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DEMOCRATISATION MOVEMENT AND OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRATISATION IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

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Abstract

This article analyses and compares the strengths and the weaknesses of democratic movements in Singapore and Malaysia. It also highlights the obstacles of democratisation in both countries. The question that put forward is, why the democratic movements in both countries are weak, unenthusiastic, relatively fragmented. Using Eva Bellin's concept -contingent of democrats, this article argues that the weakness of democratic movements in both countries are influenced by the nature of capitalist development that dominated or at least sponsored by the state. The higher degree of the social classes to the state will be followed by the higher degree of the fearness of these social class towards the state. It eventually resulted in the lower degree of enthusiastic political activism from the relevant social classes towards democracy. In overall, the democratic opening in Singapore and Malaysia require structural transformation in the pattern of relations between states and the social classes.

Keywords: *democratic movement, contingent of democrats, Singapore, Malaysia.*

Introduction

Arguably Singapore and Malaysia are the most resilient yet dynamic authoritarian regime in Southeast Asia. Singapore and Malaysia are both newly industrialised economies that attached with a range of modern attributes. Singapore has one of the highest standards of living in the world and urbanised. Singapore's GDP per capita is US\$ 36,537 (<http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/hist/gdp.html>). On the 2009 Human Development Index, Singapore rank of 23rd out of 182 countries (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_SGP.html). While as not high as its neighbour,

Malaysia also shares those conditions. Malaysia's GDP per capita is US\$ 14,700 (http://www.indexmundi.com/malaysia/gdp_per_capita_%28ppp%29.html). On the 2009 Human Development Index, Malaysia rank of 66th out of 182 countries (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_MYS.html). Furthermore, both countries have substantial and educated middle classes. Nevertheless, those modern components do not give rise to democratic political regime.

Singapore and Malaysia become a striking evidence of contradiction of modernisation theory of democracy. Modernisation theory argues that the level of

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socio-economic development, education and modern culture become the critical factors in explaining democratisation. Advance economic development (indicated by industrialisation, education and urban life) will result in the emergence of middle classes, which will demand for greater political liberalisation and participation. This process will lead to democratisation. Lipset, for example claimed that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959). In the context of Southeast Asia the indispensability of middle class seems under attack since the newly emerging middle classes in the region in general have been instead of enthusiastically support the democratic project they more interested in become the beneficiaries of state economic paternalism (Mauzy, 2006: 203). Why there is no democratic movement in Singapore? Why democratic movement in Malaysia is weak, fragmented and so far failed to articulate democratisation? Singapore and Malaysia cases are a clear evidence of modernisation paradox.

In this regard, the question on the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic movement and the obstacles to democratisation in Singapore and Malaysia therefore should be explained in a larger picture of dynamic power relationship between state and civil society that produce formal institutions within which politics will be played out (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009). Using structural perspective on democratisation and employing the concept of "contingent of democrats" (Bellin, 2000), this essay argues that the weakness of democratic movement in Singapore and Malaysia are fundamentally influenced by the process of capitalist development that strongly affects the capacity and the collective action of the social forces in mobilising democratic movement. When the "contingent

of democrats" are weak and incapacitated, this is in turn become the biggest obstacles of democratisation in Singapore and Malaysia.

This argument will be elaborated in three parts. The first part will provide a brief overview of structural theory of democratisation and positioning the importance of contingent democrats. The second part is discussing state capitalism and unenthusiastic contingent of democrats toward democratisation in Singapore. The third part will discuss the state-sponsored capitalism and fragmented democratic movement in Malaysia.

Structural Approach of Democratisation and the Contingent of Democrats

After more than a decade a great deal of academic literature committed to transition to and consolidation of democracy, the pace of democratisation around the globe enters a political grey zone (Carothers, 2002: 9). In Southeast Asia, although some countries underwent political changes but still it is considered to be "a recalcitrant region" (Emmerson, 1995). Amid the vast optimism that the region is no more untouched from democratisation wave, it soon has to face incomplete democratic transition and sophistication of authoritarian regimes.

Most recent literatures of democratisation in Southeast Asia are dominated by a surge of research that focused on the role elite and leadership and the importance of political institutions as determinant factors in democratic transition and consolidation (Case, 2005a; Case, 2005b; Croissant, 2004). In these studies democracy is identified as a product of elite rational choice in the process of negotiation and compromise, institutional functioning and conjuncture factors such as globalisation and "black swans" (Emmerson, 2008)². From transi-

tion theory, the political regime Singapore and Malaysia have been categorised as a hybrid regime. Focused on analysing political institutions functional and entrepreneurial elites, William Case described Singapore as “stable-semi democracy” (Case, 2009), while Levitsky and Way depicted Singapore as facade electoral regime (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Meanwhile, Malaysia portrayed as electoral authoritarianism (Case, 2009) or competitive authoritarian (Levitsky & Way, 2002). These analytic categorisations provide a more specific characterisation of political regime and detail depiction on the complex result of democratisation in the third wave era. However, those residual categories seem to be a representation of frustration in dealing with the resilience of authoritarianism in Singapore and Malaysia. By accepting the categories as a temporary detour to liberal democracy, those analyses fail to establish the true character these political regimes and fell short in understanding the substance of long standing authoritarianism in Southeast Asia.

Structural approach of democratisation pioneered by the work of Barrington Moore Jr. in his seminal book *Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy*. In this book Moore explained the different path of major countries that ended up as parliamentary democracy while others become communist and fascist regime in the early of 20th century (Moore Jr, 1966). The explanations were drawn from long-term historical process that shaped the class constellation and pattern of alliance and conflict between classes in different national setting. The country that produced strong independent bourgeoisie that able to work against

the landed aristocracy class and lessen the absolute claims of the state would likely to become democratic. In short, Moore's word “no bourgeoisie no democracy” is the key of explanation of democratisation (Moore Jr, 1966: 418).

Although theorisation on structural factors is underdeveloped³, growing attention to structural perspective in Southeast Asia emerges from the work of Richard Robison (Robison & Hadis, 2004) and Garry Rodan (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009; Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2006). Structural perspective tries critically evaluating the domination of “transitology” and modernisation theory by changing the object of analysis to historical process of political-economic development within which the political regimes are formed, forged and transformed.

There are several starting points of this perspective. First, unlike modernisation and transition theory that posit the mechanic linearity of liberal economic development and democratic regime, structural perspective argues that political regime is a product of struggles, conflicts and alliances among social power of different interest that associated with changing social and economic relations (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009: 2). This perspective also prefer using “regime changes” term rather than “democratisation” to avoid false regime type identification and concentrating on the examination of the changing form of political participation and representation by analysing the political struggles behind it. Therefore political institutions are not only understood by its functionality but also as the outcome of political conflict or alliance to explore deeper expression of

³Black swan in ASEAN means that there were something that extremely rare from ASEAN collectivism in supporting democracy in the region. For example, on November 2007 ASEAN Summit in Singapore, ASEAN leaders condemned the brutal measures of Burma Junta toward Buddhist monk protesters.

³Rodan himself acknowledge that there is no consensus yet among different “structural” scholar on several questions, should the forces be understood as classes or group? Are the conflicts between social forces generated by capitalist development or just incidental?

these institutions such as pattern of interest, conflict and contradiction.

Second, it is economic interest not enlightenment or other philosophical idea among different social powers that drives those power struggles, conflicts and alliances in regime change process (Bellin, 2000: 177). Because of the importance of material interest, this perspective propounds that those power struggles should be understood by tracing down the historical process of capitalist development. In the capitalist development process, the nature of power relations among social forces is expressed and forged. The dynamic of capitalist development process also affects the capacity of such social forces to conflict and or alliance with other social forces that will determine the future of political regimes (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009: 24-25).

Third, what cast as social forces or social powers that become the centre stage of explanation are capitalist class and working class. Echoing Barrington Moore proposition of "no bourgeoisie no democracy" capitalist class, motivated by economic interests, mobilised their power to create a mediation institutions (parliamentary institutions) to control the state power. Working class also identified as agent of regime changes. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, for example, argued that the working class is the true democratic forces, since this class demands for civil liberties and extensive participation that motivated by the aspiration to alleviate economic subordination (Rueschemeyer, Stephen & Stephen, 1992). Nevertheless, those conclusions were drawn for Western Europe experiences which is often categorised as first tier industrialising countries. What about the role of those social forces in the late industrialising countries such as East and Southeast Asia and Latin America countries?

At this stage, Bellin's concept of "contingent democrats" is useful. She argues in the late industrialising countries' case, different with Western Europe experiences, capitalist and working class are much more ambivalent about democratisation (Bellin, 2000: 178). There are several contingency variables that affected the attitude toward democratisation, for capitalist class, the variables are state dependence and fear; for working class, the variables are state dependence and aristocratic position.

To sum up Bellin's argument; the relationship between capitalist class and democratisation depends on the degree of state dependence and the degree of fear. State sponsorship in the capitalist development process makes the capitalist lack of self confidence to democratisation because the capitalist realises that their profitability depends on the state's economic discretion through "collaborative profitability". The higher degree of state dependence combines with state elite's enmity to democratic project resulting in low support of capitalist to democratisation. The degree of fear also affected the capitalist position to democratisation. The biggest concern of the capitalist is to protect their property rights and long term benefits of its business activities (the logic of accumulation). That is why the capitalist prefers stability and order rather than democratisation which will put their privileges on perils by the wave of political inclusion and the demand for wealth distribution.

Similarly, working class's relish to democratisation much more depends on state's support for the viability of labour organisation. Under state's corporatism, labour organisation may be granted political and financial support at the expense of political loyalty to the government. In the situation where labour relies on state's

benevolence, labour will choose to collaborate with the government rather than jeopardising their interest in the name of democracy. Another variable that also affect the labour's stance on democratisation is the degree of economic privilege of the organised labour among other informal sectors in population. If the degree of privilege is high, it will make the working class diffidence about democracy. Summary of Bellin's argument can be presented in the

account as inseparable tension to state's political-economy condition.

Singapore: State capitalism and unenthusiastic democratic movement

Until recently Singapore has been celebrated as one of Asia's "economic tiger". But like many other successful Asian countries, Singapore become a paradox of modernization since attached with high level modern attributes does not necessarily pave the

Figure. 1
Capitalist class and democracy

Fear		State dependence	
		High	Low
	High	Anti democracy	Leaning to democracy
	Low	Ambivalent	prodemocracy

Figure.2
The Working Class and democracy

Aristocratic position		State dependence	
		High	Low
	High	Anti democracy	Leaning to democracy
	Low	Ambivalent	prodemocracy

Note: figures are adapted from Eva Bellin, Eva Bellin (2000), 'Contingent Democrats; Industrialist, Labor and Democratization in the Late-Developing Countries', p. 185.

figures below.

The political disposition of the capitalist class and the working class toward democracy is guided by material interest. Changing in political economy condition will change the interest of each class and their political stand on democracy, that in turn prompt the dynamic power relations, conflicts and alliances between social powers to regime change. Economic crisis, globalisation, economic integration and neoliberal adjustment should be taken into

way to democratisation. On the contrary, Singapore evolves into the most consolidated authoritarian regime in Southeast Asia. The emergence and consolidation of authoritarian regime in Singapore is a product of political alliances and conflicts that created by state capitalist development. In this political struggle, PAP become the champion and transformed itself into a state party. There are at least four stages of PAP's evolution to overcome the challenges and pressure from other social pow-

ers. First, PAP succeeded in merging the party with the state through state violence and control towards grass-roots organisation. Second, the state capitalist become the foundation of authoritarianism to co-opt and block a potential emergence of the contingent of democrats. Third, to contain the snowballing effect of democratization, the PAP institutionalised state ideology of state paternalism and the role of technocrat at the expense of political rights

Since firstly established, PAP involved in internal conflict between left factions and educated nationalist led by Lee Kuan Yew. The left faction of PAP was a well organised yet had strong capability to mobilize support from grassroots organization. While the executive of PAP was controlled by Lee's faction that prefers to build a cadre party, it soon prompted to internal tension of the PAP. Parallel with the unification of Singapore into Malaysian Federation, the internal tension mounted in the establishment of Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) in 1961 (Turnbull, 1982: 265-266).

With the power in hand (as the winner of election in 1959) the PAP managed to preserve its political ascendancy and build PAP as a strong state party. Using Internal Security Act (ISA), a law inherited by the British colonial, the Singapore government (PAP) began to suppress their rival. In 1963, security forces arrested hundreds of PAP opponents around the Barisan Sosialis, trade union movement such as Singaporean Association of Trade Union (SATU). Again in 1971, on "the event of May 1971" several senior journalist detained under the ISA act and the freedom of press subordinated by the primacy purpose of the government (George, 2007: 133-134)⁴. Another tool of PAP to guarantee winning conflict over other social forces is the Societies Act

which regulates registration of any organisations of more than ten people (Mauzy, 2006: 56). It has been used as an effective tool to keep away any social groups from political activities.

From the very beginning, PAP realise that to merge the party with the state, it needs strong power base. The state's economic role was initially directed to boost the export-oriented industrialisation through government agencies. The government built Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) to dominate the domestic economy. Companies such as Temasek Holding and Government of Singapore Investment Corporation are significant to put together state economic and political power. The organisation structure of these companies allows the political executive to apply influence to the companies and establish a strong power base to the PAP (Rodan, 2006: 10).

The pattern of Singapore's capitalist development is a simultaneous strategy, on the hand to boost up the economic growth and on the other hand to contain the potential resistance of the capitalist class and the working class. As a consequence, the domestic bourgeoisie have been heavily dependent on state capitalism of the GLCs. Much of Singaporean middle class works within state's department, GLCs or other business that indirectly related to state capitalism such as in commercial and services sector. Moreover, as a preemptive strategy to contain any pressures from independent civil society to the growing absolute of the PAP, the state brings the ideology of meritocracy and technocracy as an exchange for political freedom and civil liberties. This strategy started in the late 70's when the PAP replaced the first generation of leaders to the second generation in the parliament. The criteria of the second generation

⁴Lee Kuan Yew accused several journalis from Nanyang Siang Pau, Eastern Sun, and Singapore Herald involve in 'black operations' against Singapore.

that recruited based on merit and incorporate the military, civil service and GLCs (Rodan, 2006: 11). This description shows that the domination of PAP evolve based on growing coalition among social powers. That is why the capitalist class (or middle class) has no predisposition and capacity of break the state domination in the economic and political sphere. It is different with the case of Korea in the mid 80's, in which private sector become enthusiastic to challenge the state domination on economic. Though it does not always meant for democracy, the private sector assertiveness represents an independent interest that conflicted with state power that can be disseminate democratic forces among civil society (Bellin, 2000: 199).

Similar to the capitalist class, the working class also unenthusiastic support democratisation. Realising that working class is the most important mass based support, the PAP sought to strategically co-opt this section of society. The establishment of National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) was very significant for the PAP to garner electoral support. Politic of subordination to the working class built on material interest benefits to the working class at the expense of control. The material benefits to the working class are the politics of wages through Council of National wages, in which the government have a significant influence on wages (Rodan, 2006: 8).

For the reasons above the capitalist class and the working class in Singapore historically are proven highly dependent on the state and have a high degree of fear and high aristocratic position. The weakness and ambivalence of the contingent of democrats explain the weakness of democratic movement in Singapore. These classes not only fail to arrange coalition to mediate the state power, but they also fails to articulate their economic interest in growing econom-

ic disparity. Interestingly, Although Singapore is one of the most affluent countries in Asia; Singapore's income inequality is in line with those of third world countries. As showed by Verweij and Pelizzo, in 2005, the median monthly income for Singaporean residents was only about US\$1,750 which is below the minimum wage of a fully employed forty-year-old in Britain. It becomes worse since the Singaporean residents works in a longer hour per week of 48 hours. As a result, Singapore's GDP per hour in 2005 is as a level with Slovenia, and just under Trinidad Tobago and Estonia (Verweij & Pelizzo, 2009: 22-23). Life for many Singaporean therefore, considered being stressful and dilemmatic (Lee, 2002: 106). However, the capitalist class and the working class less are confident to articulate their interest. The Singaporean that are fear and susceptible to the PAP claim that the opposition which is lack of experience will mess up the Singapore economy. A significant number of Singaporean has chosen to migrate to other country and raise the phenomena of brain drain, rather than involve in a democratic movement.

For institutionalist scholar such as William Case (Case, 2005) the problems of weak democratic movement in Singapore is influenced by "artful manipulation" of the PAP leaders, for instance in implementing the GRC (Group Representation Constituencies) and creating town councilors to anticipate any kinds of popular confrontation or voters reaction. Similarly, Cherian George with the concept of calibrated coercion shows that with the whole power of repression in hand, PAP used the coercive power to use coercion effectively at minimum cost and hinder the use overt force (George, 2007). Calibrated coercion combines with state domination economic decision making policy become the institutional mechanism to build a political com-

pliance from the society. Nevertheless, as has been showed above, the weakness of democratic movement in Singapore related to the diffident and less enthusiastic from the “contingent democrats”. The explanation of the reluctance rest on the political struggle, conflict and alliance between social forces that influenced by the dynamic of capitalist development. The state capitalism has deprived the political and economic independence of the capitalist class and the working class not only through institutions and regulations but through the merger between state and party. This merger in turn facilitates the consolidation and sophistication of authoritarian regime and. Even though there is an initiative to create an informal political space through various networks such as internet, it is still highly atomized and politically fragmented, so they are lacking the capacity to initiate a collective action.

Malaysia: State Sponsor Capitalist and Weak Democratic Alliance

Similar to Singapore, Malaysia arguably is also a case of resilient authoritarianism, though in lesser degree. Malaysia is also distinguished from Singapore since it allows a limited political opposition in the parliament and civil society. From transition theory point of view, Malaysia has been categorised as competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way, 2002) or electoral authoritarianism (Case, 2009a). With the presence of periodical election and oppositions in the parliament, the authoritarian regime in Malaysia looks less deceptive. However as shown by Mauzy, the domination of authoritarian element in the government is rendered to the ‘unartful manipulation’. The ruling elites use the

coercive tools to curb the political freedom with substantial political and economic cause (Mauzy, 2006: 61).

In contrast to transition theory, from structural point of view, a difference on the degree of authoritarianism between Malaysia and Singapore are linked to the different pattern of capitalist development. Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of democratic movement around the contingent of democrats in Malaysia also affected by the particular capitalist development that wrapped the political struggle, alliance and conflict among social forces. Capitalist development in Malaysia has been characterised by state-sponsored capitalism (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009: 32). The model of state-sponsored development becomes the structural foundation of the ruling *Barisan Nasional* or *Barnas* (National Front) coalition in the process of merging the coalition to the state⁵. Unlike the success story of the merging of PAP and the state in Singapore, the *Barnas* faces complexities to merge the party and the state related to ethnic composition and rivalries between Malays and non-Malays (especially Chinese).

Following the historical racial riots in May 1969, the government sought to create a strong Malay business class, through New Economic Policy (NEP). On the one hand this policy aimed to shorten the economic gap between the Malays and non-Malays, but more than just for economic purposes; the policy was also designed to ensure the integration of the coalition and in turn domination UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) in the *Barnas* coalition⁶. The NEP gave the new structural base for the UMNO through network of patronage between elite and the Malay ethnic. Therefore, the NEP also becomes a

⁵Barisan Nasional is a coalition between Malay ethnic party (UMNO), chinese ethnic party (Malaysian Chinese Association, MCA) and Indian ethnic party (Malaysian Indian Congress, MIC)

⁶The initial economic goals of the policy were to decrease poverty by 15% and to raise the Bumiputra share in corporate equity to 30% by 1990.

strategy to mediate the factionalism in the UMNO (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009b: 313). The implication of using NEP as factionalism mediation is that there always a space though limited, for the opponents of the ruling party to criticise. Challenges and frictions from within UMNO caused by intra elites struggle sometimes use criticism from the external opposition to win the internal struggle. The expulsion of Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Anwar Ibrahim after the financial crisis in 1997 demonstrates the internal struggle over the state's patronage. Basically, the hostility between Mahathir Muhammad and Anwar Ibrahim began from policy standpoint on how to respond the Asian Financial crisis. While Anwar Ibrahim advocated neoliberal policy, Mahathir Muhammad retained to preserve the state sponsor capitalism and the NEP, since this policy contains a huge patronage network that involves the UMNO Elite⁷.

Conflict between Mahathir Muhammad and Anwar Ibrahim turned into a big mass rally that often called as Reformasi in 1999 and open an optimistic hope on democratisation. Maudy argues that the Reformasi movement rose because of unartful manipulation and uncalibrated coercion. Nevertheless, Case's hope on Malaysian politics in the wake of reformasi that the voter will punish the ruling elites, result in the lost of Barnas's parliamentary seats, though it is still not strong enough to topple them.

Why there was an overt social movement in Malaysia following the Asian Financial Crisis, though the social movement was failed to punish the Barnas alliance? Unlike Singapore's case in which state capitalism has produced a cohesive technocratic based on merit bureaucrat and members of parliament and co-opting

all social organization, Malaysia shows a "political opportunity structure" (Weiss, 2009). State-sponsored capitalist development in Malaysia only produced a half way state-party merger. Yet, the NEP inherently contains the dynamic conflict of resources among the UMNO factions (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009: 34). That is why political opportunities for social movement among other social forces depend on the dynamic changing of capitalist development. When the financial crisis swept across Southeast Asia, the personal differences between Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir was growing stronger relating on how UMNO should dealing with indebted UMNO connected companies. Anwar Ibrahim advocated a selected market oriented reform that implicated on reducing if not dismantling the patronage economy, while Mahathir Muhammad, realising political cost of liberal policy, prefers to promote entrepreneurship and state managers (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009: 34).

The 'half merge state party' and yet factionalised opens space for numbers of independent and politically oriented civil society organizations, such as Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN), Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM or Malaysian People's Voice), Sister in Islam and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia. Using contingent democrats approach, the case of Malaysia shows the financial crisis and expected responses from the government jeopardize some growing less dependence of capitalist class's interests. This situation became conducive for the opposition to mobilize against the state power. Nevertheless, the failed of reformasi movement demonstrate the fragmented and unsustainable alliance of the contingent of democrats in Malaysia. Such a reformasi process also occurred in

⁷One of the 'opened to public' cases was the case of Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin that notoriously distributes state patronage to many of his client.

Indonesia. While in Indonesia's case the economic crisis ruined the structural foundation of New Order social power alliance around the oligarchy, Malaysia state-sponsor capitalism still left a fear among the Malay capitalist class, that democratization will take away all the material interest that they have enjoyed (Robison & Hadis, 2004).

The result of 2008 election was often seen as a revival of Reformasi. In the election, the Pakatan Rakyat (People Alliance) showed a remarkable result, with 82 federal parliamentary seats and dominating five states parliament. However, the internal tension among the party of alliance such as a contrast ideology between PAS which assume a conservative Islam ideology and secular view of the DAP and PKR and weak communication among partner in the alliance has put the future of the new alliance in peril (Singh, 2010). It shows that the PR is still a nascent coalition that has limited capacity for political mobilization towards a sustained and strong democratic contingent.

Conclusion

In attempt to explain the strengths and weakness of democratic movement and the obstacle of democracy in Singapore and Malaysia, many literatures argues that political institutions, manipulations and hard and soft coercion of the authoritarian regime are the explanatory factors. While the explanations generated from those factors portray a detailed mechanism of political regime manipulation and dysfunction of social organisations measured by democratic indicators, they disregard the importance of structural factors in shaping the social power in regime formation process.

This essay argues that social movement in the late development countries should

incorporate the pattern of capitalist development that shapes the power struggles, conflicts and alliances among competing social power to form and forge the regime. The nature of capitalist development could become a structural constraint among the contingent of democrats to hail democratisation. Singapore's case shows that state capitalism pave the way to party-state merger and give no space for social and political activism. Malaysia's case shows that party capitalism has laid the structural foundation of the UMNO and the Barisan and become the structural hurdles to build a sustainable alliance for democracy. Nevertheless it does not mean that there is no progress at all. In the two countries, there a growing extra-parliamentary political space, whether it is sponsored by the state or emerges from the hollow of opportunity structure. In Singapore the emergence of blogger politics would likely to make a big impact in the future, meanwhile in Malaysia, combination of social movement around the disappointed middle classes and political space in the internet will also determine the future. In the two countries, the prospect for strong democratic movement will be affected by the dynamic of political economy that changes the material interest and political will among the contingent of democrats.

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1. Naskah dapat berupa artikel hasil penelitian, kajian teoretik Hubungan Internasional, ulasan masalah-masalah internasional, serta resensi atau ulasan buku.
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 - a. Buku
Schulze, Kristen E. (2004). *The Free Aceh Merdeka (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center
 - b. Artikel dalam buku
Appadurai, Arjun. (2002). Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. In: J.X. Inda & R. Rosaldo (eds.). *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 46-64.
 - c. Artikel dalam jurnal
Croissant, Aurel. (2005). Unrest in Southern Thailand: Contours, Causes and Consequences since 2001. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 27 (1), 21-43
 - d. Makalah, skripsi, tesis, disertasi
Leander, A. (2006). The 'Realpolitik of Reason': Thinking International Relations through Fields, Habitus and Practice. In: *International Studies Association Annual Convention, 22-25/03/2006, San Diego*.
Dhakidae, D. (1992). *The State, The Rise of Capital and the Fall of Political Journalism: Political Economy of Indonesian News Industry*. Disertasi PhD tidak diterbitkan, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University.
 - e. Artikel dari internet
Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2000). *1996 census of population and housing: Northern (Statistical Division) Queensland*. [Data file]. Diakses 17 Juli 2004, dari situs elektronik the Australian Bureau of Statistics, <http://www.abs.gov.au>
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