighting for independence against colonial powers. The country even has women day as remembrance of one of the heroines, Kartini, on April 21 every year. In the writing of Rusiyati on Indonesian women movement, she explained the story of women fighters in Dutch and Japan imperial era in Indonesia (Rusiyati, 1990). In the recorded Dutch era (1880-1941), Marta Christina Tiahahu was known for fighting to take over Beverwijk Fortress in Moluccas, Nyi Ageng Serang fought in Diponegoro war by leading battalion in Java until she was in the age of mid 70s, and in Aceh there were Cut Nyak Dien and Cut Meutia that leaded guerilla troops. There were also women that fight in the corridor of education and women organization,

such as Kartini, Putri Mardika, and other women wings of social-political groups of *Sarekat Islam*, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*, *Partai Nasional Indonesia* and *Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia*. Indonesia had it first women congress in this era, on December 22-25th, 1928 which gathered the many women organization and created women union named *Perserikatan Perkumpulan Perempuan Indonesia* as communication forum. The day of December 22 is also celebrated as mother's day in Indonesia.

By the surrender of Dutch General Ter Poorten to General Imamura in 1942, the era of Japanese colony in Indonesia started. All organizations dissolved, including the women movements. There were only women organizations that were allowed by the Japanese occupied government. Although they had large diversity, from women organization which had domestic scope like *Fujinkai* until group of women that were trained and armed called *Srikandi*, nevertheless their activity were limited and tightly controlled by the Japanese occupancy force:

The trained women of *Srikandi* were the beginning of Indonesian women armed forces corps (*Wanita Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Wan TNI*). The women armed forces formally established after the suggestion in Indonesian Women Congress of September 29, 1959 (*http://www.tniad.mil.id/kowad/1kowadsejarah.php*). Each branch of the armed forces had women component within. There are Women Army's Corps (*Kowad*), Women Navy's Corps (*Kowal*) and Women Air Force's Corps (*Wara*). *Kowad* instituted by Army Commander Letter SK Pangad No.1056/12/1960 and Kpts-1047/8/1962 which formalized the body on December 22, 1962. *Kowal* instituted by Navy Commander Letter SK Pangal No.5401.24 on June 26, 1962. *Wara* instituted by Air Force Commander Letter No. 794/T-MKS/I/63 on August 12, 1963. What needs to be reconsidered is that their roles were to "set to work at places and in function conforming to their feminine disposition" (*http://www.mongabay.com/history/indonesia/indonesia -women_in_the_armed_forces.html*). Although they had been around for long

Table 5. Women in *Bundeswehr* According to Corps

Army	10,400
Navy	2,200
Air Force	4,300
Medical Unit	7,100
Total	16,900

Source: Bundeswehr, *"Verteilung in der Truppe – Distribution of Force"*, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/streitkraefte/grundlagen/frauen_in_der_bw

Table 6. Women in *Bundeswehr* According to Rank

Rank Group	In Number	In Percentage
Officers	2,600	6.9
Sergeants and Corporal	10,700	9.5
Team (with Sergeants and Non Commissioning Officer/NCO candidates)	3,600	3.7

Source: same with Table 3

unfortunately they never grew as big as the male counterparts. In particular women were assigned to administrative work, teaching foreign language, and working on improving health and social conditions of the armed forces member. The Indonesian women armed forces are not allowed to join the combat service, such as infantry, but there can be technician and pilot.

Indonesian military actually played a great role in the country's politic. When it was newly born in 1940s, under Soekarno presidency, the military repelled two times effort of the Dutch to retake its power over the area. In the 1950s the military, especially the army was used to counter communist power of *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI). This is also because PKI was contesting the army's political and economic role, and started to win the heart of President Soekarno. The situation resulted to the kidnapping and assassination of six senior army generals, repudiation of Soekarno and government being takeover by the military which given the leadership to Major-General Soeharto. This is the beginning of military based authoritarianism of Soeharto's New Order era in Indonesia (Liddle, 1992; 447). This grand roles of Indonesian armed forces in the country's economic-social-politics areas were nevertheless only applicable for male troops, not for the female because women movement received huge cut in the same time the new government established since in the earlier stage, Indonesian women movement (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia – Gerwani*) had grown strong and seen to be in alliance with the communist PKI.

Gerwani distinguished itself in its concern for the rights of female labourers and peasants. The movement's 1.7 million members were fighting for a 'more complete' range of interests and proposed solutions which "drawn primarily from the socialist world" (Wieringa, 2002; 275)

although it has no direct relation with PKI. This organization then experience downsizing with its member killed or lost in the slayer era of communist follower in 1966 and Indonesian women movement also experience downgrading since then. The role for women declined using the perspective of 'state ibuism' that was coined by Indonesian feminist Julia Suryakusuma (Suryakusuma, 2004; 161-188). The ideology is to put women in the chaste wives and devoted mothers by using the justification of the biological nature (*kodrat*). The New Order put male as head of the household which act as main wage earner and female doing domestic work, caring the family, raising children and husband helper. The military and state bureaucracy in this perspective, using Suryakusuma term, is boys' club which acts in patriarchal way in controlling the state and in the end, the women.

The ideology which refuses to recognized women as worker was even stated by military high power figure in the 1970s, General Ali Murtopo, stated, "…in Indonesia…generally it is only men who work" (*Angkatan Bersenjata*, July 2, 1973). This narrow perspective hampers the growth of women in Indonesian armed forces to seek active roles. Background of Indonesian women soldier was built over the goals to use women military power for special tasks that need thoroughness, perseverance, patience and maternal traits (*http://www. tniad.mil.id/kowad/1kowadsejarah.php*). That is why one of the slogans of Indonesian female soldier is "*Walaupun militer tetap wanita, walaupun wanita tetap militer* – Even though military still woman, even though woman still military" which keeps reminding the women in the corps that they are biologically woman that has bounded social roles attach to it. This image building limits the women soldiers but because it is

part of military doctrines rarely the member raise question.

The wave of *Reformasi* that occurred in Indonesia started May 1998 brought a big change to the country's political situation. The authoritarian regime under President Soeharto had successfully overthrown after 32 years of power and reforms transpired. The country was said to have achieved quantum leap of democracy by succeeding to conduct democratic legislative and presidential election in transparent and safe manner (Widjojo, 2005). Not only the political system was reformed but also the military body, TNI was also has its part of transformation. Its *dwifungsi* doctrine or dual-function of military and non-military roles was replaced. Which means that TNI must stepped out of their economic-social-politics roles and 'professionalized' itself to only focus to guard against outside threats and run military operation other than war (Chapter IVof Law No. 34/2004).

In the issue of women empowerment, international women movement's policy suggestion shifted from the concept of "women and development" to women's "platform of action" which was agreed upon in Beijing, China, 1995. The 189 states which signed then need to conduct *gender mainstreaming* in their bodies and policies, this includes Indonesia. The concept of gender mainstreaming is used to scrutinized and reinvent process of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women. In the effort, gender equality institutions are located in the state apparatus which the UN Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) recommended in 1998 that those institutes "should be at the highest level of government falling under the responsibility of the President, Prime Minister or Cabinet Minister … and be located in the central planning or policy coordination area of the government" (True and Mintrom, 2001; 31). The concrete impact of this international support on women empowerment in Indonesia is shown by the creation of National Commission for Violence against Women (*Komnas Perempuan*).

In the grand policy level, the fourth president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, had instructed the ministers, head of state institutions, armed forces, police forces, state prosecutors and all head of regions in each phase of development through Inpres No.9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development. Private institutions such as professional and religious organizations were also included in the government request to conduct gender mainstreaming, however only the government institutions that must report the changes which took place to the president directly (Irianto and Hendrastiti, 2009; 9). Unfortunately President Abdurrahman Wahid was put on motion of non-confidence by the parliament before his era finished due to his controversial policies Such as neutralizing the outlaw communist ideology, investigating corruption conducted by military generals, planning to open diplomatic ties with Israel and issuing presidential decree which tried to dissolve parliament and froze *Golkar*, the New Order biggest party (Rahardjo, 2005). His position must be given to President Megawati Soekarno Putri on 2001. Although the next president was a woman she was not committed in running gender equality policies and therefore the mainstreaming report never been realized.

So far there has no significant change brought by the Gender Mainstreaming regulation on the women condition in Indonesian armed forces. Yes there are more women generals, but there is no specific policies made to incorporate

women in the armed forces. After *Reformasi*, TNI transformed by getting out of legislative, deleting its social-political body, and demanding its officials that active outside military roles to leave its civilian job (Crisnandy, 2005). Nevertheless the only publicly known policy change for its women personnel is to allow Moslem women soldiers to use *hijab* (head scarf) when posted in Aceh for duty since the area was under *syariah*/Islamic law. The regulation is TNI Commander Letter SKEP No. 346/X/2004 and was even issued six years after *Reformasi*. In Indonesia defense white book and other formal military documents until now there had not yet been found any section stating women empowerment in the armed forces or in defense ministry (Sukadis, 2009; 8-9). This situation strengthen the image that defense sector is a male world without any effort to

news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006113555). The detail can be seen in the table 7.

Compared to the 30% of women soldiers of El Savador and 12% of them in Sierra Leone which also sent to the front line (The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security Council, 2005; 36) the number of *Wanita TNI* is considerably lower and has limited scope of work. This low number of women is because there is still no military academy that open for women so they must start from the low rank and make their way up. They also are not allowed to fill the combat positions due to their natural condition as women. What disturbs is that to be able to enter the military, women must pass the virginity test (*http://www.tni.mil.id/news. php?q=dtl&id=113012006113555*). Although this test is also conducted to the male applicant nevertheless this prerequisite is

Table 7. Recapitulation of Wanita TNI Personnel

Women Corp of the Military	Higher Rank	Middle Rank	First Rank	Lower Rank	Total per Corp
Women Army	1	668	913	2005	3587
Women Navy	1	304	377	1060	1742
Women Air Force	1	210	370	807	1388
Total	3	1182	1660	3872	6717

Source: Pakor Wanita TNI Spers Mabes TNI, *Rekapitulasi Jumlah Kekuatan Wanita* TNI,: TNI Headquarter, Jakarta, 2009

change its exclusivity.

Since there is no real policy change within the TNI to integrate more women, the number of women soldiers does not experience significant alteration, which only raises around 1% yearly. From the data noted by Women Personnel Management of TNI Headquarter (*Pembinaan Wanita TNI Staf Personel Mabes TNI*) in January 1, 2009, the number of women soldiers was around 6,700 personnel. This number made *Wan TNI* to be part of around 10% of Indonesian armed forces (*http://www.tni.mil.id/*

breaching privacy rights and not relevant to measure one's professional capacity.

As written in state constitution Articles 4 and 7 UUD 1945 which was amended three times after *Reformasi* 1998, that all citizens are equal in the terms of their rights and obligations, Indonesia should not differentiate between man and woman in its armed forces. On the issue of women equality, the country had also ratified international treaties such as Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

(CEDAW) as Law No. 7/1984, Covenan on Economic Social and Cultural Rights as Law No. 11/2005 and Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as Law No. 12/2005. Albeit there are many international conventions that Indonesia had been adapted as national laws, *de facto* there are still policies and practices that have not adopt gender perspective and give equal treatment to women. Therefore systemic and cultural changes still need to be made.

The limitation made for women in the Indonesian armed forces is more given using the argument of 'eastern culture' (*budaya ketimuran*). In this culture, women are seen as weaker, more caring and sensible, have the role of raising children, taking care of her physical appearance and guard the national norms. Using justification of culture, women in Indonesian armed forces are expected to have personality, good natured, clean hearted, high independency, responsibility, to keep their women nature and give full dedication (*http://www.tniad. mil.id/kowad/1kowadsemboyan.php*).

Culture and society expectation then become the reason why women soldiers are not included in certain activities and being treated 'special', compared with their male colleagues (Astuti, 2009; 27). For instance in the Army Commander direction Juklak/3/ XII/2006 on the Supervisory of Army Women (*Pembinaan KOWAD*) regulates "the tasks of women personnel must be appropriate with her nature and dignity (*kodrat dan harkat martabatnya*) as Indonesian women. She joins in state defense with using her ability and expertise only for specific tasks and not in combat." In the words of one woman army personnel, Indonesian women soldiers are not included in direct battle and combat troops with using the argument of difference body posture, characteristic and nature as women (Astuti, 2009; 2008). Culture is part of the regulator

norms in certain place or state, which ideally must be followed if the person is located or joining formal institution of a country. Nevertheless culture is dynamic and can change if the society wants transformation to happen, but it will be hard when not all parties are willing. It is difficult to judge the willingness of all the parties that involved in the empowerment of women in Indonesian armed forces. There will always be "sticky floor or glass ceiling" argument that limits the advancement of women although they intend to open all opportunity using the reason of women nature or social roles. For example it can be seen in the addressing of the former TNI Commander Joko Santoso on December 22, 2008 to *Wanita TNI* (*http://www.tni.mil. id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006120748*) (in English translation):

> *"Now is the time to open the widest* **opportunity**, *give* **the hardest push** *and intertwine the widest access for increasing role and action of women in all line of life, apropriate with their* **capacity** *and* **nature**. **Appropriate with their nature**, *this must we underlined. All form of strunggle of women* **anti discrimination and emancipation**, *or its whatever name and form, for Indonesian nation* **cannot** *be against women* **nature**. *In contrary, all efforts and struggles to push women role and action should be directed to* **strenghthen**, **enrich** *and give* **additional value** *so* **their nature** *can be more honorable and noble as women. One of them which cannot be betrayed and moreover diminished is the nature of woman to be* **a mother**, *that gives birth, raise and firstly and mainly teach children or the new*

generation."

The current Indonesian military Chief of Staff Admiral Agus Suhartono was giving similar remark in his speech early this year in *Kowal* 47th anniversary. He noted the "double role as Navy members and women" (*http://info.tnial.mil.id/lantamal8/tabid/224/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/104/Default.aspx*). The statement of TNI leaders to the women soldiers is still seen as the form of *state ibuism* which imposed limit for them to actively engaged due to the possession of womb, uterus and ovarium. This addressing is regrettable since now it was already more than ten years after *Reformasi* passed and there should be changing doctrine from the New Order regime.

In the navy, women soldiers role are still limited in protocol and administration. This restrain was said because "Women Navy (*Kowal*) carried double functions. In one side as soldiers in the sea, in the other side they run their task as women," said Chief of Staff Agus Suhartono. Although currently it is difficult to see *Kowal* soldiers in the operational field, they exist in health care, finance and computer related tasks, "in the future we will consider them to enter structural position" said Suhartono (*Kompas*, January 6, 2010). The first general from Indonesian Women Navy, Maria Rantetana, stated that the problem is in the military culture that is still male dominated. There is even problem of sexist jokes which women personnel afraid to report although it disturbs them. They also criticized the posting for women which mostly for protocol tasks, "It doesn't have to be done by women navy. We are not only for ornament", said Rantetana (*Kompas*, January 6, 2010).

Nevertheless not all military corps imposed the same limitation for women soldiers. For example in the corps of air force, Chief of Staff of Indonesian Air Force (KASAU) Subandrio stated that Indonesian Air Force put its women corps (*Wara*) as equal and integrated them with its male soldiers. *Wara* is not given specific corps and assignment, which should be seen as equal partner in carrying state burden (*http://202.155.61.12/news.php?q=opn&cid=INT&id=113012006119393*). In Subandrio view, equality is a condition that depicted partnership which is in harmony and balance between man and woman in obtaining opportunity and chance in accessing, participating and controlling development implementation, including to enjoy the result. With this perspective, it can be understood why women soldiers in the air force is more advance with other corps of Indonesian military. Indonesian women soldiers that are in air force (*Wara*) experience better integration with its colleagues because they are given the same rights and tasks. Interview with military doctor of *Wara*, Yuniarti Wisma said that there are no gender disparities in TNI air force. She had been posted in the same critical place as men, such as in disaster area of tsunami Aceh and also to conduct humanitarian mission (*http://www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006124224*). So far, *Wara* already has 9 women pilot that are ready to be deployed in the same situation as men and planning to open its academy to women in the coming year.

Another problem faced by women in Indonesian armed forces is promotion issue. As stated above, women soldiers still hard to obtain strategic and structural positions which in the end hamper them to achieve as much as promotional opportunity as their male cohorts. There is a lack of interest of the decision makers to promote women to position they are qualified, there is preference for male applicant of equal or less-qualified status.

This is because of the higher rank viewed the limited vocational and geographical mobility among women due to their double burden of family and job. The other factor that limits their acceptance is the level of education and training. Until now there is still no Indonesian military academy that accept woman, not like the country's police academy ((*Kompas*, January 6, 2010)). This situation makes no possibility for women military personnel to reach the position of head of TNI. These factors are believed to have made women bounded in lower and mid ranks, compared to their male colleagues. Again exception for limitation in rank can be seen in women of air force (*http://www.tandef.net/pengabdian-wanita-dalam-bela-negara*). In *Wara* there are women positioned as Commander of Station, Commander of Education Squadron, Head of Operation, Head of Finance, and Head of Military Court and so on. From this it can be said that the situation of Indonesian women soldiers still depends on the corps and their leaders' perspective that gives great influence to the culture in the forces.

Conclusion and Recommendation

What differentiate Indonesian and German women armed forces are as follow: (1) Women soldiers in Germany is allowed to work with weapon only since 2000 while in Indonesian forces they always able to. Nonetheless the Indonesian women are not post in the combat forces therefore the ability to deal with arms is only for knowledge and not having the fair chance to be use in practice. (2) There are problems of sexual harassment in German armed forces toward its female personnel. In Indonesia these incident, if it happens, is rarely reported and usually solved by *kekeluargaan* (peace and friendly agreement) not bringing it to formal stage therefore the perpetrator does not obtain formal punishment and the survivor does not have to carry eastern culture embarrassment of being the 'woman that teases'. (3) In Germany more and more women enroll to the armed forces with the number grew three times in ten year. While in Indonesia there is no significant increase, due to no significant change of policy in its armed forces. (4) The cultural changes in German armed forces are moved by regulation while in Indonesia it depends on the leader directions because formal rules rarely followed. These backgrounds shown how Indonesian armed forces can learn from German experience in integrating women in its armed forces by implementing equal opportunity and in which condition the change can take place.

The constraint that Indonesian women, and specifically women soldiers, face is culture. It is difficult to imagine there will be one woman as brave and resourceful as Tanja Kreil that demands Indonesian armed forces to change its regulation to give the same opportunity for women, which are (a) open military academy for women, (b) allow women to be in combat posts, (c) build the same facilities given to men and (d) remove gender discriminative military regulations, such as woman soldier cannot be promoted if she has soldier husband that has not yet promoted to higher or same rank that she will obtain. However, the awareness of Indonesian women of their rights is still very low. This creates the effect of low bargaining power have by women, especially in the male dominated field, for example in the work place, especially in the military, if not there is chance that Indonesian women will be more marginalized. This situation is ironic because by population ratio, the comparison of Indonesian women and men is 50:50.

Seeing from this condition, Indonesia

needs to empower its women to be able to stand up for them to demand gender equality. This is hard to imagine because up till now gender movement is only stirred by low number of people, namely feminists, women activists and some enlightened career women. Their hope is to have access to 'self actualization' stage, which is the highest stage of Maslow's hierarchy of need (Maslow, 1943; 370-396), and also to advance the condition of women. The problem is that women movement, like what was stated in the beginning, is varied so there is no one solid voice that support the action but fragmented to certain woman issue, interest or religious groups. This situation is difficult to gain enough pressure power to demand reform from big patriarchal institution such as the military. Feminist movement in the other side also received backlash by arguments such as (1) women empowerment is not important and still regarded non-issue compared to other social problems such as poverty; corruption; or even traditional security issue, and (2) norms in Indonesian society pressured women to act in a certain corridor in which for protesters will obtain bad labeling or even social punishment.

If the 'German armed forces reform way', i.e. by demand of one woman or a group of women to reform, cannot be implemented in Indonesia therefore the last opportunity is by international pressure. In German's experience, the change was also supported by EU Directives on Equal Opportunity. In Indonesia, it can happen that the pressures come from United Nations, international women organizations and development funding institutions. Example for this is how UN can make Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as Indonesian Law No. 7/1984 and how Friedrich Ebert Stiftung can demand gender impact assessment in Indonesian program that asked for support to the institution. Through international pressure Indonesian armed forces might reviewed and changed its gender discriminative regulations.

Nevertheless there are some issues need to be focused on international pressure to aid the security reform for women soldier in Indonesia. The *first* is that it will be difficult to create change if internal demand not existed. This can be seen in the example of Tanja Kreil demand that is supported by *Bundeswehrverband* and then agreed by EU Court. Therefore to make a change in Indonesia, there should be someone that really demands it, strong women organization that gives back up, and then able to bring out the issue internationally so the country is pressurized to realize the change. The strategy, diagnosis, attribution and call for action to explain the advocacy can refer to Table II.1.Different Approach in Gender Equality Policies (in page 18), which according to author can be categorized as the second type. This is the extract:

Secondly, international pressure can create counter argument that it is different with local eastern culture. This can bring resistance to the efforts of change, especially if facing conservative people which use dispute such as women nature (*kodrat*). The challenge is to convince these people that opening equal opportunity will bring benefit to all. Therefore the entry point can be from highlighting the benefit of policy change to attract more women enrollment to the military, which can be great assets for Indonesian armed forces. For example using the words of UN Secretary Kofi Annan in the speech delivered in *Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* in 2002, **"**Existing inequalities between women and men, and patterns of discrimination against women and girls, tend to be exacerbated in armed

Table 8. Approach to Empower Indonesian Women Soldier

Strategy	Diagnosis What is wrong?	Attribution of Causality Who/what is responsible for the problem?	Prognosis What should be done?	Call for Action Who should do something?
Specific equality policies	Unequal starting position of men and women. Group disadvantage of women. Specific problems of women that are not addressed. Lack of access, skills, or resources of women in the armed forces due to gender bias policy	Diverse, both at individual level, and at structural level inside the military body but also because no pressure yet from inside and outside group	Design and fund specific projects to address the problems of (specific groups of) women, such as allow women to enter combat posts, allow women enter military academy, etc.	Gender equality agencies, together with established institutions: Indonesian armed forces, its women wings, women organization and international org related to the issue

Souce: quoted and modified from David A. Snow, "Theory of Social Movement", 1996 in Mieke Verloo, "Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe: A Frame Analysis Approach", *paper presented in Conference of the Europeanists in Chicago*, March 11-13, 2004, p. 8

conflict… But if women suffer the impact of conflict disproportionately, they are also the key to the solution of conflict" (*http://www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8461. doc.htm*). Indonesia has been sending women military personnel in international peacekeeping mission since 2005 and from the report it stated that UN asked more of them to come (*http://en.republika.co.id/berita/ en/national-politics/12/03/21/m18eb9-ban- more-women-in-un-peacekeeping-missions*). Although these women peacekeepers only posted as military observer, military staff and military police officer nevertheless this is the first step for international influence to demand more active role of women in Indonesian military.

The *third* is in Indonesia, state rules and regulations are rarely obeyed by the people, or they are obeyed in the first months of its implementation due to strict enforcement. For example the regulation to turn on motorcycle light at day time is out mid 2009 (Law No. 22/2009 Article 107 and 293) and by the end of the year only few motorcyclists that are still doing it. This is because of the enforcement officials are only stern in the beginning and grew tolerable after some time. There is also disappointment of the police and judicial forces as they are regarded as corrupt. However if the regulatory reform is being done inside a structural top down institution such as the military there might be chance for it to be successful. Women in the military can make the military and the state which it belongs look more democratic, as though women now have the same choices as men. Although this perspective is challenged by critical feminist Zillah

Eisenstein because the choices are not truly the same because the women that chose to be in the military are usually having limited resources (Eisenstein, 2007; 20) however the integration of women in the armed forces possibly will change the male dominated culture because the women will finally get the opportunity to empower themselves.

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CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CIMIC) DALAM BANTUAN KEMANUSIAAN
(Studi Kasus Masa Tanggap Darurat Letusan G. Merapi 2010)

Sundoro Agung Nugroho[1]

Abstract

The concept of coordination or cooperation between civil and military (CIMIC) has been developed since 1990s. One of the substantial instances of civil-military cooperation and coordination is related to emergency responds to humanitarian crisis. This writing discusses several factors in conducting civil-military coordination in humanitarian action,particularly in the case of Merapi Eruption emergency responses in Yogyakarta in 2010. Based on literature and field research, it argues that amongst important factors related to civil-military coordination are regulations, resources, time line, and the culture of coordination and communication.

Keywords: *civil-military coordination, civil-military coordination, TNI, disaster management, CIMIC, CM coord, OMSP, Humanitarian action, humantiraian action*.

Pendahuluan

Istilah kerjasama sipil-militer (*civil-military cooperation*) atau koordinasi sipil-militer (*civil-military coordination*) dikenal juga dengan singkatan CIMIC. Konsep kerjasama/koordinasi sipil dan militer merupakan implementasi dari hubungan sipil-militer yang terjadi di lapangan dimana tentara mengisi kesenjangan dari kemampuan sipil (Franke, 2006). Pada awalnya konsep ini dikenal sebagai konsep kerjasama antara sipil dan militer yang ditujukan untuk mempertahankan situasi gencatan senjata dan tetap terpeliharanya perdamaian (Joulwan & Shoemaker, 1988). Untuk memahami konsep kerjasama/koordinasi sipil-militer maka perlu diketahui terlebih dahulu perkembangan dari konsep tersebut.

Seiring dengan berakhirnya perang dingin, konflik di dunia juga mengalami perkembangan. Sebelumnya kecenderungan konflik hanya terjadi antar negara saja, namun dewasa ini konflik justru memiliki kecenderungan terjadi di dalam suatu negara. Konflik pada suatu negara ini pun telah mengalami transformasi, dimana sebelumnya hanya terfokus pada memenangkan wilayah/teritorial (termasuk politik, ekonomi dan sosial), namun sekarang

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juga terfokus pada memenangkan hati rakyat(Manwaring, 1998; 28). Selain itu, keterlibatan negara lain dalam penyelesaian konflik pada suatu negara juga turut mewarnai dinamika konflik yang terjadi. Dengan demikian, konflik yang sebelumnya bersifat tradisional, dewasa ini konflik telah perkembang menjadi lebih kompleks dengan melibatkan aktor-aktor internasional.

PBB merupakan organisasi internasional yang bertujuan untuk memelihara perdamaian dunia. Pada tahun 1990-an, PBB mengatasi konflik dengan menggunakan pendekatan "*Agenda for Peace*" yang diajukan oleh Sekjen PBB pada tahun 1992 (Ghali, 1992). Upaya ini dilakukan dalam beberapa tahap. Dimulai dari mencegah terjadinya konflik (*conflict prevention*), mendamaikan melalui meja perundingan (*peacemaking*), dan menggunakan kekuatan militer (*peace enforcement*) apabila diperlukan. Setelah stabilitas keamanan dapat dijaga maka upaya selanjutnya difokuskan pada bantuan kemanusiaan, rekonstruksi, pembangunan dan rekonsiliasi untuk mencari akar permasalahan konflik (*peace building*). Meski demikian, pada kenyataannya konsep tersebut sulit dilaksanakan secara berurutan, namun perlu dilaksanakan secara bersamaan (simultan) (Celik, 2005; 9). Selain perkembangan konflik yang telah dijelaskan sebelumnya , pandangan tentang *human security* yang muncul sejak tahun 1990-an juga mempengaruhi pendekatan PBB. Konsep ini menitikberatkan fokusnya pada manusia sebagai individu (Knight, 2008). Sejak tahun 1991, PBB merubah konsep perdamaian dunia menjadi *Humanitarian Intervention*, dimana tidak hanya militer saja yang diberi mandat, tetapi juga personel sipil yang dikerahkan untuk memberikan bantuan kemanusiaan (Rehse,2004). Implementasi *humanitarian intervention* dimulai di Irak Utara dan kemudian *UN*

force enforcement di Somalia (UNOSOM II). Hal inilah yang kemudian mendorong PBB dalam memandang pentingnya koordinasi dan kerjasama antara sipil dan militer. Hal ini juga merupakan pembelajaran dari beberapa kegagalan yang dialami oleh pasukan perdamaian, dimana kontribusi warga sipil sangat dibutuhkan dalam misi perdamaian sebagaimana terjadi di Somalia, Rwanda dan Bosnia (Rehse,2004).

PBB kemudian membuat konsep kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bentuk *civil-military coordination* (UN-CMCoord). Sementara NATO sebagai organisasi internasional yang cukup banyak terlibat dalam operasi perdamaian dunia juga membuat konsep kerjasama sipil-militer (*civil-military cooperation*-CIMIC) dalam bentuk doktrin. Selain itu, negara-negara di dunia pun juga membuat konsep mengenai kerjasama sipil-militer sesuai dengan perspektif, kepentingan, pengalaman, situasi dan kondisi negara yang bersangkutan.

Bantuan kemanusiaan menurut Global Humanitarian Assistance adalah istilah yang digunakan untuk pemberian bantuan dan kegiatan dalam menyelamatkan jiwa, meringankan penderitaan dan melindungi martabat manusia selama dan setelah/akibat keadaan darurat. Dalam konteks bantuan kemanusiaan ini, terdapat tiga tipe kondisi darurat menurut PBB, yaitu pertama, bencana alam dalam kondisi politik stabil (*natural disaster in stable political condition*). Kedua, kondisi darurat yang kompleks (*complex emergencies*). Complex emergencies menurut IASC adalah krisis kemanusiaan dalam suatu negara, daerah atau masyarakat yang tidak terdapat otoritas secara keseluruhan atau sebagian akibat dari konflik internal/eksternal sehingga dibutuhkan respon dari internasional berdasarkan mandat dari program PBB. Ketiga, bencana alam dalam kondisi politik tidak stabil/daerah konflik (*natural disaster*

in unstable political conditions/a conflict zone) (UN, 2008; 108). Pada ketiga kondisi tersebut, penggunaan kekuatan militer asing mengacu pada *Oslo Guidelines* (UN, 2008; 108). Sedangkan pelibatan militer dalam penanggulangan bencana di suatu negara, tergantung dari kebijakan pemerintah negara yang bersangkutan. Apabila tidak terdapat pelibatan militer asing, maka aturan yang dipakai adalah kebijakan pemerintah lokal dalam melaksanakan penanggulangan bencana.

Penanggulangan bencana di Indonesia mengacu pada manajemen bencana nasional sesuai dengan peraturan yang ditetapkan oleh pemerintah mulai dari undang-undang hingga aturan pelaksanaannya. Militer (TNI) selalu terlibat dalam penanggulangan bencana dikarenakan seringnya terjadi bencana di Indonesia. Hal ini tidak lepas dari posisi geologis Indonesia yang merupakan pertemuan tiga lempeng tektonik dunia, sehingga rawan terjadi gempa tektonik dan tsunami, serta terletak dalam cincin rangkaian gunung berapi (*ring of fire*) yang memiliki lebih dari 128 gunung berapi dan sungai-sungai yang melintasi pemukiman yang berpotensi menyebabkan banjir (*http://www.bnpb.go.id*). Dasar pelibatan TNI dalam penanggulangan bencana terdapat di dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 34 tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia, yaitu pasal 7 tentang tugas TNI khususnya ayat 2 pada salah satu tugas OMSP yaitu untuk membantu menanggulangi akibat bencana alam, pengungsian dan pemberian bantuan kemanusiaan. Sedangkan unsur TNI yang terlibat dalam penanggulangan bencana sesuai dengan Peraturan Presiden Nomor 10 tahun 2010 tentang Susunan Organisasi TNI Pasal 44 adalah Pasukan Reaksi Cepat Penanggulangan Bencana (PRCPB). Pelibatan TNI ini memberikan implikasi adanya kerjasama/koordinasi sipil-militer dalam

penanggulangan bencana di Indonesia. Menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 24 tahun 2007 tentang Penanggulangan Bencana, tanggung jawab penanganan bencana dilaksanakan sesuai tingkat bencana mulai dari daerah sampai nasional (Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten/Kota, Pemerintah Provinsi dan Pemerintah Pusat). Secara nasional, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB) merupakan lembaga yang bertanggung jawab dalam penanggulangan bencana, sedangkan di tingkat daerah adalah Pemerintah Daerah melalui Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (BPBD). Salah satu bencana di Indonesia yang ditangani oleh Pemerintah Pusat secara langsung namun bukan merupakan bencana nasional adalah letusan G. Merapi tahun 2010 di Yogyakarta.

Bencana Merapi mendapat perhatian khusus dari Presiden RI, sehingga memerintahkan kepada BNPB untuk mengambil alih penanganan bencana Merapi dibantu oleh seluruh unsur pemerintah pusat termasuk TNI dan Polri. Sebagai tindak lanjutnya adalah pengerahan kekuatan militer yang relatif banyak, yaitu sekitar hampir 5000 personel (Sodik, 2010) dan juga unsur dari Pemerintah Pusat serta organisasi kemanusiaan nasional lainnya. Hal inilah yang menjadi dasar dari kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bantuan kemanusiaan untuk menangani bencana letusan G. Merapi. Beberapa faktor akan mempengaruhi pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer tersebut. Tulisan ini membahas tentang faktor yang mempengaruhi kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bantuan kemanusiaan di Indonesia dengan studi kasus masa tanggap darurat letusan G. Merapi tahun 2010 di Yogyakarta.

Definisi Koordinasi/Kerjasama Sipil-Militer (CIMIC).
Menurut PBB berdasarkan *UN Civil-Mil-*

itary Coordination (*UN-CMCoord*), kerjasama sipil-militer lebih dikenal dengan nama koordinasi sipil militer mempunyai pengertian sebagai berikut:

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training (IASC, 2008). Ada dua hal penting dalam definisi PBB tentang koordinasi sipil-militer ini, yaitu dialog dan interaksi antara sipil dan militer dalam darurat kemanusiaan. Konsep ini lebih dominan kepada sipil yaitu prinsip kemanusiaan dalam pelaksanaan tugas. Pelaksanaan tugas yang dilakukan oleh Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO), merupakan salah satu badan PBB yang bertanggung jawab dalam menyelenggarakan operasi keamanan, lebih banyak menggunakan konsep UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC). Definisi dari UN-CIMIC adalah:

...a military staff function in UN integrated missions that facilitates the interface between the military and civilian components of the mission, as well as with the humanitarian, development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN mission objectives (Reiterer, 2011).

...the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives (*http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/451ba7624.pdf*)

Definisi yang pertama merupakan perspektif kemanusiaan, yang lebih cenderung ke sipil, sedangkan definisi kedua

adalah definisi yang sering dilaksanakan oleh UNDPKO dalam setiap operasi perdamaian serta bersifat teknis operasional. Meskipun berbeda dalam pengertian, namun pada intinya koordinasi/kerjasama sipil-militer adalah pelaksanaan kegiatan secara bersama antara aktor keamanan dan sipil dengan memegang teguh prinsip kemanusiaan untuk mencapai tujuan misi PBB.

Setiap negara mendefinisikan kerjasama sipil-militer menurut perspektif, kepentingan, situasi dan kondisi serta pengalaman masing-masing. NATO sebagai salah satu institusi militer internasional yang sering terlibat dalam operasi perdamaian dunia mendefinisikan kerjasama sipil-militer sebagai: "*The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies:* (NATO, 2003; 11).

Definisi menurut NATO ini lebih dominan pada militer dengan pelaksanaan kegiatan yaitu koordinasi dan kerjasama untuk mendukung pelaksanaan tugas. Bisa dikatakan bahwa kerjasama yang dilakukan lebih fokus pada operasi militer (Rehse, 2004). Implikasinya adalah adanya kecenderungan militer yang akan melebihi mandat sebagai aktor keamanan atau malah sebaliknya, militer lebih fokus pada kegiatan kemanusiaan daripada fungsi keamanan (Abiew, 2003).

Dari berbagai perspektif tentang konsep CIMIC baik oleh PBB maupun NATO dan negara-negara lain, maka konsep koordinasi/kerjasama sipil-militer lebih dominan pada pelibatan militer secara internasional untuk menangani krisis yang terjadi di suatu wilayah. Tulisan ini menggunakan kata *kerjasama* untuk menyebut kata koordinasi dalam konsep koordinasi

sipil-militer dari PBB.

Secara umum kerjasama sipil-militer (koordinasi sipil-militer) dapat didefinisikan sebagai hubungan interaksi antara militer dan sipil baik pemerintah (pusat maupun daerah), masyarakat sipil, organisasi maupun lembaga nonpemerintah di setiap level untuk mencapai tujuan bersama. Dalam hubungan interaksi ini mengandung kerjasama saling menguntungkan, koordinasi dan komunikasi dalam situasi aman, darurat, krisis maupun perang baik di lingkungan dalam negeri (domestik) maupun luar negeri (internasional) (Nugroho, 2010).

Dari definisi diatas, dapat diketahui bahwa aktor yang terlibat dalam kerjasama sipil-militer adalah militer dan sipil. Sipil terdiri dari pemerintah (pusat maupun daerah), organisasi kemanusiaan dan organisasi non-pemerintah (LSM). Dalam konteks Indonesia, sipil lebih diwakili oleh lembaga pemerintah yang bertanggung jawab dalam penanggulangan bencana yaitu BNPB di tingkat nasional dan BPBD di tingkat daerah.

Kerjasama sipil-militer yang dilaksanakan dapat dijelaskan sebagai sebuah proses dengan beberapa tahap mulai dari perencanaan, persiapan, pelaksanaan dan pengakhiran. Beberapa aspek yang berkaitan dengan pentahapan tersebut antara lain: latar belakang, pertimbangan pengerahan, rencana organisasi, kedudukan dan status, rencana operasi yang merupakan fase perencanaan. Organisasi dan mobilisasi merupakan fase persiapan, sedangkan laporan tugas, penyerahan tugas dan tanggung jawab serta evaluasi merupakan fase pengakhiran (Nugroho, 2010).

Penanggulangan bencana letusan G. Merapi tahun 2010 di Yogyakarta dapat dibagi dalam tiga periode yaitu masa kesiapsiagaan, masa Satuan Tugas Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Merapi (Satgas Nas PB Merapi) dan masa pengakhiran tanggap darurat. Pada tulisan ini hanya membahas pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer dalam masa Satgas Nas PB Merapi yang dibentuk sebagai tindak lanjut direktif Presiden pada tanggal 5 November 2010. Unsur sipil yang terlibat adalah BNPB dan Kementerian/Lembaga lain (Pemerintah Pusat), Pemerintah Daerah, TNI (TNI wilayah dan Satgas TNI) serta organisasi kemanusiaan/kemasyarakatan lainnya.

Analisis koordinasi/kerjasama sipil-militer di Indonesia dalam bantuan kemanusiaan.

Secara umum penanggulangan bencana dibagi dalam 3 tahapan yaitu prabencana, tanggap darurat (*emergency*) dan pascabencana. Pada periode prabencana, koordina-

Gambar .1. Kronologi kejadian letusan G. Merapi 2010

Sumber: diolah dari berbagai sumber.

si/kerjasama antara TNI dan sipil sudah dilaksanakan di tingkat daerah, namun pada masa kesiapsiagaan dan tanggap darurat (saat bencana), biasanya terdapat pengerahan komponen secara bersama-sama dan besar dari berbagai lapisan baik sipil maupun militer sehingga banyak terjadi dinamika selama berinteraksi di lapangan. Kerjasama sipil-militer dalam masa prabencana lebih kepada perencanaan dalam menghadapi bencana, seperti pembuatan rencana kontijensi, upaya-upaya mitigasi, pendidikan dan pelatihan dan lain sebagainya. Sedangkan pada masa kesiapsiagaan dan tanggap darurat, kerjasama sipil-militer dilaksanakan untuk memberikan bantuan kemanusiaan dalam menyelamatkan jiwa, meringankan penderitaan dan melindungi martabat manusia khususnya korban bencana.

Dari hasil penelitian terhadap penanggulangan bencana letusan G. Merapi tahun 2010, ada beberapa faktor penting dalam pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bantuan kemanusiaan.

a. Regulasi

Kebijakan baik yang dikeluarkan oleh institusi sipil maupun militer biasanya dituangkan dalam bentuk aturan/regulasi sebagai pedoman pelaksanaan bantuan kemanusiaan, merupakan faktor penting yang mempengaruhi seluruh pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer. Regulasi yang berkaitan dengan TNI selaku institusi militer adalah UU No 3 tahun 2002 tentang Pertahanan Negara, UU No 34 tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Dirjen Strahan, 2010), Perpres No 10 tahun 2010 tentang Susunan Organisasi TNI dan Buku Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Satuan Tugas Pasukan Reaksi Cepat Penanggulangan Bencana (Bujuklak Satgas PRCPB) TNI sesuai dengan Peraturan Panglima TNI Nomor Perpang/35/XI/2007 tanggal 21 November 2007.

Institusi sipil dalam hal ini bertanggung jawab dalam manajemen bencana, regulasi yang digunakan sebagai pedoman adalah UU No 24 tahun 2007 tentang Penanggulangan Pencana, Perpres No 8 tahun 2008 tentang BNPB, PP No 21, 22 dan 23 tahun 2008, serta Peraturan-Peraturan Kepala BNPB sebagai pedoman pelaksanaan (Dirjen Strahan, 2010) dan Konsep Satuan Reaksi Cepat Penanggulangan Bencana (SRCPB). Sedangkan unsur LSM (NGO) lebih menggunakan protap dan aturan internal sebagai pedoman pelaksanaan bantuan kemanusiaan.

Pelibatan TNI dalam bantuan kemanusiaan serta penanggulangan bencana hanya berdasarkan tugas OMSP sesuai dengan undang-undang, namun pelibatan TNI untuk tugas ini diperlukan keputusan politik negara sebagai dasar pengerahan kekuatan TNI. Sedangkan aturan pelaksanaan tugas perbantuan ini belum ada. Salah satu dasar yang bisa digunakan adalah Bujuklak Satgas PRCPB-TNI sesuai dengan Peraturan Panglima TNI, namun peraturan ini juga perlu direvisi selain waktu pembuatan tahun 2007 (sebelum dikeluarkannya undang-undang penanggulangan bencana) dan isinya juga belum sesuai dengan konsep SRCPB dari BNPB yang saat ini sedang dikembangkan.

Hal yang paling penting adalah pelibatan TNI yang ada di wilayah yang melaksanakan tugas perbantuan kepada Pemda, selaku penanggung jawab penanganan bencana di tingkat daerah sesuai undang-undang penanggulangan bencana. TNI yang ada di wilayah sudah terlibat dalam program penanggulangan bencana mulai dari prabencana sampai dengan pascabencana. Diperlukan suatu aturan pelaksanaan pelibatan TNI sehingga aspek legal pengerahan dan pelibatan TNI dalam penanggulangan bencana menjadi lebih kuat.

Pada saat penanganan Merapi, pengerahan kekuatan TNI (Satgas TNI) mempunyai aspek legal yang kuat karena berdasarkan direktif dari Presiden.

Pada masa tanggap darurat, pembentukan organisasi tanggap darurat mengacu pada peraturan yang ada yaitu undang-undang penanggulangan bencana, BNPB, PP no 21 th 2008 dan Peraturan Kepala BNPB No. 8 tahun 2008 tentang Pedoman Komando Tanggap Darurat. Namun peraturan tersebut belum mewadahi kedudukan dan status TNI dalam organisasi. UU No 24 tahun 2007 tentang Penanggulangan Bencana, sama sekali tidak menyebutkan kata-kata TNI, namun unsur TNI secara tersirat sudah masuk dalam sumber daya yang ada. Dalam Perpres No 8 th 2008 tentang BNPB, kedudukan dan status TNI hanya sebagai Unsur Pengarah, bukan sebagai Unsur Pelaksana. Sedangkan disetiap penanggulangan bencana, TNI selalu terlibat sebagai unsur pelaksana baik diminta maupun tidak.

Organisasi tanggap darurat seperti yang diatur dalam Perka No 10 tahun 2008 juga belum memasukkan unsur pelaksana di dalamnya. Kalau kita melihat berbagai penanganan bencana yang terjadi di Indonesia beberapa waktu ini, baik oleh pemerintah daerah ataupun pemerintah pusat, unsur yang terlibat didalamnya tidak banyak perubahan. Mulai dari unsur pemerintah pusat, pemerintah daerah, TNI, Polri, organisasi kemanusiaan dan organisasi kemasyarakatan. Sehingga seharusnya organisasi tanggap darurat ini sudah bisa diatur hingga ke unsur pelaksana. Kalau melihat peraturan-peraturan sebelum keluarnya undang-undang penanggulangan bencana dan Lembaga BNPB, TNI merupakan anggota langsung badan nasional yang bertanggung jawab dalam penanggulangan bencana. Bahkan dalam BAKORNAS PB (Perpres No 83 th 2005), unsur TNI masuk

dalam organisasi tanggap darurat sampai ke tingkat daerah. Komandan satuan TNI di wilayah menjabat sebagai Wakil Ketua I dari SATKORLAK/SATLAK PB sesuai dengan tingkatannya.

b. Sumber daya.

Sumber daya terdiri dari perlengkapan, sumber daya manusia dan anggaran. Sumber daya yang dimiliki oleh sipil maupun militer di Indonesia masih terbatas. Sehingga diharapkan dengan pengerahan sumber daya yang ada, cukup efektif untuk melaksanakan bantuan kemanusiaan pada saat penanggulangan bencana. Pelibatan militer dalam penanggulangan bencana ini hanya untuk mengisi gap/kesenjangan sumber daya yang dimiliki oleh Sipil (Franke, 2006). Hal ini sesuai dengan amanat undang-undang penanggulangan bencana, bahwa yang bertanggung jawab dalam penanggulangan bencana adalah otoritas sipil, Pemerintah Pusat melalui BNPB secara nasional dan Pemerintah Daerah melalui BPBD di tingkat daerah.

Perlengkapan dan materiil yang dimiliki oleh sipil maupun militer (TNI) masih terbatas sehingga pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer menjadi lebih kompleks. Perlengkapan yang dimiliki oleh TNI terbatas pada perlengkapan tempur sesuai dengan tugas utama militer. Sedangkan dalam penanggulangan bencana, diperlukan peralatan khusus yang sesuai dengan situasi dan kondisi bencana, seperti untuk bencana letusan gunung api antara lain: Alat Pengaman Diri (APD), sepatu, pakaian dan kendaraan tahan panas dan lain-lain.

Perlengkapan ini tidak bisa dipisahkan dari dukungan anggaran yang ada. Selama ini anggaran yang digunakan dalam penanggulangan bencana bersumber dari APBN, APBD dan bantuan masyarakat serta anggaran internal organisasi kemanu-

siaan. Anggaran tersebut juga digunakan untuk biaya operasional bagi TNI, dengan demikian operasional TNI tergantung dari BNPB untuk tingkat nasional dan BPBD untuk tingkat daerah. Berdasarkan MoU antara Kemhan, Mabes TNI dan BNPB tentang kerjasama dalam penanggulangan bencana bahwa anggaran yang timbul dari MoU tersebut akan didukung oleh BNPB Saat ini belum ada norma indeks yang jelas bagi operasional TNI dalam tugas bantuan kemanusiaan, dukungan yang ada hanya untuk operasional pada saat fase pelaksanaan saja, untuk fase perencanaan, persiapan dan pengakhiran tidak ada dukungan anggaran. Misalnya kegiatan mobilisasi pasukan TNI dari *home base*-nya menuju tempat kejadian bencana serta pembuatan posko dan lain sebagainya. Dukungan anggaran hanya untuk uang lelah personel dan BBM, sebagaimana tertulis dalam laporan pelaksanaan tugas Satuan Tugas Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Merapi 2010.

Sumber daya manusia, baik dalam level manajemen maupun taktis operasional lapangan masih terbatas. Personel dengan kemampuan manajemen bencana di tingkat daerah maupun pusat baik Sipil maupun TNI masih sedikit. Sedangkan pada saat pelaksanaan kegiatan bantuan kemanusiaan seperti evakuasi dan pelayanan pengungsi, ketrampilan yang dimiliki juga masih kurang. Ketrampilan dan pengetahuan tentang pertolongan pertama merupakan hal mutlak bagi pelaksana di lapangan. Bahkan bisa dikatakan bahwa personel militer kurang terlatih dan tidak pengalaman dalam menangani korban bencana (Pugh, 2001; 9-10). Untuk mengatasi hal tersebut diperlukan pelatihan dan pendidikan baik dari sipil maupun militer dalam hal memberikan bantuan kemanusiaan akibat bencana.

c. Jangka waktu

Jangka waktu pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer lebih mengarah kepada dampak lanjutan dari lamanya pelaksanaan baik bagi sipil maupun militer. Dengan adanya bantuan dari militer secara terus menerus dapat menimbulkan kecenderungan ketergantungan sipil terhadap militer. Selain itu ada kemungkinan juga militer akan lebih fokus pada tugas kemanusiaan daripada harus siap untuk tugas tempur. Jangka waktu pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer juga akan berpengaruh pada besarnya anggaran khususnya bagi operasional TNI, semakin lama jangka waktu pelaksanaan, semakin besar anggaran yang harus dikeluarkan.

Pembatasan jangka waktu pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer mengikuti kebijakan otoritas yang berwenang dalam penanganan bencana tersebut dengan menggunakan sistem penilaian dan pengkajian sesuai dengan tingkat bencana. Sedangkan kegiatan penanganan pascabencana akan terus dilakukan berdasarkan ketentuan manajemen bencana. Pada saat fase pengakhiran ada penyerahan tugas dan tanggung jawab dari militer ke sipil (Rietjens, 2006), namun di Indonesia penyerahan tugas dan tanggung jawab ini dilaksanakan secara sektoral dari militer ke militer dan dari sipil ke sipil sesuai dengan tingkat otoritas yang menangani bencana (Nugroho, 2010).

d. Koordinasi dan komunikasi

Koordinasi dan komunikasi antara sipil dan militer sebenarnya telah dilaksanakan sebelum terjadinya bencana, baik secara intern maupun ekstern pelaku kerjasama. Hal ini tidak terlepas dari kedudukan TNI sebagai unsur pengarah dalam lembaga yang bertanggung jawab dalam penanggulangan bencana. Dalam penanganan bencana Merapi, koordinasi yang dilaksanakan

di internal TNI masih belum maksimal. Hal ini terlihat dari pengerahan kekuatan TNI (Satgas TNI) oleh Mabes TNI tanpa mempertimbangkan kekuatan TNI yang ada di wilayah, sehingga status dan kedudukan TNI wilayah dalam penanganan bencana menjadi tidak jelas. Status dan kedudukan TNI dalam pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil militer merupakan hal penting berkaitan dengan komando dan pengendalian serta dukungan operasional dari BNPB.

Pada fase pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer, koordinasi telah dilaksanakan dengan baik, hal ini terlihat dari pelaksanaan rapat koordinasi yang dilaksanakan setiap hari dua kali di posko yang diikuti oleh seluruh aktor yang terlibat dalam penanggulangan bencana. Seiring dengan berjalannya waktu, koordinasi dilaksanakan satu kali sehari, karena semakin lama pelaksanaan tugas menjadi lebih bersifat rutinitas bagi setiap unsur yang terlibat. Selain itu koordinasi antara sipil dan militer juga dilaksanakan melalui LO (Liaison Officer) yang bertugas membantu Kepala Satgas Nas PB Merapi dalam berkoordinasi dengan TNI.

Komunikasi merupakan proses pertukaran informasi antar aktor dan dilaksanakan melalui unsur pimpinan masing-masing. Salah satu kendala yang ada adalah masalah perbedaan terminologi bahasa antara sipil dan militer. Sipil (BNPB) menyebut pedoman pelaksanaan bantuan kemanusiaan sebagai "rencana operasi", namun militer menyebutnya sebagai "perintah operasi". Termasuk status gunung api mulai dari level 1 sampai dengan 4 (normal, waspada, siaga dan awas), sedangkan militer sendiri mengenal tingkat status siaga seperti siaga satu sampai dengan empat.

Alat komunikasi juga menjadi salah satu kendala dalam pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer. Pemerintah (sipil) selaku penanggung jawab dalam penanggulangan bencana seharusnya menyediakan alat komunikasi yang cukup untuk pelaksanaan tugas. Alat komunikasi yang dimiliki oleh TNI pun juga terbatas untuk operasional TNI sendiri.

e. Kultur

Kultur organisasi aktor yang terlibat dalam kerjasama sipil-militer berbeda antara satu dengan yang lain. Hal ini tidak menjadi kendala apabila setiap aktor saling memahami perbedaan kultur tersebut dan saling mengisi diantara keduanya serta berpedoman pada prinsip-prinsip kemanusiaan. Prinsip kemanusiaan (*humanitarian principles*) yang dimaksud di sini yaitu manusiawi (*humanity*), imparsial (*impartial*) dan netralitas (*neutrality*). Faktor pemimpin baik sipil maupun militer menentukan dalam menyikapi perbedaan kultur tersebut. TNI saat ini berbeda dengan TNI pada masa sebelum reformasi yang cenderung otoriter. Seiring dengan perkembangan dan kondisi bangsa Indonesia, pemimpin TNI saat ini lebih memahami tugas dan tanggung jawab sesuai dengan status dan kedudukannya dibawah kendali otoritas sipil.

Kultur daerah bencana juga mempengaruhi pelaksanaan tugas, khususnya bagi unsur/instansi yang datang dari daerah yang berbeda, termasuk Satgas TNI yang dikerahkan dari wilayah lain. Aktor lokal akan lebih memahami kondisi wilayah dan masyarakat yang terkena musibah bencana. Mereka mempunyai ikatan psikologis yang kuat dengan daerah tersebut, tidak terkecuali TNI yang ada di wilayah. Sehingga pengerahan TNI sebaiknya mengutamakan TNI yang ada di wilayah. Sedangkan TNI Pusat hanya bersifat mem-*back up* TNI wilayah saja.

Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi

Terdapat beberapa hal yang perlu menjadi

perhatian dalam pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bantuan kemanusiaan di Indonesia. Pertama adalah regulasi sebagai pedoman bagi pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bantuan kemanusiaan untuk penanggulangan bencana, saat ini belum cukup memadai baik bagi sipil maupun militer. Sehingga pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer masih belum optimal. Aturan pelaksanaan belum menyentuh sampai level/unsur pelaksana.

Kedua, pelibatan TNI hanya untuk membantu sipil (mengisi kekurangan) dengan menggunakan sumber daya yang dimiliki. Meskipun selalu terlibat dalam bantuan kemanusiaan, pada kenyataannya sumber daya yang ada masih terbatas, baik perlengkapan maupun kemampuan sumber daya manusia. TNI memang tidak disiapkan untuk tugas kemanusiaan namun lebih banyak tugas tempur, sehingga perlengkapannya juga tidak sesuai dengan kondisi bencana itu sendiri.

Ketiga adalah koordinasi dan komunikasi perlu dilaksanakan secara ketat baik pada masa sebelum maupun sesudah bencana khususnya dalam pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer sehingga waktu yang ada dapat digunakan secara maksimal untuk proses dan pentahapan kerjasama itu sendiri. Pertukaran informasi, baik secara langsung maupun dengan menggunakan alat komunikasi merupakan hal penting bagi aktor yang terlibat dalam penanggulangan bencana, termasuk kedudukan dan status TNI dalam membantu otoritas sipil. Keempat adalah kultur baik unsur yang terlibat maupun daerah terjadinya bencana perlu diperhatikan dalam melaksanakan proses/pentahapan kerjasama sipil-militer. Beberapa rekomendasi yang dapat diberikan untuk pelaksanaan kerjasama sipil-militer dalam bantuan kemanusiaan di Indonesia antara lain:

a. Perlu dibuat aturan pelaksanaan sampai ke tingkat pelaksana (unsur pelaksana), termasuk aturan pelaksanaan dari kesepakatan bersama antara BNPB, Kemhan dan Mabes TNI.

b. Perlu dilaksanakan latihan dan pendidikan antara sipil dan militer sehingga mempunyai sumber daya manusia yang terlatih dan mempunyai kemampuan manajemen bencana.

c. Karena TNI selalu terlibat dalam penanggulangan bencana, maka perlu dilengkapi dengan perlengkapan yang sesuai dengan kondisi bencana.

d. Agar koordinasi dan komunikasi dapat berjalan dengan baik, perlu adanya penyamaan terminologi dalam bencana serta sistem komunikasi yang terpadu dalam pelaksanaan bantuan kemanusiaan akibat bencana.

e. Pengerahan TNI sebaiknya mengutamakan kekuatan TNI di wilayah, karena mempunyai hubungan psikologis lebih dekat serta lebih mengenal kultur dan kondisi daerah bencana daripada Satgas TNI yang berasal dari luar daerah.

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MIDDLE CLASS, RELIGIUS RITUALS, AND DEMOCRACY IN INDIA

June Cahyaningtyas[1]

Abstract

This paper attempts to investigate the expression of religiosity among the middle class and how it shapes the dynamics of democratic life in Asia, particularly in India. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper tries to find out the role of the middle class in promoting democratization in India and second, taking religion as the intervening variable for explanation. Many Indians believe that their country is not structured on the basis of economic class, but on cultural caste instead. Middle-class population in India is not based on economic, but on non-economic based. It is therefore, the middle-class would include anyone who successfully led themselves up to the ladder of the society through the emulation of cultural practice, name changing, or religious conversion. Based on sanskritisation, reservation, and migration factors this paper argues that featured by highly unequal patterns of income distribution and stratified social structures, India tend to have weak middle-class. Modernization theory posits that economic wellbeing and democracy are positively correlated, though, the case of India shows that the political correlation between expression of religiosity among middle class and democracy contradicts featured by frequent social conflict and volatile and populist politics.

Keywords: *Middle Class, Democracy, India, Sanskritisation Religiosity, Reservation*

Introduction

The increasing number of the middle class can be found everywhere in the world (see Table 1), and among developing countries Asia is being at the forefront of this trend. In response to this phenomenon, some research attempt to explain the impact it give to consumerism, other research are focused on finding the impact it brought for either potential peace or conflict within and between countries (Pew Global Studies 2007, 2009). Of the last type of research done, most are conducted based on survey and on the economic definition of the middle class which is primarily associated with wealth. From this, a great number of indirect researches linking the support of the middle class to peace are produced through the confirmation that economic wellbeing and democracy are positively correlated.

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Table 1. The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries

|	Number of people (millions and global share)		Consumption (millions PPP US$ and global share)	
North America	338	18%	5602	26%
Europe	664	36%	8138	38%
Central and South America	181	10%	1534	7%
Asia Pacific	525	28%	4952	23%
Sub-Saharan Africa	32	2%	256	1%
Middle East and North Africa	105	6%	796	4%
World	1845	100%	21.278	100%

Source: Kharas (2010), p. 16

However, accepting the sweeping account that the rise of the middle class promotes democracy at face value may not be helpful in explaining why conflict persists globally. Keeping in mind that the increase of the middle class does not necessarily associate with the rise of equality, the likelihood is equal for conflict to emerge in countries with large stock of middle class. This is because the exponential number of the middle class cannot automatically erase problems at the bottom line of the society, creating chronic injustice concerning distribution of basic needs, including food, shelter, and education, as seen in the exponential prevalence of underweight in children in South Asia and the cumulative hunger index of Southeast Asia and South Asia, despite the booms of the middle class in Asia (see Graph 1). Eventually, as many research confirmed, people who's economically disadvantaged, politically disenfranchised, and socially excluded seen to be the main promoter of conflict in society.

While most conflict are blamed to be based on material cause and promoted by people at the margin, not many research are trying to see how the middle class whose life are better off take part in the promotion of both conflict and peace in their home country. Asia is chosen because the region, as seen in the aforementioned

Graph 1. World and region-wise Global Hunger Index 1990 and 2009

Source: Global Hunger Index 2009

Graph 1, according to studies conducted by World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and African Development Bank, show the largest increase of the middle class. How-

ligion and express their religiosity in public?

3.What impact do these middle-classes give to the process of democratization in India?

Table 2. India in 2012 Global Peace Index

GPI Indicators	Score	GPI Indicators	Score
Perceived criminality in society	5.0	Terrorist acts	3.0
Security officers and police	1.0	Deaths from conflict (internal)	1.5
homicides	2.0	Military expenditure	1.0
Jailed population	1.0	Armed services personnel	1.0
Access to weapons	4.0	UN peacekeeping funding	1.0
Organized conflict (internal)	3.0	Heavy weapons	1.0
Violent demonstrations	3.0	Military capabilities	4.0
Violent crime	1.3	Displaced people	1.0
Political instability	4.0	Neighboring country relations	3.0
Political terror	1.0	Conflicts fought	5.0
Weapons imports	4.0	Deaths from conflict (external)	2.0

Source: 2012 GPI Index

ever, in order to get a focus for the study, India is purposely selected as a case study on grounds that the Indian middle class are growing in numbers and economic growth and democracy are said to have settled, yet prone to hostilities (India scores 2,569 and ranks 142 out of 158 countries assessed in 2012 Global Peace Index, see Table 2 below).

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper tries to find out the role of the middle class in promoting democratization in India. Second, taking religion as the intervening variable for explanation, this paper attempts to investigate the expression of religiosity among the middle class and how it shapes the dynamics of democratic life in Asia. But, before even going to the main discussion, the definition of Indian middle class has to be understood first. Reflecting on the objective of the paper, the research questions are therefore formulated as follow:

1.Who is the Indian middle-class and how do they earn the status of the middle-class?

2.How do the Indian middle-class view re-

Middle Class in India

Applying the word class in India is quite tricky. This is because, many Indians believe that their country is not structured on the basis of economic class, but on cultural caste instead. My 9-month field research in Kolkata, India, brought me to a tantalizing fact that, despite the globally shared objection toward class stratification particularly from the Leftists intelluals, having a class-based society is something that most Indians desire. Most Indians believe that a class-based society is an alternative to caste-less society, and of all the other alternatives a class-based society will bring India out of its laggard while fully embracing a modern society. As long as caste keeps its hold on the vein of the society, they believe that it will be difficult to attain societal welfare and politically democratic society (personal observation, 2009-2010).

A caste and a class are similar in the sense that each is a form of stratification, but the way the system works is different from each other. As illustrated in Table 3 below, a caste is differ from class in ways

Table 3. The difference between caste and class

	Caste	Class
Type of hierarchy	Rigid	Less rigid
Form of stratification	Relatively immobile, stationary	Relatively mobile
Preservation method	Closed, endogamous marriage	Open, performance-based appraisal
Characteristic	Family hereditary, given	Individual qualifications, competitive
Basis for justification	Cultural codification, social institutions	Labor relations and regulation, legal institutions
Structure created	Unidentified	Pyramidal

Source: own interpretation based on Cox (1944)

that it offers a rigid hierarchical system in society; it creates a relatively a closed and stationary form of stratification since it is tightly preserved through endogamous marriage, hence keeping the occupational lineage on grounds of family hereditary; and it is culturally justified through social institutions.

Social change and social mobility is a two-way process and, it includes some factors that must work simultaneously. In general terms, some factors that use to be associated with this process are industrialization, urbanization, education, and democratic politics. But, without undermining the importance of each of the factors, the paper proposes that in the case of India, Special Forces named *sanskritisation*, reservation, and migration are deemed much important to note than any other factors considered.

Sanskritisation

Sanskritisation, firstly coined by S.M. Srinivas, is a process by which a low Hindu caste or tribal changes its customs, rituals, ideology /way of life in the direction of high or frequently dwija (i.e. the twice born caste), to refer to the second and the third rank in caste system, or Kshatriya and Vaisya, respectively. The emulation takes place not only in forms of attitude, but also in the as-

cription of the last name which used to refer the type of traditional occupation inherited in one's family, hence situate one's location in the caste system. By change one's family name, it is expected that the social stigma associated with one's low caste root would be erased consequently.

I personally question the effectiveness of the sanskritisation. To my opinion, social stigma cannot easily be wiped away by name changing, because people within the same localities would still recognize the low-caste root one's family had already been associated with. Except when name changing is accompanied with migration, sanskritisation offers no grounds for immediate social acceptance to anyone purposely changing its fate through changing one's rituals alone. What's more, the current reservation program promoted by the government in response to the universal human rights standards drive the iteration of family name by disadvantaged groups in society, including those who had sanskritised themselves. This act of de-sanskritisation is strategic since they are automatically entitled to 27% of central government jobs and university admissions, a privilege that they had never had before (*The Wall Street Journal*, 9 December 2011).

Reservation

The word reservation in India refers to the vast and growing affirmative-action program trying to engineer advancement for the underclass in Indian society. The spirit for reservation is enshrined in Indian Constitution which guarantees equality to all. In reservation program, the government set out the benefactors to be fall among three elements (i) ST (scheduled caste), which refers to the Dalits or the outcaste, (ii) ST (scheduled tribes), which refers to indigenous forest-dwellers, and (iii) OBC (other backward castes), which refers to the underprivileged Muslims. Critics to this program address the impact of inter-caste resentment due to the quota system allotted to the reserved groups, which favorably undermining the merit-based competition that should primarily be established for Indians to keep its pace of development. The danger in using caste as a development tool, critics say, is that the government is perpetuating ancient divisions that still run deep.

Although reservation policy is eluded by outside commentators as one of the breakthrough in Indian politics, statistics does not prove much since then. Currently, India remains home to the largest number of poor and hungry people in the world. According to the Times of India, one-third of the world's poor people live in India that is equal to 1.4 billion Indians (*The Times of India*, 27 August 2008). According to the World Bank, 42 percent of its population (around 450 million) still lives with less than $1.25 a day that is below the new international poverty line. More than 6 million of those desperately poor Indians live in Mumbai alone; they live in super-sized slums and improvised housing (cited in *The Times of India*, 27 August 2008).

Migration

For Indians, migration enables not only the accumulation of wealth but also social transformation for the migrant individually and the migrant family, altogether. India remains the second largest immigrant group in the world after China and Indian diasporas are increasingly elaborated in popular culture, showing that out-migration from India is an established phenomena. Syed Ali, who researched Hyderabad as a case study to this phenomenon, explained that migration is perceived by young Indians as an easy escape from the constrained social system. According to Ali,

> being a migrant in itself has become a status marker. … They (the migrants) become highly valued commodities, irrespective of what they were before the transforming act of migration.

Graph 2. average end-use pattern of NRI remittances in 2009

http://www.oifc.in/Resources/News/Nature-of-remittance-flows-into-India-from-the-Indian-diaspora
retrieved March 10, 2012

… Those who manage to get abroad are seen as victorious, and to the victor go the spoils.

Migration thus, provides financial capital as much as social capital for the ascription of the middle class. It has an enormous impact not only on the marriage prospects of an individual but also for larger self-development since it creates the new notion of caste which revolves around the notion of Non-Resident India or NRI. The term NRI refers to anyone working and living abroad. Indian is of the country being top receivers of remittance from abroad and at home funds generated from sent remittances is a source for either consumption or further investment (Graph 2).

Indian Middle-class and Religiosity

Based on the elaboration of how the middle class come to appear in Indian caste society, it is important to note that it may be interested to include many factors in defining who the middle-class is apart from the economic indicator. This is because my field observation in India convincingly found that of the few people able to establish their pave to middle-class level, more people struggle to keep alive on day-to-day basis. I personally think that the media's headlines or the economic based research on the middle-class should not leave aside the fact that there is a widening gap of rich and poor, and high rates of suicide among poor farmers which accounts to be happen every 30 minutes (*The Times of India*, 27 August 2008) is just one of the many indicators available for delving into this phenomenon.

This paper is therefore will not count anything to do with middle-class population in India on economic base, but on non-economic based instead. According to the sanskritisation approach, the middle-class would include anyone who successfully led themselves up to the ladder of the society through the emulation of cultural practice, name changing, or religious con-

version. According to the reservation approach, the middle-class are those who get the net benefit from the affirmative-action programs in diverse field of life, including education, employment, and political participation. According to the migration approach, the middle-class is anyone who is able to pool the financial and social capital and use them strategically to legitimate their standing in society economically and socially.

Of these three approaches explained, some of the emblematic expressions that can be seen among the Indian middle-class are the use of English language and the adoption of religious rituals. To begin with, English language is conceived of as the ability that must be retaining by every educated middle-class. The ability to speak English in good grammar and with good pronunciation is holding a key to good occupation in bureaucracy or educational institutions, both of which are strongly associated with clean, educated, and high pay-off salaries job. While English are not used as the language instruction in public schools, English are considered to be utmost important for retaining a better or an already good standard of life. India is in fact the second largest English user country in the world after the U.S.

Religious rituals are another type of expression which is strengthened among the middle-class in India. According to the 2007 State of the Nation survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) among Indians, the level of religiosity has gone up considerably in the past five years. Only 5 per cent of the respondents said that their religious belief had declined, while 30 per cent said they had become more religious. The same poll found that education and exposure to modern urban life seem to make Indians more, not less, religious: "Urban educated

Graph 3. Religiosity Increase as Wealth Increases

Indians are more religious than their rural and illiterate counterparts … religiosity has increased more in small towns and cities than in villages" (cited in Nanda, 2008). So, contrary to the common assumption that religiosity will automatically decrease as wealth increase, the case of India shows the other way round. As illustrated in Graph 3 below, India stands together with other rising economies in Asia, including Indonesia and Malaysia.

In India, one measurable indicator for this trend is the tremendous rise in pilgrimages or religious tourism. Religious trips, according to a recent study by the National Council for Applied Economic Research, account for more than 50 per cent of all package tours, much higher than leisure tour packages at 28 per cent (cited in Nanda, 2008). This rising religiosity is well dispersed among any Indian middle-class irrespective of their religious background, either Hindus, Muslims, Christians, or Sikhs. Apart from pilgrimages, daily rituals are being more elaborated as more and

more Indian middle-class are participating in religious rituals in temples and in ceremonies like pujas through donations and charities. According to Nanda (2008), "it is becoming fashionable to be religious and to be seen as being religious."

Although the question "why" is not formulated in the research question of this paper, but it is important to complete the picture of rising religiosity by knowing why it happens. The Indian scientist and historian Meera Nanda explain from the widely accepted assumption that this has to do with economic well-being and defensive reaction to modernisation and Westernisation. The more people surrounded with well to do life economically, the more people feel insecure existentially. Religion is then treated as a refuge for the deep seated feeling of alienation and loneliness, mostly suffered by many urbanites, those who are uprooted from the old, secured, and warm little communities they left behind in villages. A consolation to God and the company of fellow believers are then kept well

to remedy the traumatic feeling of lost and loneliness in the hectic and consumed life of the cities.

Middle Class and Democracy

The wellbeing of the modern middle-class in India is founded upon white-collar jobs and professional positions. These jobs and positions provide not only financial security but also prestige in society. But, unlike the traditional Hindu middle-class of the dwijas (i.e. the second born castes of Khsatriyas and Vaisyas), modern middle-class are not grounded on established foundation of cultural status. The absence of traditional cultural status can be compensated, however, with either of these two ways. First, through direct political participation aimed at gaining public support or legitimacy based on popularity, crucial for self-esteem. Second, through indirect political participation in party politics, which strengthen ones and one's family membership in local party affiliation.

Strategies like rallying the cause for issues concerning "social justice" or "empowerment to the oppressed communities" will likely pave the way to withdraw popular support from particular groups subject to privilege, while drawing apathy from other groups underprivileged by the same policy. This was effectively elaborated in 1980s when intermediary or middle-class groups started its political agitation in several parts of India and emerged as important political forces. Due to their strong representation in the BJP which came to power in 1977, they launched campaign for protective discrimination. As a result, Mandal Commission was set up and identified 3,248 castes or communities as Other Backward Castes (OBCs) or comparable to 52.4 percent of Indian population. The commission made controversial recommendation that 27 percent of government jobs be reserved for OBCs, in addition to

the 22 percent quota for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). The rift spiraled into anti-reservation violence in many states in India, up until now (Mehra, 2000).

Many Indians consider politics as something dirty, but at the same time they also acknowledge that politics is powerful and pregnant with capacity to empower people. Ellis, in his research on middle class politics in Chennai, found that more suspicion is given to party politics as when he asked, "what does it mean to say that someone is 'into politics'?", he found among his respondents similar sentiments that those who were political were dishonest, corrupt, and ineffective. One of his respondents answered,

He/She wants to make money for them and their many more generations to come. A secured life where the bureaucrats, police and official machinery are all at your disposal. You are above the law because there in not even a single instance in the history of our country for convicting a corrupt politician. (Ellis, 2011).

Conclusion

In case of stable, higher income democracies, the middle-class is relatively strong and the levels of inequality is relatively low, as can be seen in many welfare societies in the West. But countries with highly unequal patterns of income distribution and stratified social structures like India will tend to have weak middle-class. As seen in the discussion, the political correlation of this system is found in the frequent social conflict and volatile and populist politics.

I personally see India as a country full of contradictory. Despite it's newly emergence in the world of technology, large population in India are still suffered from the lack of basic needs and amenities. Indian constitution is also eluded as one of the

best constitution that lays the foundation for democracy in the face of culturally great diversity. On the one hand, the constitution has set out its support for the abolition of discrimination, respect to equal rights, and promotion of egalitarian freedom, but on other hand, the protection of cultural rights has inevitably conserves the caste system for the Hindus as much as the Islamic Family Law for the Muslims, and will always challenge Indian democracy. Even with the current emergence of the modern middle-class and the provision of the reservation policy for underprivileged groups in society, disparities continue to underlie in and is visible part of the society. Therefore, the oft description of India being a peaceful, stable, and prosperous democratic country in the Western media needs a constantly balanced recheck.

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PENYELUNDUPAN SENJATA API: ISU KEAMANAN PERBATASAN INDONESIA

Denik Iswardani Witarti[1]

Abstract

Indonesia's border areas are prone with transnational security threats, particularly small arms smuggling, particularly in conflict prone areas. Geographic position of Indonesian archipelago contributes much to small arms smuggling along with the ripe of internal conflict following the fall of Soeharto. This article will describe the fact of smuggling and distribution route of small arms in conflict areas. It found that border areas between Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-the Philippine are amongst the most important route of arms smuggling. It is therefore the government should pay more attention to solve the border security issues in these areas.

Keywords: *Small arms, Smuggling, Border security, Indonesia.*

Pendahuluan

Isu keamanan non-tradisional di perbatasan sudah lama menjadi bahan pertimbangan dalam kebijakan pertahanan Indonesia. Buku Putih Pertahanan 2003 telah menyebutkan bahwa selain mewaspadai kemungkinan invasi atau agresi dari negara lain, disebutkan pula adanya isu keamanan non tradisional, yaitu setiap aksi yang mengancam kedaulatan negara, keutuhan wilayah serta keselamatan bangsa dan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). Dalam konteks strategis, ancaman dan gangguan yang dihadapi oleh Indonesia salah satunya adalah kejahatan lintas negara, seperti penyelundupan barang, senjata, amunisi dan bahan peledak, penyelundupan manusia, narkoba, pencucian uang dan bentuk-bentuk kejahatan terorganisasi lainnya (Buku Putih Pertahanan RI 2003: 39-46).

Tulisan berikut hendak menjelaskan lebih lanjut mengenai salah satu ancaman transnasional yang dihadapi oleh Indonesia yaitu penyelundupan senjata api ke beberapa daerah konflik melalui perbatasan. Untuk memberikan gambaran mengenai persoalan ini, pertama dijelaskan mengenai letak strategis Indonesia. Kemudian, dijelaskan fakta penyelundupan dan pengedaran senjata-senjata ilegal di beberapa daerah konflik di Indonesia. Tulisan ini juga menjelaskan bagaimana rute atau jalur masuknya senjata-senjata tersebut melalui perbatasan Indonesia dengan Malaysia dan Filipina.

Letak Geo/ Posisi Strategis

Secara fisik, Indonesia terletak di antara dua benua yaitu Benua Asia dan Australia, dan di antara Samudera Pasifik dan Samudera Hindia. Luas wilayah Indonesia

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termasuk semua perairan di antara pulau-pulaunya adalah 1,9 juta mil persegi. Posisi strategis ini mempunyai pengaruh yang sangat besar terhadap kebudayaan, sosial, politik, dan ekonomi (*http://www.indonesia.go.id* diakses pada 10 Juli 2010).

Indonesia merupakan negara kepulauan terbesar di dunia yang mempunyai 17.508 pulau (*http://www.indonesia.go.id* diakses pada 10 Juli 2010). Negara kepulauan menurut menurut Konvensi PBB tentang Hukum Laut (*United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea/* UNCLOS) 1982, adalah suatu negara yang seluruhnya terdiri dari satu atau lebih gugusan kepulauan dan dapat mencakup pulau-pulau lain. Konvensi menentukan pula bahwa gagasan kepulauan berarti suatu gugusan pulau-pulau termasuk bagian pulau, perairan diantara gugus pulau-pulau tersebut dan lain-lain wujud alamiah yang hubungannya satu sama lain demikian eratnya sehingga gugusan pulau-pulau, perairan dan wujud alamiah lainnya tersebut merupakan suatu kesatuan geografi dan politik yang hakiki, atau secara historis ialah dianggap satu kesatuan alur. Dengan diakuinya asas Negara Kepulauan, maka perairan yang dulu merupakan bagian dari Laut Lepas kini menjadi "Perairan Kepulauan", yang berarti menjadi wilayah perairan Republik Indonesia. Dalam perairan kepulauan berlaku hak lintas damai (*right of innocent passage*) bagi kapal-kapal negara lain. Namun demikian negara kepulauan dapat menangguhkan untuk sementara waktu hak lintas damai tersebut pada bagian-bagian tertentu dari perairan kepulauannya apabila dianggap perlu untuk melindungi kepentingan keamanannya (Siahaan, 1989: 322-323).

Ketentuan dalam UNCLOS mengandung arti bahwa negara kepulauan seperti Indonesia harus memberi kebebasan bagi kapal asing dan pesawat udara asing melintasi hak lintas alur laut kepulauan untuk transit dari satu bagian laut lepas atau ZEE (*Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif*) ke bagian lain dari laut lepas atau ZEE. Meski konvensi menjamin juga mengenai hak negara kepulauan untuk menolak kapal atau pesawat terbang melintasi wilayahnya bila dianggap mengurangi kedaulatan negaranya, namun pada kenyataannya Indonesia sulit mengontrolnya.

Indonesia juga mempunyai empat selat yang dikenal sebagai *choke point* yakni Selat Malaka, Selat Sunda, Selat Wetar dan Selat Lombok. *Choke point* adalah jalur sempit, seperti selat dimana kapal-kapal harus melintas. Dalam strategi militer, *choke point* adalah ciri alam seperti lembah atau kancing, yang memaksa tentara pergi menuju bentuk yang lebih sempit (akan mengurangkan kemampuan tempurnya) untuk dapat melaluinya. Kebebasan penggunaan *Sea Lane of Communication* (SLOC) dan *Sea Lane of Transportation* (SLOT) membawa kesempatan terbuka bagi kegiatan kejahatan transnasional terutama penyelundupan senjata api di wilayah-wilayah perairan Indonesia. Kegiatan penyelundupan senjata-senjata ilegal ini menjadi ancaman yang serius bagi keamanan nasional Indonesia terkait dengan konflik-konflik internal yang tengah melanda.

Penemuan Senjata Api Ilegal di Daerah konflik

Setelah jatuhnya Presiden Soeharto tahun 1998, konflik-konflik internal semakin marak di Indonesia. Situasi politik yang tidak stabil menyebabkan konflik-konflik yang sudah ada semakin memburuk. Perkelahian individu seperti di Maluku dan Poso, berkembang cepat menjadi konflik komunal yang menewaskan banyak masyarakat sipil. Kekerasan semakin meningkat dengan penggunaan senjata api yang menggantikan senjata-senjata tra-

Tabel 1. Temuan senjata api di daerah konflik

Daerah	Jenis Senjata	Sumber
Maluku	Rifle AK-47 M-16 SS-1 S&W 5 silinder Mortir Grenad (standard & rakitan) Senjata rakitan Bom rakitan	Rakitan sendiri Pasaran gelap dalam negara: oknum TNI/Polri senjata bekas pejuang Timor Timur Penyeludupan dari Davao, Filipina
Poso	SS-1 M-16 Semi Automatik SKS Semi Automatik M1 Mesingan Bren MK-3 Senapang Bolt Revolver Colt, S&W Pistol Walther Sub mesingan Uzi Pelancar Grenad (GLM) Senjata rakitan Bom rakitan	Rakitan sendiri Penyeludupan dari Filipina Selatan
Aceh	AK-47 AK-45 M-16 SS-1 Pistol FN Pistol Revolver GLM Senjata rakitan Bom rakitan	Rakitan sendiri Oknum TNI/Polri : aktif desersi Pasaran gelap luar negera: Thailand Kamboja Vietnam Afganistan
Papua	M-16 SS-1 AK-47 SP-1 Pistol	Perampasan dari pos TNI/Polri Senjata rakitan bekas konflik Maluku Penyeludupan dari : PNG Australia

disional. Konflik vertikal akibat ketidak-puasan daerah kepada pemerintah pusat juga semakin nyata. Kumpulan-kumpulan separatis bersenjata di Aceh dan Papua semakin berani menunjukkan perlawanan-

nya untuk memisahkan diri.

Fenomena bahwa senjata api telah menggantikan senjata tradisional dalam konflik internal di Indonesia tidak dapat disepelekan begitu saja. Banyak kasus kekerasan di daerah konflik menggunakan senjata api. Data yang digunakan dalam tulisan ini merupakan hasil penelitian dari tahun 2000 hingga 2010. Tabel di bawah ini menunjukkan jenis-jenis senjata yang banyak ditemukan di beberapa daerah konflik yaitu Maluku, Poso, Aceh dan Papua.

Tabel di atas telah menunjukkan bahwa senjata api marak beredar secara ilegal di beberapa daerah konflik dan digunakan oleh pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam konflik. Data akan semakin bertambah bila catatan mengenai penyalahgunaan senjata untuk kriminal juga dihitung. Sejumlah senjata api, standar maupun senjata rakitan, yang ditemukan jenisnya sama dengan senjata organik TNI/Polri. Sekalipun senjata rakitan dapat dibuat sendiri, amunisi yang digunakan adalah amunisi asli seperti senjata jenis AK-47, M-16, Colt, dengan kaliber yang sama dengan senjata api milik TNI/Polri. Hasil temuan senjata api di daerah konflik tersebut menjadi bukti bahwa ancaman penyelundupan dan pengedaran senjata api secara ilegal di Indonesia sudah merupakan ancaman serius bagi keamanan nasional.

Jalur Masuk Senjata

Hasil penelitian menemukan senjata-senjata yang beredar di Ambon dan Poso berasal dari Filipina Selatan. Senjata-senjata yang berasal dari Filipina Selatan diselundupkan melalui pintu kepulauan Sangihe Talaud, Sulawesi Utara. Dari Filipina Selatan, senjata ini transit dahulu di beberapa desa pesisir di kawasan Parigi Moutong, kepulauan Togean di Tojo Una-Una dan Kolondale atau Bungku Selatan di Morowali (Sangaji, 2005). Pintu lain masuknya senja-

ta-senjata ini adalah perbatasan Malaysia – Indonesia. Senjata dari Filipina Selatan diselundupkan ke Tawau (Sabah) kemudian masuk ke Nunukan (Kalimantan Timur) untuk dibawa ke Poso. para pelaku yang tertangkap oleh Polis Daerah Kalimantan Timur mengakui bahwa mereka sudah sering melakukan penyelundupan senjata ke Indonesia (*Kompas*, 22 Agustus 2001).

Sedangkan penyelundupan senjata ke Aceh, menurut kajian Capie (2005) merupakan jalur utama penyelundupan senjata di Asia Tenggara yang berasal dari pasar gelap. Senjata-senjata tersebut kebanyakan berasal dari Indochina yang dikirim melalui perairan melewati Thailand Selatan dan melintasi Selat Melaka menuju Aceh. Senjata-senjata tersebut seringkali diseludup daripada Selatan Thailand menuju Aceh dengan bantuan sindiket atau kumpulan yang bersimpati kepada perjuangan GAM seperti Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) (Makarenko 2003). Setelah melewati Selat Melaka, senjata-senjata tersebut dibawa masuk ke perairan Jambo Aye dan seterusnya masuk ke Lhokseumawe (*Media Indonesia*, 1 Mei 2003). Suplai senjata bagi GAM ketika konflik di Aceh masih berlangsung juga berasal dari perbatasan Malaysia – Indonesia, Tawau. Wakil Panglima GAM Wilayah Passe, Abu Sofyan menyatakan bahwa mereka mendapat kiriman senjata secara rutin dari Libya yang dikirim melalui Malaysia (*Gatra*, 19 Februari 2001).

Perbatasan Indonesia – Papua New Guinea (PNG) juga menjadi salah satu pintu masuk penyelundupan senjata ke wilayah Indonesia, terutama ke Papua (Wawancara dengan AKBP Hadi Darmawan di Jayapura, 7 Juli 2008). Pos lintas batas antar kedua negara yang belum terbangun memudahkan senjata-senjata ilegal ini berlalu lalang. Senjata-senjata dari PNG dibeli dari hasil penjualan marijuana di Papua. Simpatisan OPM dilaporkan juga berusaha membeli

senjata dari Australia Utara dan dari beberapa daerah di Papua Barat. Daerah perbatasan di Papua Barat, sekitar Kiunga dan sungai Fly, rawan akan penyelundupan senjata (*Koran Tempo*, 27 Desember 2002).

Gambar di bawah ini menunjukkan jalur masuk senjata-senjata ilegal ke daerah-daerah konflik di Indonesia;

sution menyatakan bahwa para pelaku penyelundup senjata dan narkoba yang dulu sering menggunakan bandara-bandara dan pelabuhan sebagai pintu masuk, kini banyak yang mengubahnya dengan menggunakan jalan tikus di wilayah perbatasan Indonesia (*Mediaindonesia*, 21 Januari 2012).

Gambar 1. Jalur masuk senjata api ilegal ke

Sumber peta: *http://www.nationsonline.org* diakses pada 13 September 2010

Berdasarkan gambar di atas, terlihat bahwa konflik-konflik internal di Indonesia terjadi di dekat jalur *choke point*. Posisi strategis Indonesia membawa kerawanan bagi penyelundupan senjata-senjata ilegal ke daerah konflik. Senjata-senjata yang diselundupkan ke Indonesia kebanyakan masuk melalui perbatasan yang kurang terjaga. *UN Institute for Disarmament Research* mencatat bahwa senjata api dan narkoba dikirim bersamaan melalui rute-rute yang sama, oleh penyelundup yang sama pula. Kajian Pirseyedi (2000) membuktikan bahwa dalam aktivitas kejahatan lintas batas negara, senjata api dan narkoba sering dipertukarkan (*barter*).

Perbatasan memang menjadi wilayah yang rawan dengan berbagai aktivitas kejahatan transnasional. Kepala Divisi Humas Mabes Polri Irjen Saud Usman Na-

Penutup

Hasil penelitian di atas menunjukkan bahwa perbatasan Indonesia terutama perbatasan laut sangat rawan dan menjadi jalur utama aksi kejahatan lintas negara khususnya penyelundupan senjata api ilegal. Berleluasanya senjata-senjata ilegal dari satu negara ke negara lain menunjukkan bahwa perbatasan Indonesia terutama dengan Filipina dan Malaysia masih lemah. Senjata-senjata inilah yang memperburuk konflik-konflik internal yang tengah dihadapi Indonesia.

Sebagai penutup, tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa perbatasan yang sering menjadi ajang transaksi kejahatan lintas negara dapat mengancam kedaulatan suatu negara. Masalah-masalah yang muncul di perbatasan ini, apabila tidak ditangani dengan baik akan berdampak terhadap

kemanan nasional Indonesia, dan bahkan keamanan kawasan.

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THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MINDANAO CONFLICT: ITS DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

Mindanao conflict in the Southern Philippines has been categorized as the second-oldest conflict. This conflict is not only caused by different interest between Muslims and Christians, but also related with the issue of land, agrarian justice, and global economic integration. The questions pose in this paper are why the peace process in Mindanao failed? What are the agendas that should be considered to create sustainable peace in Mindanao? Actually both of Muslim groups in Mindanao and the Philippines government have tried to make peace negotiations. The peace talks which were facilitated by the international institutions resulted in signing the peace agreement in 1976, 1989, and 1996. Unfortunately, the three peace agreement failed to end the conflict. There were no single factors that caused the failure of the peace agreement. In general, these factors were: the rejection from other Muslim groups excludes the MNLF such as the MILF and the ASG, the protests from Christians who did not include in peace negotiations, different interpretation about the autonomous region between the government and the Muslims groups, and the absence of the issue of land in the negotiations. In order to gain a just and sustainable peace in the Mindanao conflict, the partnership between civil society and the government should be considered as the urgent agenda. An interactive state/society institutional frame work by issuing the program such as land redistribution and agrarian reform are very crucial in peace building. Besides that, the involvement of civil society in the future peace agreement is very useful to reduce the influence of "conflict entrepreneurs" which often attracted people by provoking with sensitive issues.

Keywords: *Peace Process, Mindanao Conflict.*

Introduction

Although the Mindanao conflict in the Southern Philippines only one of five major conflicts in the Philippines since its independence day, this conflict has been categorized as the second-oldest conflict in the earth. The first-oldest is the conflict between North and South Sudan which just resolved by referendum to divide the country into two states (Shiavo-Campo and Judd, 2005: 1). Indeed, the conflict in Mindanao has been going on for more than

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three decades and not yet resolved until now. During this period, the conflict has caused much damage to livelihoods, displaced 2 million people, and caused others immaterial effects for people.

The conflict condition in Mindanao actually is quite complex. This conflict is not only caused by different interest between Muslims and Christians, but also related with the issue of land, agrarian justice, and global economic integration. Ironically, there is also banditry issues that focusing on kidnapping, a communist insurgency, and also endemic clan conflict. And the kidnapping in this area often focused the Filipino-Chinese as the most frequent target (Rood, 2005: 4). Considering these facts, it can be understood that the conflict in Mindanao was quite difficult to solve in past times.

It is important to note that the Philippines government, the Mindanao people, the Philippines' civil society, and international communities have done many efforts to end the Mindanao's conflict. There are also huge amounts of aids and advices that were given by international communities to help people in Mindanao. Besides that, the peace making in Mindanao has also been taken for a long time with complex and intractable process. In addition, there were also the support and meditation from international actors, the autonomous policy to Mindanao region, elections, and other ways to solve the conflict (Gutierrez & Borras, Jr., 2004: 1). Unfortunately, all these peace agreements only worked in few time and then failed.

This essay will examine the dynamics of the peace process in the Mindanao conflict and its prospects. We will argue that the peace process in Mindanao failed because of several important factors and it will have sustainable peace by considering some agendas. Specifically, the following questions will guide trajectory of this essay: Why the peace process in Mindanao failed? What are the agendas that should be considered to create sustainable peace in Mindanao? In attempt to answer these questions, this essay will be divided into three parts. The first part examines the background of the Mindanao conflict. The second part assesses the previous peace process and its failures. The third part discusses the future of the Mindanao peace.

The Historical Background of the Conflict in Mindanao

The roots of the conflict in Mindanao can be tracked back from colonial history of the Philippines. Andrew Tan (2000: 271) points out that the history of conflict began when the Islamization of the Philippines islands was stopped by the Spaniards, who arrived in 1565. They not only defeated the Moro in the North, but also aggressively attacked the Moro sultanates in Mindanao and the Sulu islands in the South for the next 350 years. However, the Spanish were never able to conquer the Mindanao region because of the strong resistance that Mindanao's people had. This is not surprising because before the arrival of the Spanish colonialist, actually people in Mindanao were already in the process of state formation and governance. Islam came to this island in the 13th century. The Muslims created their permanent settlements and established their sultanate in the 14th century (Islam, 1998: 444).

Although the Spanish's mission failed, it gave many negative impacts to the Mindanao people. The Spanish did establish a few garrisons in the area to continue their intervention and made a vigorous attempt to impose Catholicism on the Mindanao population. In fact, they also succeeded to conquer the rest of the Philippines and they were successful in con-

verting local people to Catholicism (Islam, 1998: 444-445; Calk, 1997: 80). Indeed, the achievement of the Spanish to build a few small settlements in the Northern and Eastern parts of Mindanao became a very serious potential conflict in the future.

Furthermore, the U.S. victory in the Spanish-America war in 1898 led to the transfer of the Philippines to U.S. control. Despite the fact that Mindanao and Sulu were never under complete Spanish control, the areas were included in the Treaty of Paris of 1898. The Muslims objected this idea and fought several battles to resist the American invasion. The American responded this protest by initiating a 'military pacification' campaign to force the integration of Mindanao with the rest of the Philippines (Chalk, 1997: 81). The U.S. colonial government introduced an "attraction policy" by a massive re-settlement program to encourage Christian migration from several areas of the Philippines to the South. The program which started in 1913 grew during 1920s and 1930s. It also accelerated after the Philippines independence in 1946. As a result, most of the Mindanao areas were dominated by the Christian. Indeed, by 1983 census, it is showed that 80 % of the 10 million people in Mindanao were non-Muslims (Chalk, 1997: 81). This condition was different from previous times when the majority of the Mindanao people were Muslim.

The colonial government in Manila actually not only encouraged non-Muslims to migrate in Mindanao, but also offered many benefits for people who were willing to move there. For example, the government provided loans to those who were lacked of funds and gave huge lands to new settlers. The colonial government applied some policies from marginalized Islamic values in formal and informal daily life of people in Mindanao (Islam, 1998:

445). Certainly, the policies of land had serious consequence for Muslims in Mindanao and triggered conflict in this region. This is because Muslims were not only being displaced from their traditional areas, but also were being dispossessed of their communal property by the new-comers (Chalk, 1997: 81).

It is interesting to note that the Moro leaders actually submitted a memorandum to the U.S. government before the Philippines independence in 1946. They stated that they did not want to be included in the Philippines state because these two people in Mindanao had not lived in harmony. Unfortunately, the U.S. government refused this proposal (Islam, 1998: 445-446). In the post independence of the Philippines, the government continued to apply the colonial policy and practice further repressive policy. In 1960s, after the massive migration from the Northern and Central Philippines, the Moro became a virtual minority in their own area. The government also transferred the wealth from Mindanao to other part in the country and continued to use the old laws to occupy the Muslims' lands for re-settlement projects and plantation agriculture. As a consequence, violent clashes at the area became a regular incidence. At the same time, riots and criminal acts also broke out in many parts of Mindanao (Ferrer: 2010: 23-24; Islam, 1998: 445-448). In this regard, Jacques Bertrand (2000: 44) showed that the Philippines government's policy intensified to issue insecurity and the feeling of marginalization toward the Moro's. As a result, the Moro ownership to the land decreased rapidly from times to times. For example, in 1912 the Moro owned most of the land in Mindanao and Sulu, but in 1972 they only had 30 % of the land. Ironically, the Moro only represented 17 % of total landowners.

Meanwhile, the conflict in Mindanao

turned into more complexes and reached its peak during the Ferdinand Marcos era. The president ruled the country repressively. In fact, the current armed conflict began in the late 1960s which was followed by the explosion of the Jabaidah incident on March 17, 1968. At this incident, 28 Muslims trainees of the Philippines Army were slaughtered by their superiors on Corregidor Island (Quimpo, 2001: 275). As a result, the gradual worsening of the Muslims in Mindanao together with the 1968 Jabaidah massacre led to the declaration of the MIM (the Muslims (Mindanao) Independence Movement) in 1968. After the formation of MIM, the Catholics launched the anti-Moro Ilaga Movement as the counter organization. (Islam, 1998: 448).

The Peace Process and Its Dynamics

Due to the cooptation of MIM's leaders by the government, the young Muslims militant then set up the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) in 1969 led by Nur Misuari. This organization proposed as the Muslim's armed struggle for self-determination. Indeed, the MNLF issued a manifesto in 1974 which contained condemning the worse policies of "Filipino colonialism" against the "Bangsa Moro People" and declaring the formation of the "Bangsa Moro Republik" and armed wing, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) (Quimpo, 2001: 275-276). The MNLF succeeded to acquire supports from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), and Libya. In fact, the formation of the MNLF had caused the conflict in Mindanao rapidly escalated. Therefore, President Marcos imposed martial law in 1972 as the solution for the serious violent confrontations between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao (Chalk, 1997: 82; Tan, 2000: 271-272).

By imposing this law, according to Chalk (1997: 82), the Philippines government gave the army unlimited power to fight against the armed Muslim insurgency in the South. Besides that, the government also formed Christian wings to support the war against the Moro separatists and their supporters. Quimpo (2001: 275) argues that by imposing this law, the Marcos government declared Muslim insurgency as one of the two biggest threats to national security which had to be eliminated. MNLF responded these attacks by strengthening its army to confront with the government. By the mid 1970s, the people who were dead because of the civil war had risen at least 60.000. In fact, the civil war also displaced more than 200,000 people and caused huge physical damage (Chalk, 1997: 82). However, Tan (2000: 272) shows that over 100,000 people were dead in the war and over 500,000 fleeing as refuges.

Due to the high cost of financial resources and human casualties that was spent by the Philippines government in fighting with the Moro rebellion, in the mid-1970s the government tried to find a solution to overcome the Mindanao conflict. Marcos tried to negotiate with the MNLF that culminated by signing the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 (Chalk, 1997: 82). The peace agreement which was facilitated by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was the new development of the Mindanao conflict. The agreement provided many good things such as a cease-fire and the creation of the autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao. Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, was also able to cooperate with the government by accepting autonomy for 13 of Mindanao's 21 provinces rather than provoking for full independence of Mindanao region (Tan, 2000: 272).

However, the agreement was broken down not long after the Philippines government and the MNLF signed it. So, it can

be said that the agreement only worked in the paper without zero effort to implement it. As asserted by Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005: 2), Marcos did not implement the agreement because it was meant to carve out provinces in Mindanao to constitute as the autonomy region under the MNLF supervision. Thus, the government would not gain any benefits from this agreement. Syed Serajul Islam (1998: 449) argues that actually Marcos did not have any political will to solve the Mindanao conflict. The Marcos government interpreted the agreement differently and stated that "autonomy" was the internal matter of the Philippines. The MNLF objected the government's plan and interpretation about the agreement. Consequently, the cease-fire between the government and the MNLF collapsed and the conflict resumed in higher tension.

Peter Chalk (1997: 84) states that there were no single reasons behind the failure of the Tripoli Agreement. He shows that the agreement failed for 3 reasons. Firstly, opposition acts from the Christian population in Mindanao who did not want to integrate in autonomous Muslim region. Secondly, the Marcos government which made a general failure to fully implement the autonomy provisions of the agreement. Thirdly, the content of agreement which did not give full independence to the Moro that became the goal of some radical elements in the MNLF. Moreover, the failure of the Libya agreement stimulated the establishment of the MILF (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) which undermined the credibility of the MNLF leaders. The organization which led by Hashim Salamat had an objective to struggle independent Muslim Moro State (Islam, 1998: 449-450; Tan, 2000: 272). After that, both of the MNLF and the MILF competed to persuade the Marcos government to make negotiations. Unfortunately, both of them failed and the Marcos regime could not end the conflict in Mindanao.

Furthermore, People Power Revolution in January 1986 had succeeded to overthrow Marcos from the power and brought Corazon Aquino as the new president of the Philippines. This moment stimulated the new hope for the peace negotiation between the government and the Muslim groups in Mindanao. Both of the MNLF and the MILF also appreciated and agreed to reconcile with each other. Then, they enter a joined negotiation with the Aquino government. However, according to Rodell (2007: 231), the talks about the peace agreement were not clear from the beginning because the government insisted to implement the autonomy without negotiating their specific intention with the Muslim group. When the Philippine Congress created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in August 1989, only four provinces of the 12 provinces agreed to become parts of the autonomous region. Consequently, both the MNLF and MILF strongly objected the model of autonomous region which were offered by the government. Having been ignored by the government, the MNLF and the MILF accused that the Aquino government violated the Tripoli agreement. Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005: 2-3) show that after this event both of the MNLF and the MILF continued their armed struggle against the government.

In this respect, Bertrand (2000: 39-40) argues that the serious cause that made the peace agreement between the Philippines government and the MNLF-the MILF failed was the disagreement about the regions which included to the autonomous region. He also points out that the position of the Philippines armed forces which did not agree about the peace negotiation with the Muslim rebel groups broke down the

agreement. At the same time, the position of Aquino before the armed forces was weak because several coup movements happened against her governance. In addition, Andrew Tan (2000: 273-274) conveys that the peace negotiation also failed because of the MILF attack to the government and the MNLF units as their attempts to scuttle the negotiations. Thus, when the ARMM was declared in 1990 by the government, only few of the Moro rebels accepted this institution. In fact, the ARMM did not represent the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement and the Islam-based autonomy which was struggled by the MNLF (Chalk: 1997: 85).

It is important to note that after the rejection of the ARMM by the Muslims in Mindanao, actually both the government and the MNLF continued to make peace efforts. In this regard, Islam (1998: 450) shows that Fidel Ramos presidency era which was started in 1992 gave the new hope for the MNLF for making the peace negotiation. As a result, the peace agreement was signed by the government and the MNLF in 1996. This agreement gave the authority to the MNLF to become the overseer of economic development projects in all provinces in Mindanao for three years. Besides that, it also led to the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council of Peace and Development (SPCPD) which positioned Nur Misuari as the region's governor. According to Bertrand (2000: 40-41), the compromise between the government and the MNLF because of the Ramos government accepted the principle of an enlarged autonomous region. Besides that, the peace agreement referred to the Tripoli agreement and the government committed to make a clear process in peace making. The Ramos government also had greater control to armed forces and political stability in domestic region.

However, the Philippines government and the MNLF Peace Agreement of September 1996 remained many serious problems that had not been anticipated before. The government thought that because the MNLF represented the majority of Muslims in Mindanao, so by negotiating with them would attract all Muslims. Unfortunately, the issue of whom and what Nur Misuari represented remained to cause a problem of serious dispute for some extreme Muslim and Christian groups. They conveyed that the agreement did not start the peace action. Nevertheless, it was the beginning of the conflict. Christian people also objected that because the agreement did not include their interests and aspirations (Chalk, 1997: 87). Similarly, the MILF also protested the accord and believed that the sole solution for the Mindanao's conflict was the establishment of Islamic state. In respond to these political conditions, President Ramos then opened negotiations with the MILF. The Ramos government promised the MILF that it will prioritize the legislative measures that promoted the economic and social conditions and the ancestral domain of the Muslims group (Islam, 1998: 451). By making negotiations with both of the MNLF and the MILF, the government hoped that the Mindanao's decade-old conflict could be ended.

Meanwhile, Nur Misuari's leadership in the ARMM's administration actually only had limited authority to fulfil its mission. The ARMM's never delivered basic social services and only did few initiatives to alleviate the poverty in Mindanao. As a result, when Nur Misuari's finished his power in 2001, he did not show social and economic progress as both ARMM governor and the chair of SPCPD did. Then, the Philippines government inaugurated other person to lead the SPCPD. Due to the disappointment for the government political

policy, Nur Misuari led the boycott to this policy and called his followers to struggle against the government (Rodell, 2007: 231-232). In this respect, some scholars argue that the peace agreement failed to settle the issues of political autonomy and mobilization of resources. Even though there was no war during the time, political tensions was unpredictable and violence also often happened (Malapit, Clemente, and Yunzal: 2003: 36). Both of the government and the MNLF were actually responsible for this failure. The weakness of the MNLF leadership and the lack of strong commitment and resources from the Philippines government were the major causes of the failure of the agreement.

The political and social situations in Mindanao during President Joseph Estrada's governance were different from the Ramos's era. Although the government did not receive the threat from the MNLF, the MILF and the ASG (The Abu Sayyaf Group) continued to use armed struggle against the government. Due to the lack of understanding of the previous peace initiatives and to respond to the attacks, Estrada launched an "all-out war" policy in April 2000. In this operation, the government mobilized a large military group to damage several of the MILF camps. The MILF responded this attack by making guerrilla operations in many part of the region (Schiavo-Campo and Rudd, 2005: 3). Certainly, the attack became a serious problem of the Mindanao peace movement. Nevertheless, the new hope of peace agreement reoccurred when the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to rule the Philippines. In February 2001, President Arroyo created an-all Mindanao panel which had responsibility together with the government in general to pursue an "all-out peace" policy toward the Mindanao's conflict (Rood, 2004: 1-2). After that, the government made several meetings with the MILF to seek solution and to make a cease-fire agreement. Unfortunately, the peace agreement between the government and the Muslim groups in Mindanao has not yet achieved until today. The global war on terror which was launched by the U.S. after the 11/9 tragedy, also made the conflict in Mindanao more complex. This was because the Arroyo's regime asked the U.S. military to force Muslim rebellions in the Southern Philippines rather than to make a dialogue. Consequently, the conflict which displaced more than half million of people and caused the deaths of dozens of civilians still continues.

The Future Peace in the Mindanao Conflict

It is interesting to note that although religious differences were seen as the main causes of the conflict in Mindanao, actually the roots of the conflict were beyond the religious factor. As Schiavo-Campo and Rudd (2005: 2) stated, the clash of interest in land, other natural resources, and the identity issues from the *de facto* second class status of the Moro populations were the main roots of the Mindanao's conflict. As a consequence, Bertrand insists (2000: 54) that there will be no final resolutions of the conflict without addressing issues of the land, the position of Christians and *Lumads*, and the preservation of the Muslim attitudes that should accommodate the rights of non-Muslims. He also stresses that the future of peace in Mindanao depends on a number of factors. First, the negotiations to make peace agreement with the MNLF and the MILF must be linked in some manner and accommodated both sides-intentions. Secondly, new institutions should have access to resources and clear authority. Thirdly, the MNLF leaders and the Muslims need to prove their commit-

ment to peace by eliminating their corrupt practices. Fourthly, the Christians and Lumads must be included in the negotiations for the future autonomous institutions. Finally, the issues of land will need to be addressed seriously and comprehensively in future accord (Bertrand, 2000: 54).

In order to gain a just and sustainable peace in the Mindanao conflict, the partnership between civil society and the government should be considered as the urgent agenda. This is because, according to Gutierrez and Borras, Jr (2004: 47), peace-building from below is very important to strengthen the peace-making that was done by state-authority. Thus, an interactive state/society institutional frame work by issuing the program such as land redistribution and agrarian reform are very crucial in peace building. Besides that, the involvement of civil society in the future peace agreement is very useful to reduce the influence of "conflict entrepreneurs" which often attracted people by provoking with sensitive issues. In fact, the role of civil society is also important to monitor the agreement, deliver and convey particular results to particular communities, and bridge the differences among many religious and ethnic groups in Mindanao (Rood, 2005: 36).

One of the major obstacles in making peace agreement in the Mindanao conflict was the Muslim groups which have different agendas and goals. In this case, it is very difficult to find the representative of organization which can represent the *Bangsa* Moro people. Even the MNLF and the MILF often attacked each other and did not have similar agenda; the ASG also did similar things. This phenomenon is different from the Indonesian case when making peace process in the Aceh conflict. At the region, Aceh people were represented by the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka- Free Aceh

Movement). Hence, the Indonesian government made the peace agreement with the GAM as the representative of Aceh rebels. Relating to this matter, Quimpo (2001: 288-289) states that the Philippines should consider to always making peace talks with both the MNLF and the MILF. This is because both the organizations have attitudes to join peace negotiations with the government. On the contrary, the ASG (the Abu Sayyaf Groups) which had excluded from the peace process from beginning and preferred to make a link with international terrorism groups should not be placed as the representative of the Mindanao Muslims. Then, if the government can create and implement serious peace negotiations with the MNLF and the MILF, the ASG will be politically isolated and marginalized. Therefore, the Philippines government should promote all Muslim Mindanao's economic development in the comprehensive peace process as the strategy to accommodate many objections that caused separatism (Rodell, 2007: 243).

Furthermore, it should be underlined that the participation of the international institutions as the mediator in peace negotiations is very important. The Organization of the International Conference (OIC) which had brokered in facilitating the peace agreement in 1976 and 1996 should be considered in the future. The OIC can still play a positive-third party role in making the peaceful resolution in Mindanao (Quimpo, 2001: 289). In addition, Malaysia should continue its role of facilitating the Philippines government-the MILF peace talks. Malaysia also has to consider making peace talks with the MNLF. In this respect, the involvement of the European Union which had rich experience and good reputation in assisting peace building efforts in many countries, should be considered too (Lingga, 2006: 12-13). The role of

the European Union which had succeeded in mediating peace agreement in the Aceh's conflict was one of success stories which can be considered as a lesson learned for the Philippines people.

Conclusion

This essay has discussed the Mindanao conflict in the Southern Philippines and its dynamics which influenced its continuing and prospects. It has been suggested that the Mindanao conflict actually was very old conflict with complex background. The conflict which has occurred for more than three decades caused huge damage and negative implications for the Mindanao people and the Philippines government. Indeed, the roots of the Mindanao conflict can be tracked for the colonial period when the Spanish and the Americans occupied the Mindanao areas. At that time, the colonial power made a policy which gave big negative impacts for marginalizing Muslims in Mindanao. However, this conflict not only related with the issue of disharmony between Muslims and Christians, but also very close with the issue of land, distribution of wealthy, injustice policy of the Philippines government toward Muslims, and economic integration for people at that area.

In order to end the conflict, actually both of Muslim groups in Mindanao and the Philippines government have tried to make peace negotiations. The peace talks which were facilitated by the international institutions resulted in signing the peace agreement in 1976, 1989, and 1996. Unfortunately, the three peace agreement failed to end the conflict. There were no single factors that caused the failure of the peace agreement. In general, these factors were: the rejection from other Muslim groups excludes the MNLF such as the MILF and the ASG, the protests from Christians who did

not include in peace negotiations, different interpretation about the autonomous region between the government and the Muslims groups, and the absence of the issue of land in the negotiations. The Philippines government and the Muslim groups in Mindanao have responsible in the future to conduct peace process by considering these factors seriously. Besides that, the partnership between the government and civil society should be taken as one alternative in forging peace agreement. In fact, the involvement of international institutions which can be a mediator for the conflict is very important. It is supposed to continue its roles in the future. At the same time, the Philippines government and Muslim groups in Mindanao should believe that more integrative and participative peace negotiations are the best ways to make a just, comprehensive, and stable peace in Mindanao.

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IMPLEMENTASI *AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE* (AOA) DALAM LIBERALISASI PANGAN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Indonesia has been involved and ratified the WTO agreement through Law No. 7/ 1994. One of important sectors that included in WTO agreement is agriculture. Agricultural sector had become one of hotly debated issues in Uruguay Round and had been ratified on 15 December 1993. Through Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) stipulates members of WTO to open their domestic market to foreign agricultural commodities and vice versa (called as Market Access), to reduce support and subsidies to the farmers (domestic support) and reduce support and subsidies to farmer to do export (Export subsidies). The ratification of AoA faced Indonesia in a challenging situation in time when domestic agricultural sectors has been badly deprived. Without a clear and determine strategy in agricultural sector Indonesia's involvement in AoA will put Indonesia's agriculture in peril.

Keywords: *Agriculture Agreement, Liberalisasi Pangan, Indonesia*

"Kolonialisasi lama hanya merampas tanah, sedangkan kolonialisasi baru merampas seluruh kehidupan" (Vandana Shiva)

Pendahuluan

Berakhirnya Perang Dunia II menandai reorganisasi kekuasaan pada tingkat antar negara. Sesudah periode konflik dan krisis terbuka dalam tatanan global, Amerika Serikat, selaku satu-satunya negara dengan perekonomian, politik dan militer yang masih utuh, tampil sebagai kekuatan ekonomi, politik, dan militer yang masih utuh, tampil sebagai kekuatan hegemonik dalam arti kata sesungguhnya. Tatanan ekonomi internasional sesudah Perang Dunia II muncul sebagai produk dari persaingan sengit antara dua kebijakan yang bertentangan di Amerika Serikat maupun di negara-negara kapitalis utama lainnya: antara internasionalisme liberal yang menghendaki sebuah perekonomian dunia yang terbuka, di satu pihak, dengan kapitalisme nasional yang menuntut lebih banyak peran aktif negara dalam mencapai tujuan sosial, di lain pihak.

Sejarah kemudian memunculkan kemenangan internasionalisme liberal. Hal itu dapat kita lihat dari perkembangan situasi ekonomi-politik internasional yang memperlihatkan dominasi ide-ide internasionalisme liberal (neo-liberal). Jadi setelah terjadinya pertarungan ideologis dan berbagai perundingan, akhirnya terja-

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di kesepakatan (konsensus) bahwa sistem ekonomi internasional akan menggunakan kebijakan internasionalisme liberal.

Berakhirnya Perang Dunia II juga telah memunculkan tiga blok besar negara. Blok pertama merupakan blok negara-negara kapitalis-imperialis seperti AS dan Inggris. Sedangkan blok kedua dan ketiga adalah negara-negara yang baru saja merdeka, di mana blok kedua adalah negara-negara bercorak sosialistis dan blok ketiga adalah negara-negara sedang berkembang di mana Indonesia termasuk di dalamnya.

Kemudian muncul peperangan antara Blok Pertama dan Blok Kedua yang kemudian dikenal dengan "Perang Dingin" yaitu perang yang tidak menggunakan bentuk fisik tetapi menggunakan ekonomi, intelejen, hegemoni sosial budaya, dan teknologi. Peperangan ini memperebutkan dominasi di Blok Ketiga (Negara-negara sedang berkembang). Negara-negara Blok Pertama (Kapitalis-Imperialis), disokong oleh perusahaan-perusahaan Transnasional *(Trans National Corporations-TNCs)*, menggunakan segala cara untuk memenangkan "Kekuasaan Dunia". Di bentuklah berbagai perangkat dan metode untuk melaksanakan ekspansi imperialisme ini, termasuk dengan membentuk organisasi internasional atau semacam rezim internasional seperti IMF, WTO, dan World Bank. Dewasa ini, kita tengah mengalami krisis akibat dari kegagalan *developmentalism*, suatu model kapitalisme Dunia Ketiga era pasca-kolonialisme. Kegagalan *developmentalism* pada negara-negara yang dijadikan model yakni negara-negara yang dianggap paling sukses dan paling banyak dijadikan contoh bagi kapitalisme. Dunia Ketiga, yakni negara-negara kapitalisme model NICs *(Newly Industrialst Countries)*, seperti Korea Selatan dan Taiwan, juga termasuk negara NIC baru seperti Thailand, Malaysia, dan Indonesia. Sampai saat ini

berbagai penjelasan terhadap krisis itu belum selesai. Berbagai penjelasan lebih menyalahkan faktor korupsi dan *bad governance* rezim negara-negara tersebut sebagai akar krisis kapitalisme di Asia tersebut. Meskipun demikian, menjelang kejatuhan kapitalisme Asia *discourse* baru telah diciptakan untuk mereformasi sistem kapitalisme tersebut. Sebagai suatu reformasi dan bukannya transformasi maka pendekatan, ideologi, dan struktur *discourse* baru itu tidak jauh berbeda dengan sistem, struktur, dan ideologi yang dijadikan landasan bagi *developmentalism* yang mengalami krisis tersebut (Fakih, 2004; 1).

Perdagangan internasional pasca perang dunia kedua bisa ditafsirkan perang antara ideologi ekonomi liberal dan merkantilis dan dan ideologi anti liberal lainya. Sampai awal 1970an sistem perdaghangan lebih banyak didominasi oleh gagasan liberal yang diajukan oleh amerika serikat. Periode antar pertengahan 1970an sampai awal 1980an adalah masa kritis yang diwarnai oleh kemerosotan hegemoni amerika serikat dan menigkatnya posisi bergaining negara-negara selatan, gagasan reformis dan neo-merkantilis muncul kembali mendominasi arena ekonomi politik internasional. Ketika ekonomi negara-negara utara mulai membaik dan perdagangan dunia tumbuh kembali, yaitu pada pertengahan 1980an sampai awal 1994 di tandai dengan gagasan liberal berhasil muncul kembali membendung kecenderungan merkantilis. Dinamika baru yang muncul dalam perundiingan GATT, putaran uruguay pada awal 1990an menunjukan kemenangan liberalisme (Mas'oed, 1998). Sementara itu komunisme yang menjadi satu-satunya yang paling tegas menolak dan menjadi pesaing ideologi liberal sedang menuju kematian dengan hadirnya Mikhail Gorbacvev ke majelis umum PBB pada tahun 1988, menyampaikan pidato historis dengan satu

peryataan bahwa perang dingin telah berakhir. Komunisme gagal dalam perang tujuh puluh tahun melawan sistem kapitalis global (Herzt, 2005).

Sebagai negara ekonomi terbuka (*Open Economic*) situasi pasar domestik di Indonesia tidak terlepas dari gejolak pasar dunia yang semakin liberal. Proses liberalisasi tersebut dapat terjadi karena kebijakan unilateral dan konsekuensi keikutsertaan meratifikasi kerjasama perdagangan regional maupun global yang menghendaki penurunan kendala-kendala perdagangan. Dalam sistem ekonomi tertutup negara hanya mengkonsumsi barang dan jasa sebanyak yang diproduksi sendiri. Akan tetapi dengan melakukan perdagangan terbuka (*open economic*) suatu negara memiliki kesempatan mengkonsumsi lebih besar dari kemampuanya berproduksi karena terdapat perbedaan harga relatif dalam produksi yang mendorong spesialisasi dan kualitas produk (Hardono, 2005). Sebagai realisasi dari hal tersebut, *Internasional Monetary Found* (IMF) kemudian didirikan pada tahun 1944 pada konferensi internasional yang berlangsung di Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, dan operasinya di mulai tanggal 1 Maret 1947 , serta didirikannya International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) yang kemudian menjadi World Bank .

IMF yang pada awalnya berfungsi sebagai lembaga donor dalam proses rekonstruksi negara-negara Eropa, kemudian berkembang sebagai alat intervensi departemen keuangan AS, khsusnya bagi negara-negara berkembang lewat berbagai program pembenahan struktural (*structural adjustment program*). Adanya IMF dan World Bank, membuat AS dan negara-negara sekutunya yang berhalauan neo-liberal mampu mendikte perkembangan pembangunan dan moneter negara-negara yang menjadi 'pasien-nya''.

Selain dibidang finansial dan keuangan yang sudah terwakili melalui IMF dan World Bank, upaya yang dilakukan AS adalah dengan mendirikan ITO (International Trade Organization) dengan format General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), sebuah forum multilateral yang dimaksudkan untuk mengurangi (bukan meniadakan sama sekali) hambatan perdagangan, khususnya tarrif barrier. Beberapa negosiasi pergadagangan (trade negotiation) yang menonjol misalnya kennedy Round (1967) yang didesain untuk menurunkan tarif rata-rata 35 % dinegara-negara industri utama. Kemudian disusul dengan Tokyo Round yang dirembukkan dengan sangat alot selama enam tahun, 1973-1979. Skema Tokyo Round lebih rumit dibandingkan dengan pendahulunya, karena memasukkan unsur liberalisasi non-tarif (*non tariff barriers*). Hingga negosiasi terakhir adalah Uruguay Round, yang dimulai tahun 1986. Proses ratifikasinya juga lambat dan mengundang banyak masalah, sampai akhirnya disepakati untuk menggulirkan WTO (*World Trade Organitation*) mulai 1 Januari 1995.

Hasil peraturan perundingan Uruguay mencakup 15 bidang, dengan tambahan masalah– masalah baru, salah satunya mencakup bidang pertanian yang diatur dalam WTO melalui *Agreement on Agriculture* (AoA). Dengan masuknya pertanian ke dalam cakupan WTO maka WTO menjadi pengendali dan penentu sektor pertanian bagi negara–negara anggotanya. Hal ini terjadi karena WTO merupakan organisasi internasional yang memiliki sifat mengikat secara hukum (*Legally binding*) bagi anggotanya. Selain mengatur perdagangan barang manufaktur, WTO juga telah melakukan pengaturan terhadap perdagangan komoditas pertanian, melalui mekanisme *Agreement on Agriculture* (AoA), yang merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan

dari dokumen hukum WTO (Deplu, 2004). Setidaknya terdapat tiga komitmen dalam AoA, yakni perluasan akses pasar, pengurangan subsidi domestik, dan subsidi ekspor (Dirjen Perindaginki, 2008).

Sebagai salah satu anggota WTO, berarti Indonesia bersedia membuka pasar domestiknya bagi produk negara lain dan menerima segala konsekuensi perdagangan bebas Selain itu, sebagai anggota WTO, Indonesia juga telah meratifikasi pembentukan WTO melalui UU No. 7 Tahun 1994. Sektor pertanian adalah salah satu sektor yang masuk WTO, dengan disahkannya hasil Putaran Uruguay (*Uruguay Round*) WTO sebagai rangkaian dari General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) pada tanggal 15 Desember 1993 (*http://ajiesaid.blogspot. com/2008/08/pengaruh-perdagangan-internasional.htm*).

Dengan menempatkan perjanjian pertanian di dalam WTO maka dengan sendirinya WTO kini mempunyai peran utama sebagai pengendali dan penentu sektor pertanian di negara-negara anggotanya. Semua kesepakatan yang ada di WTO merupakan perjanjian negosiasi multilateral (perundingan yang mengikat banyak negara dengan badan dunia) yang bersifat mengikat secara hukum (*Legally Binding*). Dengan AoA maka WTO mewajibkan anggota-anggotanya untuk : membuka pasar domestiknya bagi masuknya komoditas pertanian dari luar dan sebaliknya (disebut sebagai Perluasan Pasar/ *Marcet Accses*), mengurangi dukungan dan subsidi terhadap petani (Subsidi Domestik/ *Domstic Support*), dan mengurangi dukungan dan subsidi bagi petani untuk mengekspor (Subsidi Ekspor/*Export Subsidy*) (Setiawan, 2003; 72-73). Ketiadaan strategi dan arah kebijakan dalam perdagangan multilateral, terutama dalam AoA membuat sektor pertanian Indonesia semakin terpuruk.

1. Perluasan Pasar/*Market Access*

Sebelum Perjanjian AoA, Indonesia tercatat sebagai negara eksportir beras ke-9 di dunia. Tapi tiga tahun setelah AoA (1998), Indonesia bukan tidak lagi menjadi negara eksportir beras tapi justru beralih menjadi negara importir beras nomor pertama di dunia. Impor pangan Indonesia dari tahun ke tahun terus mengalami perluasan dengan rata-rata volume import 3,2 juta ton setiap tahunnya. Bagi petani domestik, dampak menumpuknya impor ini sangat terasa yang ditandai dengan tidak imbangnya harga jual hasil produksi (*out put*) dengan biaya produksi (*input*) (Khudori, 2004; 178). Di Indonesia akses pasar sebetulnya sudah terjadi sejak dahulu karena sebetulnya Indonesia tidak pernah menutup pasarnya terhadap import komoditas hasil-hasil pertanian dunia. Contoh kasus terjadinya praktek perluasan akses pasar dapat dilihat dari kejadian di bulan april 2000, dimana kapal Pin Queen yang memuat 9.519 ton beras asal Cina milik BULOG membongkar muatanya di pelabuhan panjang Lampung. Padahal seharusnya di pelabuhan Kupang, NTT. Hal ini mencurigakan karena lampung adalah daerah surplus beras sementara NTT mengalami kerawanan pangan.

Prinsip akses pasar bebas WTO telah menempatkan pasar domestik di bawah kendali perusahaan- perusahaan raksasa agrobisnis yang tidak peduli apakah petani di suatu negara bangkrut atau tidak, karena semuanya diserahkan kepada mekanisme pasar. Saat konsep kedaulatan pangan digulirkan, hal itu dimaksudkan untuk melawan WTO organisasi perdagangan dunia yang ingin agar pasar dalam negeri bebas dimasuki siapa pun, bebas menjual di mana pun, dan harus dijamin oleh aturan global.

Pemerintah Indonesia harus menerima kenyataan bahwa pasar domestik bisa di-

intervensi oleh produk pertanian negara lain. Demikian pula Indonesia juga harus melakukan kebijakan impor beras. Ini berdampak sejak 1998/1999 Indonesia menjadi negara pengimpor beras terbesar di dunia sebanyak 4,8 juta ton. Indonesia kini bahkan menjadi pembeli beras sebanyak 10% dari jumlah beras yang diperdagangkan di dunia, sekitar 20-30 juta ton per tahun. Rata-rata perkiraan permintaan per tahun beras impor mencapai 2,7 juta ton. Dampak lain perluasan pasar, seperti dicatat Bonnie Setiawan (2003), terjadi penurunan harga gabah pada 1997 dan tahun-tahun berikutnya, karena harga gabah ataupun harga beras petani dalam negeri harus disesuaikan atau dibuat lebih murah dibanding harga beras impor (Krisnawati, 2010).

2. Subsidi Domestik/*Domestic Support*

Komitment mengenai *domestic Support* (DS) diwujudkan dalam bentuk kebijakan penurunan subsidi baik untuk produksi maupun untuk dalam bentuk pengalihan (*transfer*) dana kepada produsen. Komitmen ini dilatarbelakangi oleh riwayat kebijakan subsidi yang telah mendarah daging dalam praktik-praktik industri pertanian di negara-negara maju. Sejarah kebijakan subsidi pada masa-masa sulit yang dialami oleh AS, dimana AS menyubsidi petaninya saat kegawatan *Great depression* berlangsung agar mereka mampu bertahan dalam situasi pelonjakan biaya produksi, sementara harga pasar relatif stagnan. Negara-negara eropa mengalirkan subsidi kepada petani mereka guna mendongkrak produksi makanan serta menghindari ancaman malnutrisi seusai Perang Dunia ke II.

Intensitas subsidi pertanian bertransformasi berjalan seiring dengan menggumpalnya atmosfer globalisasi perdagangan. Subsidi kini telah bermetamorfosa maksud dan tujuanya. Subsidi yang semula dimaksudkan untuk menghindari kelaparan, kini bergerak menuju keinginan untuk mengejar keuntungan di arena pasar global. Buktinya produk pertanian adalah komoditas kedua setelah farmasi yang meraup surplus perdagangan terbesar pada ekonomi AS.

Subsidi dan transformasinya tersebut apabila diterapkan secara berlebihan atau dibiarkan seperti yang terjadi sekarang akan mendistorsi pasar. Ketentuan AoA tidak melarang semua bentuk subsidi kepada produsen tetapi menentukan disiplin yang lebih teratur dalam wilayah domestik. Dalam AoA DS dirancang sedemikian rupa sehingga dapat dihilangkan atau kalaupun ia masih ada maka pengaruhnya terhadap distorsi perdagangan dan produksi tiap-tiap produk pertanian berdampak kecil sekali.Ada dua tipe dari DS yaitu yang dapat digolongkan dalam *Green Box*, dan lainya masuk adlam *Amber Box*. *Green Box*, mengacu pada Annex 2 AoA adalah daftar pembayaran domestik yang dikecualikan dari kalkulasi AMS (Agregate Measure of Support), seperti untuk program lingkungan, pengawasan penyakit, pembangunan infrastruktur dan bantuan pangan domestik. *Amber Box*, adalah pembayarn subsidi ke produsen dan subsidi domestik lainya yang harus dikurangi,tetapi tidak dihapuskan. *Amber Box* dihitung berdasarkan AMS yaitu nilai yang setara dengan tunai dukungan pemerintah untuk produsen pertanian. Semua pengeluaran pemerintah dibidang pertanian dianggap sebagai *Amber Box.*

Yang masuk dalam klasifikasi *Green Box* (GB) adalah jenis Support yang tidak berpengaruh ataupun kalau ada pengaruhnya tersebut amat kecil terhadap distorsi perdagangan, sehingga support jenis ini tidak perlu dikurangi karena secara sosial dan politik biasanyamasih diperlukan. Sebaliknya, *Amber Box* (AB) adalah semua *support* yang digolongkan dapat

mendistorsi perdagangan, sehingga harus dikurangi tau dilakuka pembatasan sesuai dengan komitmen (*reduction comitment*) yang disepakati.

Ada 8 bentuk DS yang masuk dalam *Green Box* yang dikecualikan untuk dikurangi, yaitu :

Pelayanan umum (*general services)* seperti *research, pest and disease control, extention and marketing services and infrastructure,*

Stok penyangga pangan (*stockholding for food security),*

Bantuan pangan dalam negeri untuk masyarakat yang memerlukan (*domestic food aid for the needy);*

Pembayaran langsung terhadap produsen (*direct payments to producers that are "decoupled" from production*), Pembayaran ini *"should be coupled from the type or volume of production and the factors of production employed"*. Jenis support ini banyak dilakukan oleh Negara maju terutama AS dan UE;

Asuransi pendapatan dan program jaringan pengaman social (*income insurance and safety net programs*). Produsen diperbolehkan menerima pembayaran dari pemerintah apabila terjadi kehilanagan pendapatan lebih dari 30% dari rata-rata pendapatan mereka.jumlah yang dibantu harus kurang dari 70% dari pendapatan yang hilang.

Bantuan darurat (*disaster relief*)

Program penyesuain struktur (*structural adjustment Programs*)

Program bantuan lingkunagn hidup dan bantuan daerah (*environmental and regional assistance programs*).

Kesemua *support* itu harus dinilai setiap tahun (*annual value*) yang dijumlahkan menjadi *Total Agregate Measure of Support* (AMS). Artinya komitmen yang harus dikurangi adalah yang terungkap dalam besaran atau nilai total AMS. Besaran total AMS didapat dari penjumlahan *support* untuk masing-masing produk dan *support*

yang bukan produk *spesifik. Support* yang diberikan untuk pengamanan harga dasar gabah misalnya, adalah bentuk support terhadap produk spesifik yaitu padi/beras. Sedangkan contoh dari produk yang bukan spesifik misalnya adalah program subsidi pupuk yang tidak diperuntukan untuk suatu jenis produk tertentu tapi banyak komoditas (Khudori, 2004; 63-66).

Sejak tahun 1998 pemerintah mencabut subsidi atas input-input pertanian, seperti pupuk, benih, maupun pestisida. Hal ini menyebabkan turunya produktivitas pertania karena petani terlanjur diarahkan pada pertanian konvensional yang berasupan tinggi (*high external input*). Dampaknya bukan saja hama dan penyakit merajalaela biaya produksipun melambung tinggi (Khudori, 2004; 179). Padahal untuk pemberantasan dan pengendalian petani memerlukan dana yang cukup besar dan untuk itu harus melalui KUT dengan bunga pinjaman 18% pertahun sementara masih ada resiko kegagalan usaha yang tidak terprediksi dan tidak mampu mengembalikan pinjaman. Dampak negatifnya ;a) biaya produksi menjadi tinggi akibat penghapusan bebrapa subsidi. Ini menimbulkan bentuk usaha tani yang memrlukan modal besar. b) harga jual gabah di tingakat petani dimana biaya proses produksi yang tinggi tidak seimbang dengan nilai jual yang diperoleh (Setiawan, 2003; 85).

Subsidi dan dukungan domestik dianggap menyebabkan distorsi dalam perdagangan internasional. Subsidi melalui berbagai cara dan jenis, dilakukan untuk membantu dan melindungi sektor pertanian di dalam negeri. Pemberian subsidi dapat meningkatkan kuantitas dan kualitas produk pertanian. Sehingga menyebabkan produksi lokal cukup memenuhi permintaan dalam negeri yang berarti akan mengurangi permintaan impor produk serupa

dari luar negeri. Pemberian subsidi juga akan menyebabkan over produksi atau surplus di dalam negeri yang kemudian surplus produksi tersebut akan di eks-por ke luar negeri. Surplus produksi yang terlalu besar akan meningkatkan tingkat suplai atau penawaran di pasar internasio-nal sehingga menurunkan harga produk di pasar dunia. Harga produk yang turun di pasar dunia, menyebabkan produksi dari negara lain yang tidak bisa memberikan subsidi menjadi lebih mahal, sehingga ti-dak laku di pasar internasional. Demikian juga dengan di dalam negeri, karena harga internasional turun maka orang/pembeli akan cenderung membeli di pasar interna-sional (impor) dibandingkan membeli pro-duk pertanian lokal. Dampaknya produksi lokal tidak diserap pasar dan petani yang menjadi produsen dan sektor pertanian se-cara keseluruhan akan merugi.

3. Subsidi Ekspor/*Export Subsidy*

Komitmen dalam subsidi ekspor dimak-sudkan untuk mendisiplinkan kebijakan dan tindakan pemerintah yang menyalur-kan bantuan terhadap ekspor daam ben-tuk subsidi ekspor. Pengurangan subsidi ekspor dilaksanakan pada target volume komoditas yang diekspor maupun dalam bentuk nilai (*budgetary*). Pengurangan sub-sidi ekspor bertujuan untuk mengurangi distorsi di pasar internasional, karena ke-bijakan subsidi ekspor dianggap dapat memancing persaingan yang tidak sehat antara negara pemberi subsidi dan negara pengimpor.

Subsidi ekspor untuk komoditas pertanian primer dibatasi sesuai dengan disiplin yang telah ditetapkan.Terdapat 4 ketentuan yang berlaku dalam pengu-rangan subsidi ekspor :1) subsidi ekspor untuk produk spesifik tertentu harus di-kurangi sesuai dengan komitmen, 2) setiap kelebihan pengeluaran pemerintah untuk

keperluan itu harus dibatasi sesuai dengan yang telah disepakati, 3) subsidi ekspor buat negara berkembang diangap konsis-ten dengan special and differential Treat-ment (SDT), 4) subsidi ekspor selain dari yang harus dikurangi itu, bila dilakukan harus diberitahukan terlebih dahulu. Kar-enannya, menurut ketentuan WTO hampir semua jenis subsidi ekspor komoditas per-tanian sbenarnya dilarang.

Pengurangan dalam bentuk nilai (*budgetary*) diberlakukan kewajiaban penu-runan sbesar 36 persen dan penurunan kuantitatif tarif volume sebesar 21 % dari total ekspor dalam kurun waktu enam ta-hun dengan menggunakan tahun adasar periode 1980-190. ini kmitmen yang harus dilakukan oleh negara-negara maju. Se-dangkan untuk negara berkembang, kewa-jiban pengurangan nilai (*budgetary*) adalah sebesar 24% dalam jangka waktu 10 tahun (Khudori, 2004; 76-77).

Pada dasarnya subsidi ekspor san-gat minim dilakukan oleh negara berkem-bang termasuk Indonesia Karena tiadanya kemampuan keuangan pemerintah. In-donesia lebih memberikan prioritas pada sektor industri yang berbasis bahan baku industri. Selain itu subsidi pada eksportir hanya berupa kemudahan-kemudahan ek-spor dalam bentuk izin dan pengurusan kredit ekspor dari negara importir melalui konsulat perdagangan RI di negara tujuan ekspor (Setiawan, 2003; 86).

Ketiga elemen utama dalam AoA ini merupakan tiga pilar yang satu dengan yang lainya saling terkait bila diterapkan. Oleh karena itu tidak tepat apabila ses-eorang melihat perjanjian itu hanya me-lulu pada aspek akses pasar (MA), dan melupakan dua pilar lainya (DS dan ES). Subsidi ekspor barang pertanian yang di-lakuka oleh suatu negara misalnya akan berdampak luas terhadap pasar ekspornya. Subsidi ekspor selain akan memperko-

koh cengkeraman di negara pengimpor juga dapat berpengaruh buruk terhadap daya saing ekspor bagi negara yang tidak melakukannya.

Demikian pula besarnya DS yang diberikan suatu negara terhadap petaninya akan mempengaruhi nilai ekspor serta membawa persaingan tidak sehat antar negara pengekspor. Hal ini dapat ditemukan dalam komoditas bsar misalnya. Akibat praktik DS harga beras internasional misalnya tidak lagi menggambarkan tingkat efisiensi atau ongkos produksi karena sebagian besar negara-negara utama eksportir beras melakukan pelbagai *support* terhadap petani mereka, tidak terkecuali buat negara UE yang masyarakatnya bukan konsumen makanan utama (Khudori, 2004; 77).

Pangan harus didudukkan sebagai hak yang paling dasar dari warga negara serta salah satu unsur dari kekuatan nasional dalam politik antar bangsa. Hans J. Morgenthau menyebutkan, negara yang berswasembada atau hampir berswasembada, mempunyai keuntungan besar atas negara yang tidak demikian keadaanya dan harus sanggup mengimpor bahan pangan yang tidak dihasilkannya, kalau tidak, akan menderita kelaparan. Jadi swasembada pangan selalu menjadi sumber kekuatan yang besar bagi sebuah negara, karena jika sebuah negara tidak lagi berdaulat atas pangan berarti telah terjadi distorsi atas kedaulatan nasional bangsa tersebut (Morgenthau, 1990).

Artinya bahwa sektor pertanian tidak hanya hanya sekedar sebuah paket industri, seperti industri sepatu misalnya. Petani adalah pelindung sah lingkungan hidup. Sektor pertanian tidak hanya memberi makanan dan pakaian kepada manusia selama ribuan tahun, tetapi juga menjamin dan melindungi sebuah ekosistem yang sehat. Penghancuran kehidupan petani adalah penghancuran lingkungan hidup, sejarah, kebudayaan serta peradaban dari sejumlah besar penduduk dunia. Oleh karenanya sebagai hak dasar, maka pangan merupakan hak asasi manusia di mana negara memiliki kewajiban *(state obligation)* untuk menghormati *(to respect)*, melindungi *(to protect)*, dan memenuhi *(to fulfill)* hak atas pangan masyarakat bukannya justru menjadikan pangan sebagai komoditas dagang.

Secara ontology konsep ketahanan pangan memang jauh lebih mapan *(established)* dari pada kedaulatan pangan. Ketahanan pangan yang diartikan sebagai kemampuan negara memenuhi kebutuhan pangan bagi warganya merupakan konsep yang diterima secara luas dan telah diadopsi di hampir seluruh negara di dunia.

Istilah yang menunjuk pada kondisi terpenuhinya pangan bagi setiap individu dalam suatu negara, yang di dalamnya terkandung aspek ketersediaan *(availability)*, keterjangkauan *(access)*, dan stabilitas *(stability)* juga lebih bersifat universal karena dapat diterapkan semua negara tanpa terkecuali . Hal ini mengingat, kondisi tahan pangan dapat dicapai di semua negara baik dengan atau tanpa dukungan sektor pertanian. Sebagai contoh, negara sekecil Singapura bisa tetap tahan pangan tanpa harus di dukung oleh produksi pangan domestik. Dengan pendapatan per kapita yang cukup tinggi, rakyat Singapura bisa memenuhi kebutuhan pangan mereka dari impor.

Sementara itu, kedaulatan pangan yang diartikan sebagai hak setiap orang, masyarakat, dan negara untuk mengakses dan mengontrol aneka sumber daya produktif serta menentukan dan mengendalikan sistem pangan sendiri sesuai kondisi ekologis, sosial, ekonomi, dan karakter budaya masing-masing, merupakan konsep yang muncul belakangan. Konsep

yang pertama kali diusung oleh gerakan Via Campesina pada 1996 ini muncul sebagai reaksi dari kegagalan konsep yang ditawarkan WTO terkait dengan ketahanan pangan dalam melindungi ekosistem dan menjamin kesejahteraan petani khususnya di negara sedang berkembang.

Secara konseptual, kedaulatan pangan yang mensyaratkan pengendalian sistem produksi distribusi dan konsumsi pangan memang kalah universal dibandingkan pendahulunya. Hal ini mengingat, konsep ini tidak mungkin diterapkan di negara yang tidak punya lahan pertanian seperti Singapura. Disamping itu, tanpa dibarengi dengan upaya peningkatan produksi dan perbaikan sistem secara serius, kedaulatan pangan tidak cukup menjamin ketahanan pangan atau terpenuhinya pangan di tingkat rumah tangga yang selalu terkait dengan kesetaraan sosial, kesejahteraan dan daya beli.

Namun demikian, konsep kedaulatan pangan menjadi penting ketika negara dihadapkan pada pilihan antara memproduksi pangan sendiri atau menggantungkan diri pada impor. Dalam perspektif kedaulatan, pangan bukanlah komoditas yang diperdagangkan begitu saja tanpa perlindungan. Oleh sebab itu, pangan seharusnya tidak ditumpukan pada pasar yang rentan, tetapi pada kemandirian dalam mencukupinya. Dalam konteks negara besar seperti Indonesia, ketergantungan terhadap pangan impor adalah ironi, karena selain mengabaikan potensi dan kekayaan sumber daya lokal juga bisa membawa ancaman bagi stabilitas nasional.

Berdasarkan pada uraian tersebut di atas, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa meski kedua-duanya berbicara soal pangan, batu pijak dari kedua konsep tersebut tidaklah sama. Ketahanan pangan lebih menitikberatkan pada ketersediaan pangan bagi rakyat tanpa memedulikan dari mana dan siapa yang memproduksi pangan tersebut, sedangkan kedaulatan pangan lebih menitikberatkan kemandirian pangan, perlindungan kepada petani dan ekosistem lokal. Dalam hal ini, ketahanan pangan dan kedaulatan pangan sejatinya adalah dua konsep berbeda yang tidak dapat dipertukarkan *(non-interchangeable).*

Norma dan peraturan dalam perjanjian internasional merupakan institusi yang dibangun untuk memenuhi kepentingan korporasi dalam membangun imperium pasar bebas. Gramsci dalam konsepnya yang dikutip oleh Robert Cox, menyatakan bahwa hegemoni merupakan kesatuan antara kekuatan material *(material power)*, ideologi dan institusi. Ideologi pasar bebas tidak akan dapat berjalan tanpa bangunan struktur institusi yang menopangnya secara kuat dan membentuk rezim lewat sejumlah peraturan dan norma internasional yang mengikat setiap negara anggotanya. Kepatuhan seluruh negara di dunia untuk menjadi anggotanya secara suka rela dan menjalankan segenap peraturannya (tanpa pernah memperdebatkannya) menunjukkan peran hegemonik para pemodal besar dunia. Institusi tersebut membangun konsep 'kebenaran' yang kemudian diterima negara anggotanya dengan patuh. Kebenaran itu diterima dan dijalankan oleh negara yang mengintegrasikan diri, seolah-oleh tanpa paksaan sehingga nampak alamiah *(http://www.globaljust.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=301&Itemid=113).*

WTO merupakan salah satu rezim internasional yang dituding negatif oleh banyak pihak karena terlalu menguntungkan kepentingan negara-negara maju, dan merugikan negara-negara berkembang yang mayoritas 'gagap' berkompetisi karena kalah bersaing dalam hal modal, teknologi, arus informasi, lintas jasa, SDM, dan lain-lain. Tidak hanya itu, pada pandangan

ekstrem rezim-rezim global seperti IMF dan World Bank dianggap sebagai 'serigala berbulu domba' yang cenderung membuka dunia ketiga demi kepentingan negara-negara maju, daripada tujuan dasarnya mengurangi tingkat kemiskinan global (*http://sinopaxsinica.blogspot.com/2009_04_26_archive.html*).

Lewat WTO munculah kesepakatan di bidang pertanian, *Agreement on Agriculture* (AoA), perjanjian yang dihasilkan dari putaran Uruguay ini, mengatur perdagangan pangan secara internasional dan dalam negeri. Aturan-aturan ini memacu laju konsentrasi pertanian ke agribisnis dan dapat melemahkan kemampuan negara-negara miskin untuk mencukupi kebutuhan swadaya pangan dengan cara bertani subsistens (bahan pokok penyambung hidup). Hal ini menyebabkan rendahnya harga komoditas mereka atas jumlah ekspor mereka yang juga terbatas.

Dalam kasus Indonesia, AoA merupakan mekanisme yang dapat mendorong distribusi pangan secara liberal karena lebih berientasi pada pasar. Setelah di ratifikasi oleh AoA, mekanisme ini dapat berdampak sistemik untuk waktu yang sangat panjang terhadap kebijakan pangan indonesia. Dampak yang akan ditimbulkan adalah adanya modus operandi yang sedikit berubah tapi dengan tujuan yang sama yaitu liberalisasi sektor pertanian, lewat AoA yang mengikat Indonesia, kebijakan kedaulatan pangan lebih dialihkan ke ketahanan pangan dimana pembukaan pasar dalam negeri bagi produk pangan dari luar negeri dan kebutuhan pangan dalam negeri di penuhi dengan mekanisme impor. Riwayat pertanian dalam sejarah dunia adalah seusia peradaban manusia. Begitu manusia berurusan dengan penguatan negara-bangsa (*nation state*), terjadi tarik menarik kebijakan. Dalam tarik menarik itu kebijakan protektif yang bertujuan

melindungi produk-produk pertanian domestik dalam ancaman produk pertanian luar menjdi arus utama (Khudori, 2004; 15). Liberalisasi pertanian telah menghilangkan kedaulatan negara untuk mengatur dirinya sendiri, seperti menjadi tamu di negara sendiri. Penderitaan petani semakin lengkap, ketika kini petani telah kehilangan satu lagi perangkat perlindungan dari negara yang tersisa, dimana BULOG sebagai satu satunya alat perlindungan harga dan penyangga stok beras nasional telah diubah bentuknya menjadi perusahaan umum (Perum) yang menjalankan prinsip berdasar bisnis semata. Produk dari petani Indonesia yang sebagian besar adalah petani gurem dan tanpa proteksi negara, harus berkompetisi di pasar yang liberal, dengan produk dari petani negara maju yang disubsidi besar besaran oleh negaranya.

Liberalisasi pertanian di Indonesia tidak bisa dilepaskan dari peran IMF bersama World Bank dan WTO, sebagai *triumvirat* (tiga serangkai) organisasi internasional yang mempromosikan ideologi neo-liberal. Paham neo-liberal pada intinya adalah mendorong terwujudnya pasar bebas, yang menekankan pentingnya mekanisme pasar persaingan sempurna yang tidak diintervensi oleh pihak manapun, termasuk peran negara. Peran lembaga lembaga tersebut sangat besar, dalam mempengaruhi dan mendikte arah kebijakan pertanian di Indonesia.

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LEARNING FROM VENEZUELA UNDER HUGO CHAVEZ

Desy Nur Aini[i]

Abstract

This paper aims to explain the dynamic of Venezuela's economic development under Hugo Chavez administration. It will shows several steps of Chavez's measures such as Venezuela effort to get out from the IMF and the World Bank intervention, nationalization the Venezuela strategic assets, building strong relationship with the other states and did many social projects for its citizen. Based on dependency perspective, it argues that albeit international criticism, Chaves's policy had important effect to the economic development of Venezuela continually.

Keywords: *Hugo Chaves, Venezuela, Economic Development*.

Introduction

Venezuela is the fifth largest producer and the fourth largest exporter of crude oil (petroleum) in the world. The oil sector has become the primary sector which it accounts more than three quarters of total Venezuela export income, approximately half of government income and one third of state's GDP (Gross Domestic Product). But, Venezuela does not get significant advantages because since they become the member of the Washington Consensus Institutions which are the IMF and the World Bank. Actually, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank dominated by the developed countries, especially the United States.

Both of institutions have decreased the Venezuela economic development. They have generated obviously the raising of unemployment, poverty, debts and the dominating of the natural resources. This is the impacts become the debtor of IMF and World Bank.

President Hugo Chavez has successfully brought Venezuela from the dependence condition that caused by both of them. There are several steps that have been done by Hugo Chavez in order to Venezuela could decide its policy without any intervention of the developed countries. It has improved the Venezuela income and increased the Venezuela welfare. This proves that Venezuela be able to show to

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the international community and become an independent state without the IMF and World Bank intervention. Since Venezuela has gone from the IMF and the World Bank, Venezuela is able to manage its strategic assets and promote its economic development.

This paper will explain more details about the progress of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez administration. There are several steps of President Hugo Chavez, such as Venezuela effort to get out from the IMF and the World Bank intervention, nationalization the Venezuela strategic assets, building strong relationship with the other states and did many social projects for its citizen, furthermore its effect to the economic development of Venezuela continually.

Venezuela at Glance

Since February 3, 1999 Venezuela was led by Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias (Hugo Chavez) a former military officer. The territory has large 912.050 km2. The current amount of their citizen is 26.814.843 persons (taken from CIA the world fact book) which dominated by Mestizo's tribe. Their majority citizen's believe is Catholic Rome. Then, Spain becomes their national language because actually it is influence by the past colonialism by Spain and they got their independence from Spain on July 5, 1811.

Venezuela is one of country in Latin America who becomes the world's largest exporters of crude oil. In 2007, the country was become the seventh largest oil exporter in the world. The oil sector is central importance to the Venezuelan economy because it accounts for more than three quarters of total Venezuelan export revenues, about half of total government revenue, and around one-third of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Furthermore,

Venezuela is an important player in the global oil market as founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), When Hugo Chavez become president, the Venezuela's economy dominates by government because the state oil company which is PDVSA, controls the petroleum sector and also government companies control the electricity sector and important parts of the telecommunications and media sectors. So we can see that the prospect of Venezuela's economic highly dependent on oil prices and the export of petroleum.

Hugo Chavez Leadership

Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias who born in July 28, 1952 is Venezuela's president since February 3, 1999, actually he seeks to implement his "21st Century Socialism", which purposed to reduce the social ills while at the same time attacking globalization and undermining regional stability. Furthermore, his action is really tended to the poor people, its proven by many foreign company has been he nationalize to increase the welfare of poor people.

He has a national television program which is Hallo President who can be "bridge" people to him because Venezuelan people can send their problem to the government, beside that it's program delivered the president activities. Beside that to improve the welfare of people Chavez did so many actions and mission likes Mission Robinson I which is combat the illiterate. This program very special because almost 102 years it is the first time that government act this program. Beside that, there is Mission Ribas and Sucre likes the establishment of school and scholarship, and also establishment of health centrals and many programs that concern to poor

people that cover by health and education issues, because of that Hugo Chavez is has a firm relations to the socialism.

Based on explanation above we can see that Chavez really support the Democratic socialism include integration of Latin America and anti imperialism. Then, he also really criticized neoliberal globalization and foreign policies of USA.

He is very controversial because he claim to against USA as the superpower country, his policy and actions are really controversial likes the nationalization, the main policy in land (Constitution of Land Owner Reform) likes give the authority to take lead of real estate company, agriculture land who less productive and many others who become establishing the protest especially from private side, because of that he was coup de e tat by his opposite, but he can become Venezuela's President again because many people that dominated by poor people are really pro to him. Furthermore, with his iron hand through the policy and action that was done by him, he becomes the important actor that really influenced the development of Venezuela.

Hugo Chaves Measures
Venezuela Refused the IMF and World Bank Intervention
Before President Hugo Chavez taken the government, almost 70% of 26 million people lived in poor condition. The previous leaders (neoliberalism) have made the Venezuela assets occupied by foreign companies, such as *Chevron Corps, Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol and Exxon*. As a consequence, the biggest of oil income was entered to the elites /foreign investors. So, Hugo Chavez decides to escape from the IMF and the World Bank and paid all of the Venezuela's debts. The development programs of them have made the developing countries getting worse condition. The

donation that has given is not free. The IMF and the World Bank's interest is they want to involve in Venezuela decision making process. Hugo Chavez always effort against this imperialism because he did not want the Venezuela's income was just for pays the debts, but it for the citizen welfare. Beside that, he wants to release from the dependency toward the foreign countries.

The successful of Hugo Chavez has been shown in spreading of anti-neoliberalism in Washington Annual Meeting 2007. The IMF has failed in handling the Asian financial crisis in the last decade and global economic recession. Brazil and Argentina considered that the IMF and the World Bank just support the developed countries like the United States and European.

Nationalization of the Venezuela Strategic Assets
The braveness of Venezuela government is to protect its national interests and fight the international companies. In 2003, the President Hugo Chavez nationalized the oil private companies like Petroleus de Venezuela (PdVSA) to strengthen the economic of Venezuela. This has been shown from the total of oil income (59 billions US$) in 2006. This policy has been also supported by the labor union. In 2007, he also nationalized 2 of oil sources that managed by TOTAL SA (French) and ENI (Italy). Beside that, he renewed the contracts and built the *joint-venture* companies. He also controlled tightly the Venezuela's oil fields and punished the international companies that resist the government control of it. In January 2007, the president Hugo Chavez nationalized the electrical and telecommunication sectors that are *Eletricidad de Caracas (United States) and Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela* (CANTV).

The Venezuela's seems like motor to influence the anti-neoliberalism in South America. The oil income is not only to improve the citizens welfare, but also to help the other countries to leave the IMF and World Bank. So, it means that Venezuela has returned its economic and political sovereignty.

Building Strong Relationships with the other States

Venezuela has built the cooperation with other foreign national oil companies with Brazil (Petrobras), China (CNPC), India (ONGC) and Iran (Petropars). Venezuela has also built the strategic association to exploit its oil which was named *Orinoco Belt Strategic Association*. Venezuela government has also signed the agreement of oil export with Cuba that Venezuela want to export its oil with low price (cheap). Beside that, Venezuela built relationship closely with the United States rival such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. They challenged the United State's domination obviously. In

OPEC Forum that held in Venezuela (1999), Venezuela has succeed in controlling the production of oil from 8,43 US$/barrel (February 1999) become 23,34 US$/barrel (January 2000).

Venezuela has conducted the same thing toward Latin America countries which give the discount for them. The struggle to against the neo-liberalisms has been shown through giving the helpful toward Argentina in order to pay its IMF debts (9,8 billions US$) in 2005. In the same time, Hugo Chavez bought the Bond Ecuador (300 million US$) to realize the policy of gas industry nationalization in Bolivia and strong reaction came from the United States. As the consequences, Bush government canceled the military aids about US$ 1,6 million and the soybean export (170 million US$). Hugo Chavez declared that he will buy the entire product and even want to give the donation (100 US$) toward Bolivia.

From the above explanation, there explained that why Venezuela get out from the IMF and the World Bank, and then

Table 1. Demographic and Economic Indicators

No	Indicators	Year			
		2005	2006	2007	2008
1.	Population aged 65+: January 1st ('000)	1,283.91	1,334.31	1,388.31	1,446.29
2	Population density (people per sq km)	29.93	30.47	31.00	31.52
3.	GDP measured at purchasing power parity (million international $)	264,089.19	300,615.34	322,349.56	351,538.13
	Annual rates of inflation (% growth)	15.95	13.66	18.70	30.64
4.	Consumer expenditure (US$ million)	67,435.46	87,617.55	121,878.36	173,963.20
5.	Annual gross income (US$ million)	**107,762.44**	**138,241.10**	**188,610.82**	**260,695.16**
6.	Annual disposable income (US$ million)	85,572.53	110,721.65	152,380.90	214,553.90

Source: Euromonitor International, 2009

Venezuela has nationalized of its strategic assets and has many strong relationship (cooperation) with the other countries which it could give advantages for Venezuela itself (the progress of Venezuela financially). There will be data about the raising of Venezuela's income (Economic Indicators) begin 2005 up to 2008, as follows:

of health service. The Special Development Fund of PDVSA, 90% allocated for the social projects annually such as agro industry, transportation, culture development, electricity provided. In 2006, 41% (bigger 27% than the budget in 2005) of total budget has been allocated for the social programs. 47% of it has come from oil income and

Table 2. Gross National Income of Venezuela

No	Year	Gross National Income (US$ per capita)
1.	1990	US $ 2650
2.	1995	US $ 3060
3.	2002	US $ 3970
4.	2004	US $ 4080
5.	2005	US $ 4940
6.	2006	US $ 6070

Source: World Development Indicator (2004) and World Bank Data Profile Table (2008)

Table 3. Lifestyle Indicators of Venezuela

No	Indicators	Year			
		2005	2006	2007	2008
1.	Consumer expenditure on food (US$ million)	18,744.9	24,303.6	33,736.0	47,837.4
2.	Internet users ('000)	3,354.92	4,139.77	5,059.56	6,007.53
3.	New registrations of passenger cars ('000)	228.38	343.35	389.96	432.55
4.	Consumer electronics (Bs billion)	165.88	232.09	314.87	454.55
5.	Dog and cat food (Bs billion)	171.45	207.67	216.67	230.75

Source: Euromonitor International, 2009

From the table 1 about Demographic and Economic Indicators above, we can conclude that when Venezuela taken by Hugo Chavez, their income are increasing year by year. It shows that, Hugo Chavez was decided the right decision if Venezuela citizen will be more welfare when their escape from IMF and World Bank.

Social Projects for Citizens

The popularity of Hugo Chavez in poor people has increased after he used the oil income for the social programs such as, giving the food subsidies for poor people, free tuition for education until college, free

53% from the tax income of big companies. UNICEF and Inter American Development Bank (IADB) considered that this program is the biggest and the most comprehensive in Latin America and even in the world. The data about the Venezuela poverty rates will be mentioned as table 4.

From the above mentioned, we could conclude that generally the poverty rates of Venezuela has decreased gradually and significantly. This could be seen in 1997 (when the President Hugo Chavez has not become the leader yet), the data has

Table 4. Poverty Rates of Venezuela

Year	Time Period	House Holds (% of Total Declared)		Population (% of Total Declared)	
		Poverty	Extreme Poverty	Poverty	Extreme Poverty
1997	1st half	5 5 . 6	25.5	**60.9**	29.5
	2nd half	48.1	19.3	**54.5**	23.4
1998	1st half	49.0	21.0	**55.4**	24.7
	2nd half	43.9	17.1	**50.4**	20.3
1999	1st half	42.8	16.6	**50.0**	19.9
	2nd half	42.0	16.9	**48.7**	20.1
2007	1st half	27.5	7.6	**33.1**	9.4
	2nd half	28.5	7.9	**33.6**	9.6
2008	National Institute of Statistics (INE), 2008			**26**	

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 2007

shown (60,9 % of people has still poor). In 1998 (when President Hugo Chavez has

and doctors from Cuba. *Robbinson* mission has succeeded in raising literacy (UNICEF

Table 5. Venezuela Human Development Index

No	Year	Human Development Index (HDI)
1.	1975	0.716
2.	1980	0.73
3.	1985	0.739
4.	1990	0.759
5.	1995	0.768
6.	2000	0.776
7.	2002	0.778

Source: Human Development Report (UNDP), 2004

been chosen) has become 55,4 %. In 1999, the poverty rates become 50,0 % of total declared and the final data that we see, the poverty rates has decreased become 33,1 %. This shows that the effort of President Hugo Chavez has succeeded. If we see the reduction of poverty rates in the line chart as follows:

The social programs have been implemented simultaneously and comprehensively. The education and health mission like *Mission Robbinson, Ribas, Sucre and Bario Adentro* cooperated with more than 30.000 teachers

data, 2005) and graduated 900.000 children of elementary school. *Ribas* gave the funds for the person who has dropped out in senior high school. *Sucre* gave the scholarship for the poor people to enter the university and also built the 200 universities simultaneously. *Bario Andreto* held the health service with medical treatment center. Beside that, there are also *Mercal* for the distribution of cheap food in rural area. *Vuelvan Caras* has mission to give the credit for the farmers and the Venezuela government has also distributed

million hectares of land for agriculture and also built the *Banco La Mujer* (Woman Bank) that give credits for the poor women reproduction.

In this paper about Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, we use dependency theory to explain and make analysis the relation between dependency theory and this case.

Dependency theory

Dependency theory is a set of theories which maintained that the failure of Third world states to achieve adequate and sustainable levels of development resulted from their dependence on the advanced capitalist world. Dependency theories developed in opposition to the optimistic claims of modernization theory which saw the less developed countries (LDCs) being able to catch up with the West. They stressed that Western societies had an interest in maintaining their advantaged position in relation to the LDCs and had the financial and technical wherewithal to do so. A variety of different accounts of the relationship between the advanced and less developed states evolved within the broad framework of dependency theory, ranging from the stagnations and surplus drain theory of Andre Gunder Frank (which predicted erroneously that the Third World would be unable to achieve significant levels of industrialization, to the more cautious pessimism of those who envisaged a measure of growth based on a associated dependent relations with the West.

There are three common features to these definitions which most dependency theorists share. First, dependency characterizes the international system as comprised of two sets of states, variously described as dominant/dependent, center/periphery or metropolitan/satellite. The dominant states are the advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dependent states are those states of Latin America, Asia, and Africa which have low *per capita* GNPs and which rely heavily on the export of a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings.

Second, both definitions have in common the assumption that external forces are of singular importance to the economic activities within the dependent states. These external forces include multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interests abroad.

Third, the definitions of dependency all indicate that the relations between dominant and dependent states are dynamic because the interactions between the two sets of states tend to not only reinforce but also intensify the unequal patterns. Moreover, dependency is a very deep-seated historical process, rooted in the internationalization of capitalism.

Actually, dependency theory could not be separated with the phenomenon of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. For long time, Venezuela and other Latin America states are already become periphery states or just depend to center state, which is United State. In here, United State has big roles to determine all policy in Latin America and also become decision maker in deciding all International and Regional policy in those states.

Before Venezuela taken by Hugo Chavez, this state as a periphery state which always depend on United State and even the leader in that time is pro-Liberalism. The fund from IMF and World Bank has spending in every sector and it used to buy products for industrialization process in Venezuela. But, it is become useless when

Venezuela does not get any advantages, because all benefits from industrialization process are sending to United State. It is because the actors in government are controlled by the interest group who has full authority to decide all policy. Therefore, the developing process in Venezuela is become slowly and even their debts to the IMF and World Bank year by year become increase.

In here, we would like to analyze the condition of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez which could give positive effects for the Venezuela economic progress. According to dependency theory, there are two parts of regimes that consist of center (developed states) and periphery (developing states). In here, center state that has full authority to determine all decision making in periphery state involved natural resources (oil). Center state through IMF and World Bank gives the fund for periphery state for industrialization and development process with some requirements that should be fulfilled by periphery state. As the consequences, those periphery states has experienced "trap in the debt" and causing the degradation of social and economic welfare, so that, periphery state is more depend on center state.

After since Hugo Chavez taken officially the government, Venezuela is facing economic problem caused by the debts from IMF and World Bank. He think that if Venezuela is still running the same system, which is being the member of IMF and World Bank, so the debts would not be stop but become increase year by year. He also has changed the liberal ideology from the previous leader become socialist ideology. His action is quite different with the center state's ideology which is use liberalism. Finally, he decided to escape from center state intervention.

Conclusion

In conclusion let me reiterate that President Hugo Chavez has brought Venezuela become more prosperous because since Venezuela taken officially by Hugo Chavez, he decides to escape from IMF and World Bank. He think that if Venezuela is still become the member of IMF and World Bank, they still would have debts and their natural resources will dominated by foreign company.

The phenomenon of developing countries is never being separated with intervention from United State. In this case, Venezuela as the fifth largest producer and the fourth largest exporter of crude oil (petroleum) in the world, for long time ago got the impact being the member of IMF and World Bank. The developing process and industrialization process that would done by them running slowly because in decision making the decision makers are dominated by interest group who has close relations with US.

From above mentioned before, Indonesia also can learn from the experience of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. How a leader capable to against the super power's intervention and prioritize the citizen's welfare. Hugo Chavez makes some step since Venezuela escape from IMF and World Bank. First, Venezuela Refused the IMF and World Bank Intervention. Hugo Chavez decides to escape from the IMF and the World Bank and paid all of the Venezuela's debts. The development programs of them have made the developing countries getting worse condition. The donation that has given is not free. The IMF and the World Bank's interest is they want to involve in Venezuela decision making process. Second, nationalization of the Venezuela strategic assets. All Venezuela's assets are used by citizens of Venezuela. Third, building strong relationships with the other states. Venezuela has built the

cooperation with other foreign national oil companies with Brazil (Petro bras), China (CNPC), India (ONGC) and Iran (Petro pars). Venezuela has also built the strategic association to exploit its oil which was named *Orinoco Belt Strategic Association.* Fourth, doing many Social Projects for Citizens. Hugo Chavez used the oil income for the social programs such as, giving the food subsidies for poor people, free tuition for education until college, free of health service. The Special Development Fund of PDVSA, 90% allocated for the social projects annually such as agro industry, transportation, culture development, electricity provided.

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THE SOUTHERN THAILAND CONFLICT IN THE THAKSIN ERA

Mujahiduddin[1]

Abstract

With the growing escalation of violence conflict, on July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra enacted the emergency power law in order to manage the conflict. Thaksin formed National Reconciliation Commission to overseeing the peace process in the South. Thaksin's policies to mitigate the Southern conflict, however, were considered as mishandling and had serious consequences by exacerbating conflict at the Southern area as well as at Bangkok. This article focuses on the Southern Thailand conflict management under Thaksin administration. Two questions arise from this focus: what are the underlying causes behind the conflict before 2000s? What are the triggering factors of the rising violence in the 2000s? It argues that the conflict in Southern Thailand had been triggered by the hidden competing of power between Takshin and the established monarchy network in the Southern provinces.

Keywords: *Southern Thailand, Conflict, Thaksin, Network of Monarchy*

Introduction

After more than one decade enjoys a relatively stable condition, the violence conflict in Southern Thailand (notably in Patani, Yala and Narathiwat province) escalated in 2001. Started from 2001, the number of violence incident and casualties has been rising. Data from Thailand Ministry of Interior showed that until 2004, at least 1.500 casualties (MNSBC, 1 January 2008). The Strait Times .com counted that there were around of 900 victims (The Strait Times Interactive, 3 October 2005). Compared with previous violence incidents, the military and police installations become the target of attack by the militant group. In responding the attack, the Thailand military used heavy handed raids on Muslim villages. These strategies were only resulted in retaliation, while the populace began to give sympathy to the militant group. Instead of harvesting support from the Southern people, two incidents provoke a more intense violence. The first is the Krue Se Mosque incident on April 2004 and the second is Tak Bai incident in Narathiwat province on 25 October 2004. Krue Se Mosque incident happened when the military attacked the militant group who retreated to Krue Se Mosque that considered as the holy and the

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oldest mosque in Southern Thailand. The Army commander ordered to assault the mosque and kill all the militant members. It was revealed later that the order to assault the mosque contravened with the order of the Defense minister, Chavalith Yochaiyudh who seek to find a peace resolution to the situation. While The Tai Bak incident was a fatal respond of the military toward a group of young man consist of more than 70 member who rallied over the arrested of 7 man accused of weapons smuggling. The military brought all the 70 young man in a truck to the military camp in the hot day. All the young man then found death suffocated after reached the destination. The Tai Bak incident was a fatal respond of the military toward a group of young man consist of more than 70 member who rallied over the arrested of 7 man accused of weapons smuggling. The military brought all the 70 young man in a truck to the military camp in the hot day. All the young man then found death suffocated after reached the destination.

With the growing escalation of violence conflict, on July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra enacted the emergency power law in order to manage the conflict. Thaksin also formed National Reconciliation Commission to overseeing the peace process in the South. Nevertheless, Thaksin policies to mitigate the Southern conflict were considered as mishandling and had serious consequences by exacerbating conflict at the Southern area as well as at Bangkok (Pathamanad, 2006). These mishandling policies mounted in the military coup on 19 September 2006 by led army commander General Sonthi Boonyaratkhalin to ousted Thaksin and replaced it with military junta to improve the stability and peace in Southern provinces.

The reemergence of the conflict in the 2000s apparently tempts my sense of curiosity,

by delivering two questions; what are the underlying causes behind the conflict before 2000s? What are the triggering factors of the rising violence in the 2000s? This paper will be discussed in three sections. The first part I will describe the historical roots of the conflict and the patterns of the conflict. Section two highlights the accommodation policy taken by Prem Government. Section three I will highlight the current conflict to seek causes of the latest outburst of violence. In this paper I will argue that the conflict that is drawn with violence is caused by the hidden competing of power between Takshin and the established monarchy network in the Southern provinces.

The Historical Roots of the Conflict

In general, Thailand is country dominated by Buddhist population. Approximately 95% of the population is Therevada Buddhist. The southern part of Thailand is inhabited with Muslim minority, at around 5% of the total population. Different with the most Thailand population, the Muslim area ethnic Malay and speak Malay as well. According one survey conducted by the Thai government in 2004 shown that in Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, over 76 percent of the population adhered to the Islamic faith (Croissant, 2007; 2). Of course, this estimated percentage is more likely to be changed now.

Historically, the area that today become to provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun was incorporated into Patani Raya or Greater Patani, flanked between the Siamese Empire to its North and Malacca Sultanate to its South. Although the people of Patani identify themselves as having the same culture with Malacca, Politically, they were under the Siamese ruler, following the defeated of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511. Since then, the Malay Sultanate of Patani an accolade of Bunga

Mas or gold flowers (Man 1990; 34, quoted in Harish, 2006a; 4). This relationship was understood differently from both sides, while Malay Sultane tended to recognize that sending bunga mas was as symbol of friendship, the Kings of Siam regarded this practice as a symbol a token of loyalty or as an emblem of allegiance (Chen Man 2002; 74).

The Thailand Southern provinces have also a long history of insurrection. The explanations of underlying causes of the insurrection are complicated. There are many factors as the causes of conflict ranging from religious and ethnic differences, social and economic deprivation to terrorism. With the long history of the insurgency, the triggering factors from one period to other period may vary and fluctuating, so there are no unchanging sets of explanatory causes.

From historical point of view, the conflict in Southern Thailand could be traced back to formation of the Chakri Dynasty in the late eighteenth century (Pongsudhirak, 2007; 267) By 1786 the Patani kingdom (the old kingdom of Patani comprised the provinces of Pattani Yala, Narathiwat, satun and parts of Songkla) was conquered by the first king of Siamese (King Rama I). The King divided the area into seven provinces that were governed by appointed local rulers under overall control from Bangkok (Croissant, 2007; 2). In 1902, because of force from British, however, Siam had to relinquish the Malay states of Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and Perlish to british controlled Malaya. This situation further forced Siam to annex formally the remaining areas of the Patani Kingdom so as to make sure its territorial boundaries. The annexation was acknowledged in the Anglo Siamese Treaty of 1909, so there was new territorial demarcation between Great Britain and Siam (Pongsudhirak, 2007; 267).

Although the Patani Kingdom has defeated by the Siamese Kingdom in eighteen century, the legality of the Siamese Kingdom over the Malay Patani areas was based on the treaty.

As integral part of the Siamese, Patani has udergone unberneficial treatments from the Siamese government, ranging from replacing local elites with sending governors and bureaucrats from Bangkok down to the Southern provinces (Croissant, 2007; 2) to imposing Thai culture in these provinces (Melvin, 2007; 13). The imposition of Thai culture was conducted by force to transform the multi ethnic society of Siam into a unified Thai nation (Croissant, 2007; 2). The Siamese's effort to control over the Southern provinces was also conducted by the assimilation policy. One of areas that become the concern of the Siamese kingdom was education. It could be clearly seen from the most controversial policy of Compulsory Primary Education Act in 1921. The policy necessitated all children to go state primary schools for four years and to learn the Thai language. This policy marginalized the central function of the pondoks (Muslim religious schools), as the most important place of the reproduction of Malay Muslim culture and identity (Melvin, 2007; 13) This situation led to a number of rebellions in the Southern provinces for instance in 1922 Tengku Abdul Kadir from Kelantan orchestrated and insurrection against Siamese kingdom. The Abdul Kadir's insurrection was resulted from the fear that the introduction of Thai would erode of the Malay identities such as the language and the culture (Haris, 2006a; 6).

In 1932, the Monarchical rule in Thailand ended and transformed into modern Monarchy state the Malays Patani was granted seats in the National Assembly and Senate (Pitsuwan, 1982, quoted

in Haris, 2006b; 52). However, these new progress was not long lived. Thailand was ruled by military dictatorship when the Ultra nationalist government of field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram (Phibun) came to power in 1938. The two periods of Phibun governments (in 1938-44 and in 1948-57) applied forced assimilations policies of the local minorities culture into the mainstream Buddhist "Thai-ness" (Croissant, 2007; 2) covering almost all aspects of Muslim identity and ethnicity, including matters of attire, bureaucratic administration, education, judicial settlements and revenue collection (Pongsudhirak, 2007; 267). In term of culture, Phibun wanted to incorporate Malays through the usage of Thai language and education. For that purpose, he banned the use of minority languages (including Malay-Patani) in government offices and imposed Buddhism as the national religion across the country (Melvin, 2007; 13). These policies basically wanted to create what David Brown called as "the mono ethnic character of the state" (Brown, 1994, quoted in Croissant, 2007; 2) Similarly, Saroja Dorairajoo argued that the leaders of Thailand intended to establish a "Thai" national identity as base for nationalism. For that purpose, the assimilation policy was employed to eliminate the cultural identity bonding of minority group and transfer the loyalty to the new Thai identity. The assimilation policy was caused by the dominant paradigm at that time that ethnicity was seen as potential threat to national sovereignty" (Quoted in Liow, 2007; 157, also in Cady and Simon, 2007).

Triggered by the assimilations policy, there were numbers of organizations emerged in the Southern provinces. These organizations epitomized the discontents of the Malay Patani toward Thai government's policy that considered as discriminated measures to the minority group. In

the 1940s, the first organization that tried to promote the unity of the Malays in Southern Thailand established, known as GAMPAR (Gabungan Melayu Pettani Raya, or the Association of Malays, of Greater Pattani). GAMPAR was founded by Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen with the main aims to "unite all south Thailand Malays and their descendants who were now in Malaya" and "to improve education and revive Malay culture in South Thailand" (Haemindra, 1975; 213, quoted in Haris, 2007; 53). Following the establishment of political organization such as GAMPAR in 1959 the first armed organization was established by the ex leader of GAMPAR that is called as BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani or National Front to the Freedom of Patani). The BNPP core objective was to call for independence for Patani. The leaders of BNPP were mainly from Patani Malay elites and religious figures such as the ulama and the imams of the mosques and the madrasah in the region. The BNPP utilized guerrilla warfare against the Thai security forces in achieving their goal. They also went hand in hand with the other rebels as well as criminal elements within Patani society (Melvin, 2007; 15).

The setting up of the BNPP inspired other groups to create armed movements. It was not surprising that in 1960s the number of rebellion armed group in the region was rising, though they had different emphasis in achieving their goals. In the early of 1960s, the BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional of Front of National Revolution) was established. Similar with its predecessor (GAMPAR and BNPP), the BRN aimed to incorporate the Southern provinces of Thailand in a Pan Malay state across Southeast Asia (Harish, 2006b; 54). Although the group was an armed group, they were also focusing on political organization as well as guerilla activities. The Third armed group

is PULO that established in India in 1968. It was founded Kabir Abdul Rahman, a Pattani aristocrat and Islamic scholar educated in the Middle East. Their ideology was "religion, race, homeland, humanitarianism". The goal was to establish and independent Muslim state through armed struggle (Melvin, 2007; 16).

From the description above, it is clear that the presence of the insurgent movements were the representation of the disappointment to the centralistic policies of Bangkok. The centralistic policies marginalized the role of the local elites. For instance, Bangkok preferred to deploy regional officials from Bangkok that could not speak Malay language. For the people of Malay Patani, this policy was symbolized reluctant position of central government to do business with them. It was also representing the dissatisfaction of the Malay Patani with the assimilation policies in which the Thai government needed to unite Malay Patani into one identity Thai identity. In fact it was widely accepted that culturally Malay Patani were different from Thai. Therefore, Malay Patani recognized these policies served as efforts of to abolish the Malay Patani identity, including religious identity (Islam).

Accomodation Policy under Prem Tinsulanond

The conflict was significantly changed when General Prem Tinsulanond, a native of Songkhla province, came to as prime minister in 1980. Under his ascendance, the government reformed the previous policies and employing new policies accommodating Malay Muslim's demands. The Prem's government employed the accommodation polices in pacifying and integrating the Malay Patani, by establishing the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre

(SBPAC), the Community Development Centre and The General Education Centre. These policies aimed to meet the Malay Patani dissatisfaction and promote the public participation. The SBPAC provided a mechanism to channel the interest of Malay Patani to the Thai government. Prem also gave amnesty to reintegrate the Patani insurgents to the society (Pongshudirak, 2007-268). One of these reasons of the reformation was failure of Thai government in response to those insurgents movement by military actions. Prem realized that military measure should be accompanied with political strategies. Therefore, in 1981, the Prem government also conducted an affirmative action by introducing a new administrative in the South which had goal to promulgate a shift from confrontation to negotiation, through the SBPAC. Another innovation policy was the establishment, of a civil, police, military joint taskforce (CPM, 43). This new institution was aimed to coordinate all security operations in the South and also to ensure the extra judicial killings and disappearances ended (Melvin, 2007; 16). The SBPAC succeeded in serving as mediator that was used by Malay Muslim to deliver their discomforts to Thai Authorities (Pongsudhirak in Tan, 2007; 268). The members of the SBPAC were dominated by local official, covered the three provinces in the South, supervised economic development program. Both SBPAC and CPM could decrease tension of the Malay Muslim insurgency in the 1980s and early 1990s (Storey, 2007; 5).

Based on the fact above, it is reasonable to say that from the 1980 to the mid 1990s, the level of violence conflict in the Southern provinces of Thailand has turned into low key, fractured and ineffectual. It does not mean that the flames of the insurgency movement have totally disappeared. The Thai government under Prem Tinsu-

lanod, however, has succeeded in managing the conflict by accommodating the Malay Patani interest.

The Recurrence of the Southern Violence – Conflict in the 2000s

In the 2000s, the violence conflict re-emerged in the South. The causes of the conflict might be the same as before, that the Malay Patani have politically been being marginalized by Bangkok, and they claimed that their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity were threatened with the predominantly Buddhist Thai state. The Malay Muslim also felt the discriminatory policy in accessing educational opportunities and in the socio economic development compared with other parts of the country. Nevertheless, there are also new factors that triggered the recurrence of the conflict. The has been a heated debate on the trigger factors of the conflict in the 2000s. some scholars argue that the conflict in the 2000s is caused by the presence of alleged connection among militant insurgents in the South with the international Islamic militant movement such as Jamaah Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda. Zachary Abuza, for example argues that the recent conflict emerged due to the impetus of jihad spirit. One of these objectives of the insurgent was to implement hardliner salafism on mainly the Malaya Muslim population (cited in Abuza, 2005).

The argument above is relatively weak because it is fact that the Southern militants never sounded jihad in their insurgence. Moreover, the never claim themselves as anti West as other terrorist group usually do. Another reasons is that they never committed suicide attacks towards Western representation/ symbol (Liow, 2006; 94). From the facts above, it can be said the conflict or violent in the South does not have much to do with the transnational Islamic movement such Jamaah Islamiah or Al-Qaeda. However, if the conflict is still taking place without significant efforts to mitigate it, the potency of the Southern conflict to transform into terrorism is likely to happen.

Instead of arguing that the recent conflict is triggered by terrorism motives, I argue that the reemerge of the violence is triggered by the power competition between Thaksin's government and network monarchy in comprehending and resolving the South situation. Network Monarchy is a concept build by Duncan McCargo that points out to the prominent role of the political elites and groups around the Privy Council led by Prem Tinsulanond and the King himself that continue to intervene in Thai democratic politics. For detail see (Duncan McCargo, 2005). Before analyzing Thaksin policies or measures related to the Southern Thailand. I would like to consider Thaksin's perception of that contributed significantly to his policies. First, he distrusted credibility of the officials and the security in handling deteriorating situations. Second, he thought the old established system as symbol of loyal to the Democrats, Prem, and the Palace rather than to him and his administration. Third, with new framework "thinking new and acting new" Thaksin was quite sure he could resolve the long standing problems that had deteriorated the Thais state and society for decades. Fourth, he would find the proper decision if he was helped by him most trusted connection. Fifth, he believed that reshuffling officials by putting the right man in the right job was one kind solution. The last is that Thaksin recognized the conflict occurred in the South as such kind of criminality that should be resolved by law enforcement (McCargo, 2006; 46).

According to McCargo, Thaksin's approach to the Southern Thailand con-

flict followed his perception. For example Thaksin's view was that the established official policies in the South in Resolving conflict as a representation of Prem. Democrat party, military, and monarchy network as mentioned before. Those should be cut off in order to gain political influence or power in the Southern Thailand. Basically Thaksin did not has political will to resolve the conflict in the South, except he wanted to have political influence because the South was only area not in his hand (McCargo, 2006; 47).As a result, Thaksin took several steps to disconnect the Network monarchy. Firstly Thaksin dismantled the SPBAC on 1 May 2002 sixteen month after become prime minister. He argued that this Centre was no longer to be needed because the old insurgency had metamorphosed into only banditry and putting the police to handle it. (McCargo, 2005; 514). The SBPAC was a main administrative body built in 1981 one level above the provincial governor and accommodating local community members on its board. The centre served as the administration of the Southern provinces and as place where Thai public could get information about the culture of the southern population. The initial aim of the Centre was basically as the counter insurgency effort against the presence of Communist parties of Thailand and Malaysia and it was successful to stem the separatist movement at the time. The SBPAC was a center where leaders in the Southern provinces and policy makers in Bangkok could share information. For example southern Muslims through the SBPAC could report corruption or inept committed by Thai Government officials and the policy maker in Bangkok were able to reshuffle the alleged official if the complaints were right or accurate (Saroja Dorairajoo, quoted in Sara A. Jones, 2007; 54).

Secondly at the same time, Thaksin

also abolished The Civilian Police Military Task Force 43 (CPM-43).As replacement to the CPM 43 role; he put the police in charge of maintaining security in the South. The reason behind this policy was that Thaksin wanted to break away the control of the military commanders and also cutting Prem's influence (McCargo, 2006; 53) The CPM 43 was considered as another cell of Prem's influence.

The third step was in May 2002 he pointed Wan Muhammad Nor Matha as the interior minister. Wan Muhammad Nor Matha is a muslim who also the leader of the Wadah faction, and a senior NAP (New Aspiration Party) politician from Yala. By pointing Wan Nor, Thaksin intended to break up control of the bureaucracy of the South from the Democrat Party based officials which undoubtedly was in Prem's pocket (McCargo, 2006, p. 53). At the time the only faction of non Democrat in the South Thailand was Wadah faction. The involvement of Wan Nor and the Wadah paved the way for the politically penetration of Thaksin in the region (Croissant, 2005; 9). In reality, the result of this appointment was far from what he has predicted. After being pointed as the Interior minister, Wan Nor was distrusted by many of his fellow Muslims. He was also incapable of dealing with the complexity of the problems in the subregion. His inability to cope with the police brutality in the block of a demonstration against the Malaysian gas pipeline in Hat Yai on 20 December 2002 undermined his position. AS one protestor who lost temper, Areeya Maedee of the Ban Nai Rai village, puts it: "How could (interior Minister) Wan Nor order the police to beat us ? He is also a muslim. Does he realize what he has done to his people? (Supara, 2004; 158, quoted in McCargo, 2006; 53)

Fourth, on 1 February 2003, Thaksin

launched a war on drugs campaign that aimed to decrease the drugs supply. He wanted to remove drugs from every square inch of Thailand within four months. The war on drugs was implemented through a tough enforcement including extra judicial action by the police and other law enforcement agencies (Marcus Roberts, Mike Trace and Axel Klein, 2004; 1). However in the Southern provinces, the campaign of war on drugs encouraged police to arrest selected local for extra judicial execution, killing some long standing informers who had close ties with military. This situation led to insurrection and competition between the police and the army in taking control of smuggling and other illegal activities (McCargo, 2006; 53).

These above policies and steps Thaksin have taken contributed in the escalating of conflict during 2000s. It could be clearly seen from the beginning of 2004, more than thousand people have died in political violence. In January 2004, insurgents seized weapons from the Fourth Development Battalion of the Royal Thair Army in Narathiwat's Jo Airong district. On 28 April, there have been a number of simultaneous attacks on security checkpoints by armed millitants. 113 people killed, 32 of them in an attack by the military on the tragic kruZe mosque in Pattani. Another tragic incident occurred on 25 October 2005; around a thousand Muslim protestors were captured outside Tak Bai police station. Approximately 78 of protestors died when they were packed in a truck in a trip some 130 kilometer away, they died due to suffocation or dehydration and many other kinds of attack took place in daily live in the southern provinces notably in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala (Pathamanand, 2006).

The deteriorating situation enforced some leading Buddhist and Muslim activ-

ists to ask such an intervention to deal with the problems of the South. Some people expected that King could build a caretaker government of national unity, as it had been established after May 1992. It was interesting to see what Dato Nideh Waba, chairman of the private religious school association in the Southern border provinces and deputy chairman of Islamic Council said, as following :

"We have no alternative apart from asking our beloved King, who is our father, to give us a royal government to tackle problems down here. In a critical time like this, who could we turn to if not our fatherly King who is our sole hope since all Muslim down here regard him with the utmost respect (McCargo, 2005; 515).

The petition of King's involvement from the people of the Southern Thailand could be understood from two sides. On the one hand, some of the people of Sothern Thailand disappointed with Thaksin's measure and assuming that one of these causes of conflict is policies that are made by Thaksin. They did not trust Thaksin's will in resolving the complex problems facing the southern provinces. On the other hand, the petition epitomized that the tie between some people of the Southern provinces and monarchy was still strong. In other words, the network monarchy in the South still has significant influence.

Due to the rise of escalating conflict, the rise number of victims from the conflict, and also pressure from the south, finally, after the February 2005, Prem created the remarkable public intervention, urging Thaksin to listen advise from the King and Queen in order to utilize the peace and thoughtful approach to the problems of the South, rather than using hardliner way such as military force. Surprisingly, Thaksin responded the advice by establishing

a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) (McCargo, 2005). This event could be interpreted that the network monarchy has still power to force Thaksin, though Thaksin was not serious to make reconciliation in the south. He established NRC only to soothe his critics, whereas utilizing state power to regain the control of a resurgent network monarchy. The protracted competition on how to handle the conflict in the South mounted in the ousted of Thaksin through military coup in September 2006.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that one of the underlying factors of conflict in the Southern Thailand before the 2000s is the insensitive policies of central government toward local interest or issues. The Assimilation policy and the centralistic policy often pointed as these insensitive policies. The Malay Muslim identity is the crucial identity that easily used as the reason to rebel.

The escalating of violence conflict the 2000s, apart from the ongoing identity problem, is also triggered by the intensity of power competition between Thaksin and Network Monarchy in managing the situation in the South. Thaksin recognized the South as backyard of Prem, the Palace, the military and the Democrat party. Thaksin also did not have political influence in the Southern provinces. In order to gain the political power, therefore, Thaksin tried to disconnect the network monarchy's influence in the South by dismantling the existing power structures, putting new officials loyal to himself, and giving the police pivotal role in new power structure.

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