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[Model of integrative border diplomacy in managing harmony between Indonesia and Malaysia: Case of Temajuk, West Kalimantan, Indonesia Iva Rachmawati¹, Machya Astuti Dewi²](#) ¹Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Yogyakarta ² Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Yogyakarta Correspondence: Machya Astuti Dewi (email: machya@upnyk.ac.id) Received: 20 September 2020; Accepted: 27 November 2020; Published: 27 February 2021 [Abstract The discussion about border diplomacy, either by the central government and sub-national actor, is still dominated by the state. The border issues are still considered as part of the security issue that makes the issues belong to the domain of high politics. In turn, this point of view makes the state the only actor in the management of the borderline area and border diplomacy. This paper is going to propose an integrative type of border diplomacy as a model to study borderline diplomacy. This model introduces the roles of the three actors, namely, central government as the main actor, sub-national actors, and non state actors as supporting actors. Based on an empirical study conducted through field research in Temajuk, Sambas, West Kalimantan, Indonesia, this paper argues that the collaboration of the three actors plays an important role in resolving the conflict in the borderland of Indonesia-Malaysia. National government of the Republic of Indonesia, local government of Sambas and Temajuk as sub-national actors, and supporting actors: community, academicians, and local mass media synergized in administering borderline diplomacy. In this interaction, sub-national actors played the most intensive role in seeking the resolution. In turn, this symbiosis supports the harmony between Indonesia-Malaysia in border area. Keywords: central government, harmony, Indonesia-Malaysia relationship, integrative border diplomacy, sub-national actors, supporting actors.](#) Introduction The central government, at the state level, currently dominates the borderline diplomacy of Indonesia in dealing with border conflict and managing the border area with Malaysia. Some bilateral meetings at the ministry level were held to solve the demarcation issues that are now leaving eight Outstanding Border Problems between Indonesia-Malaysia. Meanwhile, the social and political issues were managed in an institution that is named KK Sosek Malindo. However, although in practice, it is held by sub-national actors under the Ministry of Defense since 1983. As a result, the management of the border area, and the diplomacy in dealing with the borderline problems become a limited issue or rarely known and understood by the public. The inadequacy of information about the management of the border area raises various problems in the community. First, the limited information about demarcation has caused the violation of the demarcation line of the country by the citizens. Second, the limitation on the information about the management of border areas has raised the different perceptions of the area that is under conflict. Third, the restriction of public access toward the diplomacy effort by the government has made the disharmony between the state's policy and the public's perception and behavior on the issues of demarcation of the nation. The discord of the public's perception and behavior could be found in several empirical facts on some demarcation conflict with Malaysia. From the preliminary research held by Rachmawati and Dewi (2019) it is found that there was a lot of misinformation about the problem of Tanjung Datu. The misinformation was not only found at the stage of central and local government, the government, and citizens but also in the academic and media writings. Second, there were some intense paradiplomacy activities in dealing with conflicts at a low level

through non-formal ways. However, in a contradictory way, there were different perceptions about the management of the conflict area by many sub-national actors. Third, there were different behavior between the nation and the public in responding to the border issues that are influential to the relationship between countries. In October 2011 the mass media released news about the loss of boundary markers in Camar Bulan hamlet, Temajuk, so that Indonesia national parliament members checked the location. Apart from that, 31 Indonesian citizens from Camar Bulan hamlet were evicted by Malaysian security patrols (Tentara Diraja) from the land they were cultivating (in- depth interview, March 27, 2019). But this incident did not reflect a conflict among Indonesia- Malaysia at the grassroots level. They keep living in harmony, as a result of grassroots diplomacy and sub-national diplomacy. Based on empirical studies on border diplomacy between Indonesia – Malaysia in Temajuk, Sambas, West Kalimantan this paper formulates a new model of border diplomacy in Indonesia. Literature review Most studies on border diplomacy focus on the implementation of cooperation between the countries in managing the border area (Laube, 2109; Tréglodé, 2016). Some of the studies pay attention to difficulties in conducting border diplomacy (Thontowi, 2011; Puddu, 2017; Bautista et al., 2017), and the important role of state in conducting border diplomacy (Rachmawati & Fauzan, 2012; Perwita & Meilisa, 2018). Other research found that local people play an important role as an actor in daily border activities and interactions: shopping, fishing, or visiting and they take advantages from those activities (Musyaqqat, 2019; Bassols & Correa, 2017). But these last studies did not describe how various actors at the grassroots level create the dynamics of border management that in turn implicate the unique and harmonious interaction between people of two countries in the border area. It is the state or government that is perceived as the main actor in border management. In general, the government's effort in handling the management of state's border either in the issue of demarcation or economic and social problems of border areas refers to the definition of border diplomacy. Border area diplomacy is perceived as diplomatic activities that are on central government's business, where it is only central government who has access to the border issues and border diplomacy activities. The state-centric views put the border in the subject of a state's security. The border does not only separate areas that belong to the different communities but also ensure the security of each related area. The state is present at the border to ensure the security of border communities (Balibar, 2004; Walters, 2006; Squire, 201), the [escalation of cross-border policing over time \(Andreas, 2009; Nevins, 2010\)](#), and [migration control through citizenship regimes and deportation \(De Genova & Peutz, 2010; Aas, 2011\)](#). Starke (1972) also stated that the border is an important manifestation of a country and not merely an imaginary line on the surface of the earth. Yet, it is a line that separates one region from the other. In traditional concept of security, demarcation issue is identical to the issue of power. Demarcation issues are put in the same place with defense issues (conventional defense, conventional security) and not as security issues (non-conventional). As a result, the nation becomes a sole interpreter of every form of perception of threat. It does not open the possibility the new actors to entrance, eventhought they might have a contribution in lessening or resolving conflicts. This consideration gets stronger when the demarcation problem is associated with nationalism sentiment, history, race, and other matters that could drag two countries in damaging warfare. Teshome (2009) supposes that demarcation issues is not easy to solve. The state's domination toward border area that emphasize on defense and security yields a development pattern that has centralistic nuance. Then, it neglects the economic reality and prosperity of local community and even the ability of sub-national actors and local community in managing relation, solving border's problem, and taking manner. Concerning the domination of central government in managing

relationship between countries following country's border, Istiqamah (2017) argue that the military approach in diplomacy is an appropriate strategy. The Military is the only agent who can establish the power in the border area (sea). Firmness is needed to maintain the Indonesian government authority from the threats abroad. However, Andika (2017) noted that in the era of global interdependency, there is a rising challenge faced by the state's border. The mutual understanding of a country's demarcation through non- traditional security point of view enables the participation of sub-national actors, even the non- state actors in the management of border area and the border diplomacy. The paradiplomacy roles on border diplomacy ideas can be found in the writings of Miere (2014) concerning maritime diplomacy. Miere's maritime diplomacy was borrowed because state borders were not infrequently located in sea areas. Maritime diplomacy is not only aimed at managing conflicts between countries related to maritime issues through the preparation of international legal instruments, but maritime diplomacy is also the use of assets or resources, especially maritime, to manage relations between countries. The idea of sub-national actors in border diplomacy is also found in the writing of Henrikson (2000). Henrikson explains that demarcation diplomacy is an effort that is not only done by the state actors but also by the non-state actors to maintain the relationship between inter-bordered countries. The demarcation diplomacy is only possible to be administered through what is called the diplomacy of bon voisinage or good neighborhood diplomacy. An important note from Henrikson (2000) is that diplomacy focusing on demarcation must coordinate the interests of central government and the outskirts area in managing demarcations. Both central government and local government of the outskirts area must be able to adapt and coordinate in managing the border area related to the joint interest with the neighboring countries. The idea of involving the sub-national actors comes from Duchacek (in H. Michaelmann & Soldatos, 1990). He proposes the involvement of paradiplomacy in holding the negotiation of state borders. Paradiplomacy urges the involvement of local government in international relations through the foundation of formal and informal, bilateral, or multilateral contacts with foreign parties. The idea of communication transparency has given significant support to them to contribute to the relationship between countries. The privilege to do agreement and cooperation between countries without the presence of the government is an acknowledgment of their role (Bradshaw, 1998; Jordan & Khanna, 1995). The number of agreements and policies that have been parts of the local government's jurisdiction state their autonomy level about the central government (Martínez, 2018). Even Cornago notes that they have important roles in the issues of politics and security between countries. Therefore, they do not only give significant contributions to economic and social issues (Cornago, 2018; Sergounin, 1999; Bustamante & Cañas, 2017). The model of demarcation diplomacy has ever been initiated in Rachmawati and Fauzan (2012) however, in the model, the roles of sub-national actors or non-state actors have not been noticeable.

Method and study area This paper is the result of research that has been done through a qualitative approach with an in- depth interview method and field observation in the village of Temajuk, Sambas, West Kalimantan, Indonesia (see figure 1) during March-April, 2019. Temajuk is located in the North- Western End of Kalimantan Island. This region has minimum public facility such as roadway, communications, and electricity. Because of the great distance and the minimum condition of the roadway, the residents are highly dependent on the main stuff they get from Malaysia. From Temajuk to the nearest village in Malaysia, Kampong Telok Melano it is only needed 10 minutes journey with motorcycle passing through rubber forest. From this village, the residents of Temajuk get their daily needs such as rice grain, cooking oil, sugar, LPG, and so on. Source: Google map (2020) Figure 1. Map of Temajuk The in-depth interview method is used to find the roles of sub-national actors and the local citizens' perceptions of

the conflicts in the border area and their responses to the conflict. Besides, to find the roles of sub-national actors and the local citizens' perceptions, the research also collected scientific papers and media content regarding the related issues. Those documents revealed how academicians perceive the demarcation conflict in Tanjung Datu. Besides, the media contents become a significant source because it becomes a primary reference in the demarcation issues. The data collected from the interview, field observation, and documentation become a foundation of the border diplomacy model that could be an alternative model for managing the borderland issues. All the data categorized and analyzed using a descriptive-qualitative technique. Result and discussion Referring to the high activities of sub-national actors in the border area of Temajuk Village and the limitation of information about the management of border area and demarcation area, this paper proposes a model of border area diplomacy that is not only concentrated on the central government. This model intentionally interprets border diplomacy as an effort to harmonize the management of border area between the bordered countries by placing the demarcation as an important symbol of a state's authority diplomacy is more advocating the harmony through cooperation and dialog in solving and synchronizing the development in the border area and in managing the countries' demarcations. Therefore, the involvement of sub-national actors and non-state actors becomes important as a part of information dissemination and the development of mutual awareness about the management of the state's border area (see figure 2). Adjacent Country Border Diplomacy: Harmonizing border management between adjacent countries and nurturing border as symbol of sovereignty Social Economy Politic National Actor: Subnational Actors: Central Local Government Government (provincial-village government) Supporting Actors: - Academician - Media - Local Community Figure 2. Model of Integrative Border Diplomacy The model of Integrative Border Diplomacy focuses on the importance of harmony in the effort of managing the nation's border area. As a result, the participation of the stakeholders, either the state or the non-state actors, becomes the primary matter. Through the involvement of those actors, at least the information transparency could minimize the misinformation and could develop a mutual understanding about managing the management of the state's border. The mutual understanding and the management of the border area of a country will demand all parties involved in the cooperation in the border diplomacy. Good collaboration and coordination (shown by the dotted line) is a strong foundation for border diplomacy that does not deal with demarcation only but also the management of border areas related to the fields of social, economic, and politics. The national government and demarcation problem The state is the owner of the highest political authority of territory, whether it is the area of the land, the air, and specific maritime area like the territorial sea. The classic international law develops the doctrines where a nation owns a right to propose claims legitimated authority of a territory. As a consequence, the central government, as the legitimate representative of a nation, has any authority to do international agreements related to territory. Besides, although the role of sub-national actors in international cooperation, the state still has an important role in influencing the local or non-central government decisions (Aguirre & Bojórquez, 2018). As a legitimate subject of an international agreement, the central government is also the main actor in border diplomacy. Its role is quite crucial in doing negotiations in deciding the demarcation and giving guarantees that the process of delimitation runs well. The central government of Indonesia inherited agreements that had been made by the colonials. The Dutch and United Kingdom agreed to divide their power area in Kalimantan Island based on the London Treaty on June 20th, 1891, that was signed on September 28th, 1915. In the treaty, the demarcation between Indonesia and Malaysia is mentioned from Sebatik to Tanjung Datu through some border points. After the independence, Indonesia and

Malaysia negotiated about the demarcation line, although not all of them have been agreed. The topography directorate of the army claims that the negotiation of the demarcation area in West Kalimantan has been done from 1973 to 2000 and yielded 20.311 pillars, including the pillars in the area of Tanjung Datu. The accomplishment of the demarcation line has passed through three stages. First, the survey process of determining the demarcation area in 1973, where the two countries agreed to use the agreement between the United Kingdom and Dutch. Second, Indonesia and Malaysia joint survey from 1973-1976 using the watershed method that was successful in agreeing upon several demarcation pegs and building some pillars. Before agreeing the Memorandum of Understanding in 1976, Indonesia asked [for permission to postpone the signing of the MoU because the survey](#) teams from Indonesia found that the area of Malaysia was indented more to Indonesia's area (enclave Camar Bulan). However, Indonesia decided to sign the agreement on the border two years later on November 18th, 1978, in Semarang, which is stated in the Memorandum of Understanding of Demarcation Survey of International Boundary between the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia 1976. The area that became an objection of Indonesia on the MoU of 1976 is located on the peg A 98- A156, whereas Camar Bulan is located on pegs A88=A156. In 2001, the Indonesia survey team did a repetition survey in Enclave Camar Bulan and found some problems. The problem occurred because the Indonesian team did not find the watershed. However, when they made a measurement using a straight line, they could find the demarcation peg. This reason made [Indonesia claimed that the MoU of the demarcation of 1976](#) had some mistakes, [and](#) they must make a review on the demarcation agreement. A new agreement was held in 2011 with based on the review verse of an agreement that is the paper number 48 VCLT 1969. Therefore, Indonesia asked for a change in the possibility of the cancellation of the MoU agreement of 1976. The meeting in 2011 finally re-agreed the content of MoU year 1978. The MoU signed on October 20th, 2019. Case of Temajuk and subnational actors role Temajuk is the name of a village in Paloh sub-district, Sambas Regency, West Kalimantan Province. Geographically, Temajuk Village is directly adjacent to Kampung Melano, which is the territory of the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Temajuk Village is the farthest village from Paloh sub- district with a distance of 55.2 km via the coastal route and 53.8 km by land (BPS, 2018). In the past, Temajuk was very isolated and could only be accessed by sea. Until the 1990s, people could reach Temajuk by traveling along the coast. There is no road to get there, lack of electricity, and cellular signals. During low tide (07.00 AM to 02.00 PM) people could pass the beach by motorbike to go to the district town. In 1999 a road was finally constructed from Ceremai to Temajuk. The construction of this road was followed by the flow of population migration to Temajuk. In 2011 the mass media reported the annexation of one area in Temajuk by Malaysia. It was the dispute over the A-104 boundary mark in Camar Bulan Hamlet. Not long after another news arouse about the construction of a lighthouse by the Malaysian government in the waters of Tanjung Datu which is part of Indonesia's territory ([https://www.pontianakpost.co.id/temajuk-desaperb-border](https://www.pontianakpost.co.id/temajuk-desaperb-border-Indonesia-Malaysia-yang-penuh-problem) -[Indonesia-Malaysia-yang-penuh](#)- problem). [Temajuk](#) then becomes the focus of the attention of the central government, provincial, and district governments. But the minimum presence of the state either in the form of policy or representative, the [low coordination, and the minimum](#) information [about the](#) state's [policy](#) on [border area](#) has made [the local](#) officials [take](#) their [policy](#). In terms of the management of conflict areas in Camar Bulan Enclave, sub-national actors tend to have their views. Usman, ex-chief of Paloh district, states that the conflict should be initiated by the local people to show that they have power in the area: "... the people's homes are not there, but it is the gardening activities that show we have power upon the area. If Malaysia is not there, (there is no Malaysians who stay or do gardening in Camar Bulan Enclave), they are far

away because the people are not willing to stay in the forest except our citizens. There are many of our citizens there. Why? It is because we have to hold it. It means that we are willing to cultivate that. What we are not permitted is burning and destroy. Our citizen seeks for food; it's part of human rights, if we destroy or even for business by selling the land, then it is forbidden, if it is only for gardening and stay there, then it's not a problem." (Personal Interview, March 25, 2019). A different understanding of the management of conflict area management is also found in an interview with Manto Saidi, the former chief of BPPD Sambas. Although from a different point of view, he states that he had ever motivated the citizens to cultivate the land into a farm. "What I am sorry about is the productive land attempted by the people....in 2010 or 2014, there used to be a district radio that could reach Malaysia.... I provoked my people in the district hall so that they make productive land in Camar Bulan enclave. At that moment, the regent responses to my provocation by giving them productive tree seeds. Finally, the local people planted the seeds there, but we informed them that the land could be taken at any time because it is still a land of conflict. We let them know it." (Personal Interview, March 28, 2019). Saidi's reason for motivating the citizens to open a farming land is that he feels that the government did not give any care to the border area in Camar Bulan. If there is a problem at the low level, the central government will provide them with more attention (Personal Interview, March 28, 2019). This opinion was also asserted by Uray Tajudin, the chief of Regional Secretariate of Sambas: "I even suggest them to attach the Malaysian flag to let it chaotic. The chaotic will attract the attention of the central government. If no, then they do not care about it. Who would care if there is no chaos? They do not care, Sir, Maam. So such kinds of things are needed so that the central government sees the border area that needs more attention" (Interview, March 24, 2019). The provocation, which was supported by the local government of Sambas Regency, was continuing by the opening of farming land in the conflict area by the citizen. Thirty-one families open a farming land on the field, and they are known as Group 31. One family built a house on the conflicted land, which was used as a Malaysian protected forest. The farmer's plant peppers, rubbers, palm, banana, and betel nut. In 2017, the government of Sarawak Malaysia sent a letter of objection to the Temajuk Village chief that asked the people not to cultivate the land in the area anymore. Unlike the national government which was reactive with the case of the expulsion of 31 Camar Bulan residents, the head of the Temajuk Cross-border Post said there was nothing that affected the residents regarding the border stake dispute. The relationship between the residents of Temajuk Village and the residents of Kampung Melano, Malaysia, is running as usual. He said: "Just ordinary. At that time Commission II of the National Parliament had come here and I have explained the conditions here. Just ordinary. Temajuk villagers often grow crops in Malaysia. Vice versa. Both of them also do not mind if their land is used for farming (DetikNews, 2012). The activities of the sub-national actors could be noted that they can do cooperate with their counterparts in Malaysia but, at the same time, apply the policy that contradictory to the central government. The cooperation behavior that they do through the friendly visit is, in fact, a definite point of the sub-national actors for the maintenance of the relationship between countries. What they have done could be a part of border diplomacy to manage the issues of social and economic in the border area. However, in contrast, on the policy taking that is contradicting the central government, it could be understood as a behavior that occurs because of the minimum information's border area. The minimum understanding could arise some of the bilateral issues of the two countries (Malau & Priatmojo, 2011). The role of [sub-national actors at the level of village](#) and district is significant in assuring the harmony among communities between the countries through friendly visits. They also become the frontier courtiers in finishing the problems among the communities between countries. In an interview with

Uray Willy, the Government's Department Chief of Economic Matters and Human Natural Resources Department Chief of Regional Secretary of Sambas explained that the social problems that occur among the community between the countries are, in fact, common social problems. Unfortunately, this happens between those who have a different nationality; as a result, the social issue that an ordinary matter changes into a national problem that might be more difficult to solve if it is taken to the formal domain at the intermediate level. The contestations of nationalism between the two communities surely would complicate the problems solving. The local authority usually will abridge the two families to solve the problem in their custom. Either the issue of economy or society in the border area is often tempted to finish at a low level: "If Jokowi uses fried rice lobby, ours is having some coffee in the district office. We should be nice with authority, especially those who are in PLBN Aruk-Biawak by visiting each other" (Personal Interview, March 24, 2019). A friendly visit is used by the local authority to finish the conflicts at the low level (Muhibah), like what is admitted by Usman, "Then to remove the conflicts I visited Tumenggung from Malaysia, the immigration, including the Malaysian police officer. For Tanjung Datu, I visited local authority in Melano. I went there in groups" (Personal Interview, March 25, 2019). Prospective supporting actors Andrianti (2015) claims [that the media has a significant role in](#) international political communication. [The](#) active involvement [of](#) media has produced the term "media diplomacy," which means mass media as a means of running the mission of diplomacy of a country to the other countries. Media also influences the policy because it can frame a particular issue so that it would be influential to the public's support in a specific strategy (Fryberg et al., 2011). Priyowidodo and Indrayani (2012) noted that the framing of Kompas on the marine conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia in 2010. The research found that the framing by media could compel the government to do a bilateral negotiation. However, on the contrary, media also gives a negative contribution to the policy and public's behavior. It happened when media does not provide the right information and cover certain information then the information for the people on particular issue become very limited (Happer & Philo, 2013). The research argument was constructed from data that mentioned that 70% of audience access information through media rather than the first source. In other words, the audience is dependent upon the press. Remarkably, even the media could become the main contributor in conflict through the media content it published (Puddephatt, 2006). Meanwhile, Irwansyah (2016) finds that the minimum understanding of the participant on the community of online media about the state's border gives a negative contribution to the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. Mass media influence the problems between Indonesia and Malaysia. The contents that tend to be provocative become public consumption, so it triggers the wrong perception about the condition of the border area and the management of the border area. Some of the media in Indonesia give false information about the case of Camar Bulan, Temajuk. The headline "Malaysia Devours Republic Indonesia's Territory in Camar Bulan, West Kalimantan" was reported by DetikNews (DetikNews, 2011) that rapidly spread to the public of Indonesia. Another online media: Liputan6 reported the same news with the title "Malaysia Caplok Wilayah RI" (Liputan6.com, 2011). For the two countries, the border issue is a very sensitive matter. As a result, the public insists the government solve the 1.440 hectares land of Indonesia that is claimed as the territory of Malaysia in the pegs number A88-A156 and the area as wide as 80.000 m² in Tanjung Datu (Puji, 2011). But soon after, DetikNews released new information regarding the issue. On January 10, 2012, DetikNews released a headline: "Not Confusing Patok, Residents of Camar Bulan Harmonious with Malaysia" (DetikNews, 2012). Another potential actor is academics. In managing the Indonesia-Malaysia border, several universities in Indonesia have formed the Higher Education Forum

for State Border. The aim is to improve border governance through the soft power aspect. This forum has collaborated with the National Agency for Border Management to conduct border studies, increase the capacity of village government officials at the border, and accelerate development at the border. Some programs already developed: professors teach at the border, social work, and open schools at the border (FGD, August 3, 2020). Several roles and influences by the three actors in the issues of border area become the argument for the model of integrative border diplomacy. The three actors are related through a coordinative and cooperative relationship. Through proper coordination and cooperation in the issues of the border area, the border diplomatic sentiment from the domestic public. Meanwhile, the sub-national actors would work at a different level by referring to the central government policy. Conclusion The Model of Integrative Border Diplomacy is an alternative approach for the effort of the state's border diplomacy that acknowledges the role of sub-national [actors and non-state actors](#) besides [the](#) primary function [of the](#) central government. This model placed border diplomacy as an attempt to harmonize the management of border areas between countries that have a direct board by placing the demarcation as a symbol of the state's sovereignty. Therefore the collaboration of cooperation among the three actors could yield positive strategies not only for the effort of determining the demarcation but also for maintaining the states' border area. The First actor, namely, the central government plays its role as the main actor in negotiation about demarcation the [cooperation in the field of](#) social [and](#) economy of [the border](#) area. The Second actor that is the sub-national actor takes the role of the leading actors in managing the direct interaction among citizens in the border area. They are also the actors that would initiate the needed cooperation and in line with the citizen in the border area. Meanwhile, the third actor, namely, the media, academics, and local community, are the supporting actors that become the think tank of the state in disseminating information about the policy and condition of the border area. Together with academics, the central government would be able to have a study on the management of the state's border area.

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