

Implementation of Good Corporate Governance and Financial Performance: Lessons from Telecommunication and Technology Sector in South East Asia

Didi Achjari

Universitas Gadjah Mada

Sri Suryaningsum

UPN "Veteran" Yogyakarta

Ratna Candra Sari

Yogyakarta State University

Abstract: *Implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) has been interesting topics in Indonesia as well as in many other countries. The current study aims to investigate GCG implementation especially in communication and technology companies in ASEAN countries. GCG implementation is measured using some surrogates such as corporate action, GCG elements in organization structure, public ownership, audited financial report, and return of total assets. Samples used in this study are technology and telecommunication companies from six ASEAN countries. Data obtained from OSIRIS database from year 2005 to 2007 is examined using regression analysis. The study finds factors influencing net profit vary across the countries. In Indonesia, public ownership and corporate action affect net profit. In Malaysia, the influencing factors are corporate action, public ownership independence, quality of audited financial report, and return of total assets. Meanwhile, in Singapore the significant factors are corporate action, public ownership independence, and return of total assets. Further, Thailand's results show that all variables are significant. However, Philippine's results suggest that not all variables are significant. Lastly, in Vietnam, corporate actions, the number of GCG members and return of total assets influence the net profit.*

Keywords: *Good Corporate Governance (GCG), ASEAN, corporate action, completeness of GCG organisation structure, public independency indicator, telecommunication and technology company.*

1. Introduction

The economic turmoil hit ASEAN region in 1997-1999. The crisis which began in Thailand spread out to most countries in South East Asia and also other Asian countries. Many companies in these countries that did not implement good corporate governance were collapsed. Learning from that crisis, countries in ASEAN region then require companies especially in stock exchange to implement *good corporate governance*. Therefore, the GCG has been implemented in the stock exchange in South East Asia countries since 2000.

The current research aims to show the implementation of *good corporate governance* in telecommunication and technology companies in South East Asia countries that have capital market. This research does not study nor compare the differences amongst the countries, but to provide broad pictures of the GCG principles implementation in the communication and technology industry in ASEAN countries that have capital market: Malaysia, Singapura, Thailand, Pilipina, Indonesia, dan Vietnam. In addition, this research focuses on the telecommunication and technology industry in South East Asia countries based on the following reasons. Firstly, existing studies do not specifically discuss the industrial sector which is an interesting factor. This is due to each sector of industries may have different regulation. For example, particular industries are highly regulated, like the banking and airline sectors. Secondly, the telecommunication and technology companies are considered as blue chip companies in many stock exchanges. By focussing on telecommunication and technology companies, this research attempts to contribute on the understanding of contributing factors that affect the profit gain. Thirdly, to focuses on communication and technology sector, this study can get detail information on the subject, which in turn, will help the researchers to understand the characteristic of pertinent sector.

The implementation of GCG principles is indicated by some variables: transparency of reported corporate action, the quality of financial report, public ownership, management performance, and GCG organisation structure. Transparency of company action is included as the implementation of non-financial transparency aspect. Company action, as far as the authors aware, has never been tested in previous GCG research in Indonesia. The GCG organisation structure is measured by the number of GCG members in company. Wedari (2004) states that the

existence of GCG organisation structure is measured using audit committee proxy, which is stated by 'available' or 'not available'. A study by Herawaty (2008) suggests that the existence of independent commissioners is a proxy for organisation structure. Meanwhile, Nuryaman (2008) applies the proportion of independent commissioner to the total number of the company's board of commissioner. Hence, our opinion, the proxy of GCG administration team is not only independent commissioner and/or audit committee. Both are just parts of the GCG organisation structure. The complete GCG organisation structure consist of independent commissioner, remuneration committee, audit committee, legal committee, compliance committee, mitigation committee, and corporate secretary. During the initial GCG implementation in 2001, Bapepam issued a guidance on the composition of GCG organisation board, which consist of minimum three components: independent commissioner, audit committee, and corporate secretary.

The ownership concentration is measured using indicator of the independency of public ownership provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This is a new approach in the research of GCG in Indonesia, since the ownership concentration is usually indicated by other proxy, for instance managerial or institutional ownership (Midiastuty & Machfoedz, 2003; Wedari, 2004; Siregar & Siddarta, 2006; Herawaty, 2008), and ultimate ownership (Siregar, 2008).

II. Theoretical approach

2.1 Net Profit.

Net profit is an instrument to measure the company's operational performance. It measures the success or failure of a business in achieving target of its operation (Parawiyati, 1996). Financial report is one of the signals from the company for external parties. *Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts* (SFAC) No. 1 (1978) stated that the main user of financial report are investors and creditors, and it indicates that the main focus of financial report is the information about the company's profit. *Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts* (SFAC) No.1 (1978) also stated that the financial report should deliver useful information for the investors and creditors, both existing and potential ones, in deciding the policy of investment, credit, and other decisions. Investor and creditor use the profit to: (a) Evaluate the management

performance. (b) Estimate the *earning power*. (c) Predict the future profit. (d) Assess the investment risk or the company's loan (SFAC no.1).

Creditors can use the net profit information to make a loan decision and to assess the credit risk. The use of net profit to assess securities has been conducted in many stock exchanges (Ball dan Brown, 1968; Beaver dan Dukes, 1972; Sloan, 1996). Sloan (1996) evaluates the information content in terms of accrual and cash flow components. He tries to see whether or not the information is reflected in the stock price. Sloan (1996) also shows that the stock price will react if the investor '*fixate*' (believe) on the profit. Sloan's research (1996) was consistent with the fixation of profit by some of stock market participant on the total reported profit without considering the size of accrual and cash flow components. Mispricing phenomenon which was shown in Sloan's (1996) research indicates that there is a tendency of over-focussing on the reported profit in the stock exchange.

Carlsaw and Kaplan (1991) found that companies that show negative profit request their auditor to schedule the audit process quite late than the supposed schedule. This leads to delay of financial report. The research argues that a company will tend to postpone its financial report if there is a 'bad news' in its report because it will affect the profit quality. A company which has good (high) profitability can be said as having a 'good news' in its financial report. As a consequence, a company which has a 'good news' tend to submit its financial report on time, and vice versa.

2.2. Corporate Action

Corporate action is the actions taken by a company which is announced to public. This is a reflection of a good administration and public transparency on the non-financial aspect. In this term, corporate action - both national and multi national company - will also affect the stock price. *Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing* (2008) states that a complete format of *corporate action* included all values, consisting of: *company meeting, listing status change, announcement, preferential offer, bonus, new listing, buy back, issuer name change, preference conversion, local code change, arrangement, security description change, international code change, sedol change subdivion, take over*, and so on.

2.3. GCG Team in Organisation Structure

Total number of member of GCG organisation structure can be taken as the completeness of organisation structure as an implementation of GCG principal which was required by the regulator. This variable is chosen considering the possibility of incomplete GCG organisation structure existence, for example merely director and commissioner. Some countries have similar requirements to be implemented in GCG. The requirements are independent commissioners, audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, compliance committee, legal committee, and risk committee. In Indonesia, according to Bapepam guidelines in 2001, the completeness of GCG organisation structure consist of independent commissioners, audit committee, and company secretary.

Some research show that there is an effect of size and composition of board of director in company activities. The size and composition of board of director can affect the effectivity of monitoring activity. The size and composition of *board of director* also affect the relation between managerial ownership and institutional ownership on the company's performance. According to Pfeffer (1973) the increase in size and diversity of *board of director* will benefit the company since it will expand the network and guarantee the availability of resources.

Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that by including *outside directors*, the performance of the board will improve and it can minimize the management expropriation to the shareholder's welfare. In doing so, audit committee facilitates a formal communication between the board, management, external and internal auditor (Bradbury et al., 2004). Audit committee acts as the mediator when disputes occur between the management and auditors on the interpretation and implementation of generally accepted accounting principles (Klien, 2002). Anderson *et al.* (2003) investigated the relation between the characteristics of commissioners, financial report integrity, and the *cost of debt*.

2.4. Public Ownership

Problems of ownership concentration in Indonesia indicate the agency problem between the dominant and minority stock owners occurs because of the separation between the cash flow right and control right (Siregar, 2008). This is different with a study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that separates ownership and control. Machfoedz (2008) states that shareholder voice function indicates that commissioner is also responsible to increase the voice of owner (investors) to increase the company's value. Claessens *et al.*(1999) defined the expropriation as a

process which is used by the controlling share holder to maximize their own wealth or redistribute the wealth from other parties through the controlling power. Claessens *et al.* (1999, 2000) studied the expropriation of minority share holder in public companies in nine Asian countries by investigate impact of differentiation of cash flow and control rights to the company's value, and observing the ownership structure of companies.

Pyramid ownership and cross ownership are two most common mechanism used by the controlling shareholder to increase the control exceeds the financial claim to the company. The concentrated ownership may relate to low level of law enforcement (La Porta *et al.*, 1998 dan 2000). The results of La Porta *et al.* (1998) study may be understated due to the use of direct ownership data, not the ultimate ownership. By adopting La Porta *et al.* (1999) methodology, Claessens *et al.*, (1999, 2000) studied the controlling share holder which consist of individual, family or institution which have control in a company, both definite and indefinite, at the cut-off level of certain privileges. In regard to ownership concentration, Morck *et al.* (2004) argue that the majority share holders which effectively control the company will also control the reported accounting information. La Porta *et al.* (2002) and Claessens *et al.* (2002) found that the ownership concentration in *cash flow rights* will increase the company's value.

2.5. Quality of Audited Financial Report

Public accountant is one of the most important parties to produce a qualified financial report for the stock exchange. Public accountant's role is to provide assurance that financial report made by the management is free of material misstatement. The assurance is given by the public accountant through their opinion. According to PSA 29 SA article 508 in 'Standard of Public Accountant Profession' there are five categories of public accountant's opinion: (1) *unqualified opinion*; (2) *unqualified opinion with explanatory language*; (3) *qualified opinion*; (4) *adverse opinion*; and (5) *disclaimer opinion*. Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) stated that lateness in financial report positively related with audit opinion. Companies receiving other than *unqualified opinion* tend to have longer *audit delay* or tend to give their financial report not in the expected time frame. On the other hand, companies that obtain *unqualified opinion* from the auditor tend to submit their financial report on time.

2.6. Hypothesis

Gleaned from the literatures mentioned above, the current research proposes research model as shown in Figure 1 (see the Exhibit):

$$\text{Net Profit for each country} = a + b_1 \text{Public Ownership} + b_2 \text{Number of GCG structure} + b_3 \text{Corporate Action} + b_4 \text{Quality of Audited Financial Report} + b_5 \text{Return of Total Assets} + e$$

Therefore, based on the research model, hypothesis for this research is formulated as follows:

H1: *Corporate Actions*, public ownership, the number of GCG structure, quality of audited financial report, and return of total assets influence net profit in information and communication technology companies in Indonesia, Thailand, Phillipine, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

III. Research Methodology

3.1. Sample and Population

The population of this research is annual report of telecommunication and technology companies registered in the stock exchange in six South East Asia countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philipine, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. To see the consistency of each independent variable to the dependent ones, the year of 2005, 2006, and 2007 are chosen for the research. Samples used in this research are taken using the following criterias:

1. The companies are registered in stock exchange in ASEAN countries.
2. Industry classification: communication and technology industry, based on *Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)*.
3. The closing of accounting period is 31 December.

Having applied above criterias, finally, total of 531 samples from year 2005 to 2007 were collected that consist of companies from Indonesian (38), Thailand (96), Philipines (45), Malaysia (192), Singapore (143) and Vietnam (24). The samples were taken from 177 communication and technology companies.

3.2. Variables

Dependent variable in the current study is net profit (logged). Meanwhile, *independent variables* are as follow:

1. Indicator of public ownership independency by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing.
2. Corporate action.
3. Quality of audited report.
4. Return on Total Asset
5. Total number of GCG organisation structure

These variables are then operationalized as:

1. Net profit is the profit achieved from net profit after the annual tax.
2. Number of communication and technology companies is the total number of communication and technology companies in each country.
3. Independency indicator by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). According to OSIRIS Data Guide (2003), BvDEP ownership indicator for ASEAN countries are: A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C+, C, C-, D, and U. The highest level '11' is equal to A+, while the lowest level '1' is equal to 'U' (*unknown*). The indicator of independency is used to help the users in identifying independent companies by marking their degree of independency based on the shareholders. The 'A' indicator will be company with non-registered owner less than 24,99%, both direct and total ownership. BvDEP classifies further the A level into A+, A, and A-. The 'B' indicator is given to company with percentage of registered ownership, both direct and total ownership, no more than 49,99%, but has one or more shareholders with more than 24,99% ownership. BvDEP also classified this grade into B+, B, and B-. The 'C' indicator is provided to company with registered ownership, either direct or total, more than 49,99%. The 'C' indicator indicates an *ultimate ownership*. The 'U' indicator is assigned to company which is not belong to A, B, or C, categories, which indicated an unknown degree of independency.
4. Corporate action is activity conducted by the company and announced to public which can be regarded as company transparency and good administration from nonfinancial aspect. Corporate action that can be both national and international level may influence the share price. Corporate action is measured by the number of activities published or announced to public (ratio scale).

5. Quality of audited report is level of opinion of audited financial report, where score 4 for unqualified opinion, score 3 for unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph, score 2 for no opinion, and score 1 for unaudited.
6. GCG organisation structure is the completeness of organisation structure as the implementation of GCG which is required by the regulator. Each country has similar requirement to be implemented in GCG for instance independent commissioners, audit committee, remuneration committee, compliance committee, nomination committee, legal committee, and risk committee.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

In this stage, there are some tests performed: normality, [multicollinearity](#), [heteroscedasticity](#), and [autocorrelation](#). To handle outlier data, *missing value-exclude cases listwise program* was performed using SPSS. Before testing the hypotheses, the data is firstly tested in terms of data model regression feasibility, *overall model fit*, and regression coefficient. [The results](#) show that no problem found from these tests (the results are attached in Exhibit).

The results of regression analysis in six ASEAN countries are presented in following subsections:

4.1. Malaysia

There are 192 communication and technology companies listed in Malaysia. However, only 130 companies satisfy all the GCG characteristics: the corporate actions, quality of audited report, ownership independency, return and total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure in three continuous years (2005, 2006, and 2007). In terms of corporate action, the average value is 8.39. Ownership indicator score is 7.65 that shows the value between 7 and 8. The value of '7' is equal to 'B', while the value of '8' is equal to B+.

The average score of audited report quality is 3.92. It means that most of the communication and technology companies in Malaysia indicate good quality of audited report (unqualified opinion). The average log of net profit is 3.1916 that is lower than Singapore (3.9191), Thailand (3.8218), Phillipines (4.0365), and Indonesia (3.558). In terms of number of GCG organisation structure, the average score for Malaysia is 4.92.

Regression results show that value of *Adjusted R Square* is 0.530. It means that 53% of net profit variable can be explained by the number of companies in the country, corporate action, the quality of audited report, ownership independency, return of total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure. Result of ANOVA test shows that F score is 30.094 with 0.000 significancy. Which suggests the model of regression using variables of, number of companies, corporate actions, public ownership, return of total assets, and number of GCG organization structure affecting the net profit. Summary of statistic results including the regression coefficient for Malaysia is presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Results of regression analysis suggest that three out of five variables significantly influence net profit. Two variables - independency ownership and number of GCG organisation structure - do not affect net profit. The three factors that affect net profit achievement in 2005-2007 consist of two positive variables and one negative variable. The positive factors are corporate actions and return of total assets. Meanwhile, the negative factor is quality of audited report. *Return of total asset* reflects total assets performance to obtain return. In Malaysia, return of total assets affects the net profit in telecommunication and technology companies. It means that investment on assets is an important and significant factor in the net profit achievement.

4.2. Singapore

The total samples of 143 companies were collected from Singapore data. However, only 92 samples that can be analyzed due to data comprehensiveness. Results of Singapore data analysis show that corporate actions average score is 14.24. Further, ownership variable shows the value of 6.83. According to Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2008), value of 6 is equivalent to B-, while value of 7 is equivalent to B. Then, average score of quality of audited report in Singapore is 3.9191 with standard of deviation of 0.552. This means that most of the communication and technology companies in Singapore indicate very good quality of audited report (unqualified opinion).

In terms the average log of net profit, the value for Singapore is 3.9191, which is lower than Phillipines, but higher than other countries. Average log of net profit in Thailand is 3.8218. Philipine shows the highest average log of net profit that is 4.0365. While scores for Indonesia and Vietnam are 3.558 and 2.9079, consecutively. The result of the average number of GCG organisation structure completeness in Singapore is 4.92.

Regression results show that value of *Adjusted R Square* is 0.530. It means that 53% net profit can be explained by the number of the companies, the corporate actions, the quality of audited report, ownership independency, return ot total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure. Result of ANOVA test shows that F score is 30.094, with 0.000 significance level which suggest that the model of regression that consist of corporate actions, ownership independency, return of total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure, affect the net profit. Summary of statistic results including the regression coefficient for Singapore are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Regression analisys shows that there are four variables which significantly affect net profit. They are corporate action, ownership independency, return of total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure completeness. The only variable that is not significant is quality of audited report.

4.3 Thailand

Statistic descriptive results show that in 2005-2007 the average score for corporate actions is 14.01. Then, quality of audited financial report shows an average of 3.93, which is close with unqualified opinion value (the highest value is four). The log of net profit is 3.8218. Public ownership score in Thailand is 6.78. The value 6 is equivalent to B- and value 7 is equivalent to B. Meanwhile, the score for return of total assets is 10.30 and the number of organisation structure score is 2.64. Summary of statistic results for Thailand is presented in Table 3.

Table 3

Regression result shows that value of *Adjusted R Square* is 0.597. This means that 59% net profit variable can be explained by the number of the companies, the corporate actions, the quality of audited report, ownership independency, return of total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure. Result of ANOVA test shows that **F score** is 20.564 with 0.000 significance.

The results of regression analysis show that all variables affect the net profit in communication and technology companies in Thailand. The case of GCG implementation in Thailand is interesting since it is the only country in ASEAN where all variables significantly affect net profit. This fact may be due to the implementation of GCG in Thailand as soon as economic turmoil erupted in 1997.

4.4 Phillipines

Based on the year 2005-2007 data, communication and technology companies in Phillipines show an average score of corporate actions is 12.48. The quality of audited financial report variable shows an average score of 4 which means that the quality of audited report is very good. Audited financial report variable is then excluded because all variables have a value of 4 with no standard deviation.

The average score of public ownership variable for Phillipines is 4.74, which is between 4 and 5. The value of 4 or C in BvDEP public independency indicator means that one of the shareholders has more than 49.99% of the total share. The value of 5 is equivalent with C+. Furthermore, the average value of return of total assets variable in Phillipines is 19.9178 with 19.577 of deviation standard. The number of organisation structure variable shows an average value of 3.61. Quality of audited financial report shows an average value of 4 with 0.00 deviation standard. This result may explain why the regression model result is not a good one. Summary of statistical results for Phillipines is presented in Table 4.

Table 4

Regression result shows value of *Adjusted R Square* is 0.253 that means 25% of net profit variable can be explained by the independent variables. Result of ANOVA test shows that **F**

score is 28.65 with 0.053 significance level. This suggests that in Phillipine case, the model of regression fail to proof that these five independent variables influence net profit.

In Phillipine case, the result of regression analysis shows that all independent variables do not affect the net profit in communication and technology companies. The results are idiosyncratic since Phillipine is the only country in ASEAN whose all variables are not significant. The results are the opposite with Thailand. Hence, considering the results, the implementation of *good corporate governance* in communication and technology companies in Phillipines may not yet become a major issue.

4.5. Indonesia

The average score for corporate actions in Indonesia (2005-2007) is 16.71. The quality of audited financial report indicates an average of 3.88, with 0.612 standard of deviation. It means that almost all data are close with unqualified opinion. The value of public ownership variable in Indonesia is 3.13 which is between values of 3 and 4. The value of 3 is equivalent to C- and 4 is equivalent to C.

The return of total assets in Indonesia is 6.6038. Interestingly, the number of organisation structure as part of GCG completeness shows an average of 1 with deviation standard is 0.00. This means that all the communications and technology companies in Indonesia has only 1 GCG organisation structure. Summary of statistic results for Indonesia is presented in Table 5.

Table 5

The regression result (without GCG organisation structure independent variable) shows value of *Adjusted R Square* of 0.706. ANOVA test shows that **F score** is 14.781 with 0.000 level of significance. This shows that the model of regression using variables of corporate actions, ownership independency, quality of audited report, and return of total assets affect the net profit.

Results of regression analysis in Indonesia show that public ownership and corporate actions variables influence net profit in communication and technology companies in Indonesia. However, the impact of quality of audited report and return of total assets on net profit are not significant.

4.6 Vietnam

An average score of corporate actions in the sample companies in Vietnam during year 2005-2007 is 1.84. The quality of audited report variable shows an average score of 3.68, that is lower than the average of ASEAN counterparts (3.91). The value of public ownership in Vietnam is 1 that is equivalent to 'U' which means 'unidentified'. The variable is then excluded from the [data analysis](#) since its standard of deviation is 0. In general, it means that public ownership in telecommunication and technology companies in Vietnam is not an important information for public. Next, the value of return of total assets variable is 12.888. In addition, the number of organisation structure variable shows an average score of 2.05.

Regression analysis for Vietnam consists of four independent variables: corporate actions, number of GCG organisation structure, quality of audited financial report, and return of total assets. The results are shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6

Regression analysis indicates *Adjusted R Square* is 0.912. ANOVA test shows F score is 47.35 with 0.000 significance level. This shows that four independent variables significantly influence net profit. Furthermore, the results also indicate that corporate actions, number of GCG organisation structure, and return of total assets significantly affect net profit. Nevertheless, quality of audited report does not have significant impact on net profit.

5. Discussion and Summary

The study of GCG implementation in communication and technology companies in six ASEAN countries shows mixed results. In Malaysia, regression analysis results show that corporate actions, return of total assets and quality of audited report significantly affect the achievement of net profit. In Singapore, these variables are significant: corporate actions, public ownership independency, return of total assets, and number of GCG organisation structure. Unfortunately, the effect of quality of audited report on net profit achievement is not significant.

In communication and technology companies in Thailand, the regression results indicate that all independent variables are significantly influence net profit. Thailand, therefore

become the only country in ASEAN whose all independent variables are significant. This may indicate that the implementation of GCG in Thailand has been well established.

In terms of Phillipines, Indonesia and Vietnam, each country has one variable which is excluded from the independent variables since its standard of deviation is 0.00. For Phillipines case, the excluded variable is quality of audited financial report. Unfortunately, four independent variables do not significantly affect net profit achievement. The results of Phillipines are interesting since it is the only country in ASEAN that all variables are not significant. In addition, the results are the opposite of Thailand's. In Indonesia, the regression analysis using four dependent variables suggest that public ownership and corporate actions variables significantly influence net profit achievement. While in Vietnam, the regression results show that corporate actions, number of GCG organisation structure, and return of total assets significantly affect the net profit achievement.

Finally, the current research contributes in developing the GCG organisation structure variable, especially in the context of communication and technology companies in ASEAN. The development of more comprehensive proxy is an improvement of proxies of GCG completeness that are previously developed, for instance, by Wedari (2004), Herawaty (2008), and Nuryaman (2008). In the current study, the more comprehensive proxy for GCG organisation structure consists of independent commissioners, remuneration committee, audit committee, legal committee, compliance committee, mitigation committee, and corporate secretary.

There are some opportunities for future research. Instead of the total number of board of commissioners member, further research may use the proportion of total number of GCG organisation structure with the total number of board of directors and commissioners. Public ownership variable can also be developed further on the basis of types of the shareholders origin, which are domestic and foreign shareholders. In addition, ownership based on institutions (government institutions, private institutions or others) can also be further investigated. This will deeply enhance the understanding on shareholders structure.

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VII. EXHIBIT

Figure 1
Research Model




Table 1: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Malaysia

Variable	Descriptive Statistics			Model Summary		ANOVA		Coefficient			
								Coef.Unstand.			
	Rata-rata	Std. Dev.	N	Adj. R ²	Stand Err of the	F	Sig	B	Std. Error	t	Sig

					est.						
Lababersih	3.1916	0.8175	130	0.530	0.56048	30.094	0.000	3.421	0.638	5.359	0.000
AksiPersh	8.39	5.802	130					0.078	0.009	8.411	0.000
KualitasLap	3.92	0.344	130					-0.496	0.148	-3.350	0.001
Independensi	7.65	3.366	130					0.000	0.015	0.025	0.980
RoTA	11.603	8.493	130					0.048	0.006	8.051	0.000
JumlStruktur	4.92	5.802	130					0.103	0.053	1.955	0.053

Table 2: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Singapura

Variable	Descriptive Statistics			Model Summary		ANOVA		Coefficient			
	Rata-rata	Std. Dev.	N	Adj. R ²	Stand Err of the est.	F	Sig	Coef.Unstand.		t	Sig
	B	Std. Error									
Lababersih	3.9195	0.73225	92	0.349	0.59085	10.754	0.000	3.250	0.481	6.761	0.000
AksiPersh	14.24	7.925	92					0.040	0.009	4.669	0.000
KualitasLap	3.88	0.552	92					-0.013	0.120	-0.108	0.915
Independensi	6.83	3.654	92					-0.068	0.019	-3.669	0.000
RoTA	11.0226	9.71893	92					0.020	0.007	2.988	0.004
JumlStruktur	4.72	1.712	92					0.083	0.037	2.265	0.026

Table 3: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Thailand

Variable	Descriptive Statistics			Model Summary		ANOVA		Coefficient			
								Coef.Unstand.			
	Rata-rata	Std. Dev.	N	Adj. R ²	Stand Err of the est.	F	Sig	B	Std. Error	t	Sig
Lababersih	3.8218	0.868	67	0.597	0.5518	20.564	0.000	4.147	1.043	3.976	0.000
AksiPersih	14.01	7.831	67					0.055	0.010	5.656	0.000
KualitasLap	3.93	0.265	67					-0.604	0.263	-2.295	0.025
Independensi	6.78	3.915	67					0.044	0.020	2.230	0.029
RoTA	10.3073	7.364	67					0.047	0.010	4.888	0.000
JumlStruktur	2.69	1.459	67					0.182	0.056	3.234	0.002

Table 4: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Phillipine

Variable	Descriptive Statistics			Model Summary		ANOVA		Coefficient			
								Coef.Unstand.			
	Rata-rata	Std. Dev.	N	Adj. R ²	Stand Err of the est.	F	Sig	B	Std. Error	T	Sig
Lababersih	4.0365	1.267	23	0.253	1.09552	28.65	0.053	3.522	0.763	4.619	0.000
AksiPersih	12.48	6.934	23					0.052	0.042	1.222	0.237

KualitasLap	4	0.000	23					-	-	-	-
Independensi	4.74	3.570	23					0.090	0.087	1.026	0.319
RoTA	19.9178	19.577	23					0.013	0.014	0.939	0.360
JumlStruktur	3.61	1.994	23					-0.227	0.123	-1.852	0.081

Table 5: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Indonesia

Variable	Descriptive Statistics			Model Summary		ANOVA		Coefficient			
	Rata-rata	Std. Dev.	N	Adj. R ²	Stand Err of the est.	F	Sig	Coef.Unstand.		T	Sig
								B	Std. Error		
Lababersih (konstansta)	3.558	1.343	24	0.706	0.7289	14.781	0.000	4.632	1.035	4.476	0.000
AksiPersh	16.71	7.515	24					-0.059	0.025	-2.351	0.030
KualitasLap	3.88	0.612	24					-0.339	0.249	-1.360	0.190
Independensi	3.13	3.288	24					0.394	0.080	4.921	0.000
RoTA	6.6308	7.555	24					-0.001	0.031	-0.043	0.966
JumlStruktur	1	0.00	24					-	-	-	-


Table 6: Regression Results of Telecommunication and Technology Companies in Vietnam

Variable	Descriptive Statistics			Model Summary		ANOVA		Coefficient			
	Rata-rata	Std. Dev.	N	Adj. R ²	Stand Err of the est.	F	Sig	Coef.Unstand.		T	Sig
								B	Std. Error		
Lababersih (konstanta)	2.9079	0.757	19	0.912	0.22545	47.35	0.000	1.899	0.270	7.024	0.000
AksiPersh	1.84	2.007	19					-0.259	0.028	-9.211	0.000
JumlStruktur	2.05	1.177	19					0.469	0.052	8.932	0.000
KualitasLap	3.68	0.749	19					0.028	0.081	0.343	0.736
RoTA	12.888	5.416	19					0.033	0.011	2.974	0.010
Independensi	1	0.00	19					-	-	-	-

Table 7: Summary of Results

Lokasi	Corp Action	Quality of Financial Report	Ownership Independency	Return on Total Aset	Number of GCG Structure
Malaysia	√	√	-	√	-
Singapura	√	-	√	√	√
Thailand	√	√	√	√	√
Philipina	-	■	-	-	-
Indonesia	√	-	√	-	■
Vietnam	√	-	■	√	√

√ = influence

 = deleted (standar deviation value is 0.00)

Biodata Singkat Penulis:

Didi Achjari adalah staf pengajar Fakultas Ekonomika dan Bisnis Universitas Gadjah Mada sejak tahun 1994. Gelar sarjana ekonomi akuntansi (S.E.) diraihnya tahun 1993 dari FE-UGM. Pendidikan S2 diselesaikan tahun 1999 dengan gelar Master of Commerce (M.Com) dari the University of New South Wales, Sydney. Pendidikan doktoral (D.B.A.) diselesaikan pada tahun 2003 dari Curtin University of Technology, Perth. Bidang penelitian penulis adalah system informasi akuntansi, adopsi dan penerapan teknologi informasi, *e-commerce*, dan *e-government*.

Sri Suryaningsum adalah dosen FE UPN Veteran Jogjakarta sejak tahun 1997. Gelar S.E. diraih tahun 1995 dari Universitas Brawijaya. Pendidikan S2 diselesaikan pada tahun 2002 dari Magister Sains UGM, dan saat ini sedang menempuh S3 di UGM.

Ratna Candra Sari adalah dosen FE UNY sejak tahun 2007. Gelar S.E. diraih tahun 2000 dari UNS. Pendidikan S2 diselesaikan pada tahun 2005 dari Magister Sains UGM, dan saat ini sedang menempuh S3 di UGM.

